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WIELDING HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROCEDURE TO TEMPER THE HARMS OF 
GLOBALIZATION:   COSTA RICA’S BATTLE OVER THE 
CENTRAL AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
ALBERTO R. COLL* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
On May 28, 2004, the United States and the five small Central 
American countries of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Guatemala, El 
Salvador, and Honduras signed the Central American Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA), followed by the Dominican Republic on 
August 5.1  In the next few months, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Guatemala, and Nicaragua quickly ratified.  In July 2005, after 
intense lobbying by President Bush, the United States Senate 
approved the agreement by a vote of 54 to 45,2 and the House of 
Representatives did so by a slim margin of two votes.3  A few 
 
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. 
1 Robert Zoellick met with representatives of the five countries to sign 
CAFTA at a May 28 ceremony in Washington, D.C., when he vowed that 
“’CAFTA [would] put the U.S. relationship with Central America on a more solid 
mutual foundation, firmly grounded in our shared commitment to democracy, 
free markets, free people, and hope.’”  See Press Release, Office of U.S. Trade 
Representative, United States and Central America Sign Historic Free Trade 
Agreement (May 28, 2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-
office/press-releases/archives/2004/may/united-states-and-central-america-
sign-histor (outlining some of the features of the U.S.-Central American free trade 
agreement and documenting the negotiation process); see also U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., Fact Sheet on Dominican Republic-Central America-United 
States Free Trade Agreement (Sept. 2009), available at 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/factsheets/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR0909.pdf 
(summarizing the background and key provisions of the trade agreement). 
2 Paul Blustein, CAFTA Wins Approval from Senate, WASH. POST, July 1, 2005, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/29 
/AR2005062900752.html. 
3 Rick Klein, House Passes Free-Trade Agreement in Tight Vote; BOSTON GLOBE, 
July 28, 2005, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington 
/articles/2005/07/28/house_passes_free_trade_agreement_in_tight_vote 
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weeks later, the Dominican Republic also ratified.4  The sole 
exception remained Costa Rica, where CAFTA’s opponents 
proceeded to wage an intense, two-year long political and legal 
battle to scuttle the treaty.  Following an October 7, 2007 
referendum in which the treaty received 51.6% “yes” versus 48.4% 
“no” votes, the treaty finally seemed headed for ratification by the 
country’s legislature.5  After obtaining an extension on the initial 
deadline to implement the treaty, the Costa Rican legislature 
officially ratified CAFTA by passing the last of several laws 
necessary to implement the agreement on November 14, 2008.6  At 
 
(reporting on the 217 to 215 U.S. House of Representatives vote in favor of 
CAFTA); Editorial, CAFTA’s Benefits, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2005, at A12 (arguing in 
favor of CAFTA by dismissing criticisms and comparisons to NAFTA and 
highlighting the political and economic gains to be made in the region).  But see 
Bernard K. Gordon, CAFTA’s False Advertising, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2005, at A8 
(contending that CAFTA will not lead to sweeping economic gains and politically 
will encourage competing trade blocs in other parts of the world that will end up 
hurting the United States). 
4 See Rahul Rajkumar, The Central American Free Trade Agreement: An End Run 
Around the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, 15 ALB. L. J. SCI. & TECH. 
433, 456–59 (2005) (pointing out that as of May 2004, six countries, including the 
Dominican Republic, had signed the agreement and describing how the 
Dominican Republic aggressively used the flexibility of the TRIPS Agreement to 
promote access to low-cost generic drugs, especially those drugs that combat 
HIV/AIDS). 
5 See Adam Thomson, Costa Ricans Vote in Favour of U.S. Trade Pact, FIN. TIMES, 
Oct. 8, 2007, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a20bc444-75af-11dc-b7cb-
0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1dv4TgPGA (documenting the vote’s outcome as 51.6% 
yes, 48.3% no).  But see John Lyons, Costa Rica CAFTA Vote Boosts U.S. Policy, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 9, 2007, at A2 (noting the marginal victory for CAFTA and highlighting 
the growing and vocal opposition); Eva Carazo Vargas, Costa Rica: Why We Reject 
CAFTA, CIP AMERICAS PROGRAM, Mar. 8, 2007 (trans. Laura Carlsen & Katie 
Kohlstedt), available at http://americas.irc-online.org/am/4062 (detailing the 
oppositions’ main contentions and platforms).  
6 See Catherine Bremer, Costa Rica Wins 7-Month CAFTA Deadline Extension, 
REUTERS, Feb. 27, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article 
/idUSN2748968820080228 (noting the seven- month extension that the United 
States and other nations granted to Costa Rica before joining CAFTA); see also 
Trade Policy Developments, Central America-Dominican Republic-United States, 
ORG. OF AM. STATES SICE FOREIGN TRADE INFORMATION SYSTEM, available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/USA_CAFTA/USA_CAFTA_e.ASP (providing 
an exhaustive timeline of the CAFTA approval and relevant documents 
concerning the process). 
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long last, on January 1, 2009, CAFTA entered into force for Costa 
Rica as a state party.7 
CAFTA is among the latest in a long line of international and 
regional trade agreements which have proliferated over the last 
two decades as part of the broader process of globalization.8  While 
governments often describe them as “free trade” agreements, they 
also serve the purpose of “managing trade” among neighbors and 
economic rivals so as to regulate competition in politically sensitive 
sectors of the economy.9  In 1989, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay 
established MERCOSUR,10 and in 1992, the United States, Canada, 
 
7 See U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2010 National Trade Estimate Report: Costa 
Rica, in 2010 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS, 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/reports/2010 
/NTE/NTE_COMPLETE_WITH_APPENDnonameack.pdf (chronicling Costa 
Rica’s recent ratification of the agreement and describing the most important 
foreign barriers inhibiting U.S. exported goods and services, foreign direct 
investment by U.S. persons, and protection of intellectual property rights).  
8 See PAUL Q. HIRST & GRAHAME THOMPSON, GLOBALIZATION IN QUESTION 199 
(1996) (discussing trade blocs as an integral part in understanding global 
economic development and predicting a future dominated by “a newly 
regionalized international economy”); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF 
CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 130–35 (1996) (arguing that 
regional trade blocs are formed based on shared cultural traits and that these 
related civilizations will increasingly form pacts to compete against other distinct 
civilizations); PHILIP D. MCMICHAEL, DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE: A GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE 110 (2d ed. 2000) (“The world economy has tendencies toward both 
global and regional integration.  Regional integration may anticipate world 
integration—especially as it promotes trade and investment flows among 
neighboring countries.”); KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE: THE RISE 
OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES (1995) (theorizing that organizing economic activity 
around the nation-state is no longer cost-effective); MALCOLM WATERS, 
GLOBALIZATION 3 (1995) (predicting the collapse of nation-states as autonomous 
entities and defining globalization as “[a] social process in which the constraints of 
geography on social and cultural arrangements recede”); Stephen D. Krasner, 
Sovereignty, 122 FOREIGN POL’Y 20, 20 (Jan. 2001) (arguing that while transnational 
organizations and economic globalization will certainly increase, nothing will 
ever jeopardize the endurance of sovereign nation-states).  
9 But see, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 244–48 
(2002) (describing how many international and regional “free trade” agreements 
actually increase certain trade barriers in politically sensitive sectors of the 
economy by angering local populations). 
10 See Mario E. Carranza, Can Mercosur Survive? Domestic and International 
Constraints on Mercosur, 45 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 67, 68 (2003) (retracing the 
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and Mexico signed the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), in both cases with the goal of lowering trade and 
investment barriers, while leaving certain key economic sectors 
highly protected and subsidized.11  In 1994, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) was founded as the successor to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), with the goal of 
liberalizing global trade in goods, services, and intellectual 
property, but leaving untouched massive subsidies by the United 
States and the European Union to their farmers.12 
Globalization fans have hailed these trade agreements as 
harbingers of higher levels of trade, prosperity, and the lifting of 
millions of people out of poverty.13  Critics, on the other hand, have 
argued that so-called “free trade” agreements have tended to 
benefit mostly a few multinational corporations and local elites 
while harming the economic, social, and cultural human rights of 
large numbers of people throughout both the developed and 
 
history of Mercosur and attributing its creation to global competition and pressure 
to form a regional trade bloc). 
11 See John Cavanagh et al., Happily Ever NAFTA?, 132 FOREIGN POL’Y 58, 61 
(2002) (highlighting the objectives of NAFTA in the larger context of a debate 
concerning the merits of NAFTA). 
12 See Elizabeth Bullington, WTO Agreements Mandate That Congress Repeal the 
Farm Bill of 2002 and Enact an Agriculture Law Embodying Free Market Principles, 20 
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1211, 1216–18 (2005) (arguing that the United States should 
repeal the Farm Bill subsidies, but highlighting the United States’ entrenched 
adherence to the policy); see also Bernard Hoekman & Kym Anderson, Developing-
Country Agriculture and the New Trade Agenda, 49 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 
171, 174–75 (2000) (arguing against agricultural subsidies in developed nations 
because they may have an unbalanced effect on developing countries that cannot 
compete and export their own products); Jeff King, Trade Reform and the Corn 
Market: Prospects for the World Trade Organization Negotiations on Agriculture, 23 
REV. AGRIC. ECON. 47–67 (2001) (arguing in favor of reducing agricultural 
subsidies, focusing his study on corn and concluding that there is hope for 
liberalization of the global agricultural market). 
13 See L. Alan Winters et al., Trade Liberalization and Poverty: The Evidence So 
Far, 42 J. ECON. LITERATURE 72, 72–73 (2004) (arguing that empirical evidence 
supports the view that trade liberalization alleviates poverty); David R. Dollar et 
al., Growth Is Good for the Poor 4 (The World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Working 
Paper Mar. 2002), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org 
/INTRES/Resources/469232-1107449512766/Growth_is_Good_for_Poor_Journal 
_Article.pdf (“What we can conclude . . . is that policies that raise average incomes 
are likely to be central to successful poverty reduction strategies . . . .”). 
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developing worlds.14  The massive and often violent protests that 
regularly mark the meetings and conferences of the WTO15 and the 
large demonstrations that have taken place in several Central 
American countries since 200516 are all reminders of the 
considerable resistance free trade generates among various sectors 
of society.  
The small nation of Costa Rica is perhaps the most remarkable 
example of such resistance.  A vibrant democracy with five 
decades of uninterrupted civilian democratic governments, a 
strong legal and constitutional tradition, and a modest welfare 
 
14 See, e.g., Noam Chomsky, Notes on NAFTA: ‘The Masters of Mankind,’ 
NATION, Mar. 29, 1993, at 412, 412–16 (arguing that the main goal of NAFTA was 
to empower U.S. corporations through increased protection of U.S. intellectual 
property rights, rules of origin requirements, and liberalization of services meant 
to strengthen U.S. banking entities); see also Business and Human Rights, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, available at http://www.hrw.org/category/topic/business/trade; 
Aaron A. Dhir, Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks: Shareholder Proposals as a 
Vehicle for Achieving Corporate Social and Human Rights Accountability, 43 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 365, 365–68 (highlighting the rise of unscrupulous corporations that disregard 
human rights concerns and arguing for increasing shareholder power to include 
activist proposals); Martin S. High, Sustainable Development: How Far Does U.S. 
Industry Have to Go to Meet World Guidelines?, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 131, 131–37 
(2004) (describing the steps necessary for the global community to reach the goals 
of sustainable development and predicting that sustainable development will 
become increasingly important over time). 
15 See generally Chomsky, supra note 14 (protesting and arguing against 
NAFTA because of the possibility of benefitting a few at the expense of the vast 
majority of people); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 14. 
16 See Sherrod Brown, An Unbalanced Trade Policy, WASH. POST, May 31, 2005, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/30 
/AR2005053000774.html (contending that CAFTA will not help Central America 
and pointing to the mass demonstrations throughout the region, including tens of 
thousands of protesters in El Salvador and over thirty thousand in Costa Rica); 
Karen Hansen-Kuhn, Central Americans Speak Out Against DR-CAFTA: Major Issues 
and Mobilizations, GLOBAL EXCHANGE (Mar. 2005), 
http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/cafta/actions.html (underscoring 
and describing the key protests in countries throughout Central America against 
CAFTA); see also, Chris Hufstader & Andrea Perera, Resistance in Central America, 
OXFAM AMERICA (Jul. 19, 2006), http://www.oxfamamerica.org/articles 
/resistance-in-central-america (advocating research for alternatives to CAFTA 
and promoting community activism to organize in Nicaragua, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras against the agreement).  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
03 COLL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2011  8:23 PM 
466 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 33:2 
state that is advanced by Latin American standards,17 Costa Rica 
was the locus of an intense constitutional and political battle over 
CAFTA that lasted over two years and involved all sectors of its 
society.  In spite of earlier predictions that forecast an easy victory 
for CAFTA, its opponents came close to derailing it.  This article 
will look at how opponents of CAFTA effectively wielded the 
language of human rights, constitutional procedure, and the 
country’s courts to generate intense opposition to the free trade 
agreement, in spite of the strong support of local political and 
business elites and immense pressures by the United States on the 
small country. 
Costa Rica’s battle over CAFTA is a highly instructive case 
study on several levels.  First, it illustrates the powerful social and 
political countercurrents and intense emotions generated by 
globalization, as people resist what they perceive to be its assault 
on local and national values, their sense of identity and traditional 
ways of life, and absorption into a larger global system dominated 
by impersonal economic forces and institutions they do not trust 
and over which they have little control.18  Second, it underlines the 
great power which the language of human rights and the rule of 
law—including constitutional tradition and the power of courts—
can have in affirming the legitimacy of claims for individuation 
and protection against the impersonal processes of globalization.  
One of the most powerful arguments in the debate was the claim 
that the treaty endangered the country’s uniqueness, its individual 
identity as a particular community of people bound by certain 
 
17 See THE COSTA RICA READER: HISTORY, CULTURE, POLITICS 1 (Steven Palmer & 
Ivan Molina eds., 2004) (describing Costa Rica as “a democratic oasis on a 
continent scorched by dictatorship and revolution . . . an egalitarian, middle-class 
society blissfully immune to the violent class and racial conflicts haunting most 
Latin American countries”). 
18 In contrast, there are some who view globalization favorably.  See, e.g., 
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 7, 42 (2000) (arguing that 
globalization is the central organizing principle of the post-Cold War world and 
suggesting that, in order for a country to thrive economically, a balance must be 
found between the preservation of the ancient forces of culture, geography, 
tradition and community, and globalization).  But see HUNTINGTON, supra note 8, 
at 125, 311 (recognizing that a conflict between cultures and civilizations will 
likely result from globalization and urging the West “not to attempt to reshape 
other civilizations in the image of the West . . . but to preserve, protect, and renew 
the unique qualities of Western civilization”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss2/3
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specific social and economic values and ideals shared over a 
common history.  Third, the battle over CAFTA illustrates the way 
in which human rights and constitutional procedure can help to 
generate and legitimate political forces which, once awakened, 
may acquire a momentum of their own.  Fourth, in spite of the 
tremendous passions it aroused, the two-year struggle over 
CAFTA was orderly and peaceful to a high degree, validating to a 
large extent the resiliency of Costa Rica’s political and judicial 
institutions, the country’s non-violent ethos, and the reality of a 
distinct Costa Rican political and constitutional culture deeply 
infused by the principles of human rights, the rule of law, and 
peace. 
2. THE DEBATE OVER GLOBALIZATION AND FREE TRADE 
Costa Rica’s battle over CAFTA needs to be placed in the 
broader context of the debate over the merits of free trade and the 
advance of globalization, of which free trade is a key element.19  
Globalization can be best described as the process by which, over 
the last two decades, the world has become highly interconnected 
economically and culturally at a faster pace than any time since 
1914.20  Key dimensions of globalization have included the spread 
of market-based capitalist systems over wide areas of the globe, the 
 
19 Some see free trade as a benign “inexorable integration of markets, nation-
states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before—in a way that is 
enabling individuals, corporations and nation-states to reach around the world 
farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before . . . .”  FRIEDMAN, supra note 
18, at 9.  But cf. Juan Carlos Linares, The Development Dilemma: Reconciling U.S. 
Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America with Laborers’ Rights: A Study of Mexico, 
The Dominican Republic and Costa Rica, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 249, 257-59 
(2004) (stating that free trade has diversified the Mexican economy, while also 
recognizing the damaging effects of the prominence of American-owned 
maquiladoras in Mexico and the existence of inequality in wages and income 
among the Mexican citizenry). 
20 In line with this view, some scholars and analysts refer to globalization in 
terms of consciousness and interdependence, viewing it as a process embodied by 
“the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the 
world as a whole . . . concrete global interdependence and consciousness of the 
global whole in the twentieth century.”  ROLAND ROBERTSON, GLOBALIZATION: 
SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL CULTURE 8 (1992). 
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revolution in information and communication technologies, and a 
massive increase in international trade and capital flows.21 
As its admiring observers are quick to point out, globalization 
has yielded important benefits.22  The spread of market-based 
capitalism has been partly responsible for unleashing a wave of 
economic growth that has lifted hundreds of millions of people out 
of poverty in China, India, Vietnam, and elsewhere.23  Advances in 
global travel, communications, and information technologies have 
resulted in the “CNN phenomenon”, the ubiquity of the internet, 
and the creation of the “blogosphere”, which have made it harder 
for repressive regimes to control their populations and to conceal 
information from them.24  Increases in global trade and investment, 
 
21 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 18 at 121, 140 (describing the growing variety of 
investment instruments and opportunities as a godsend and asserting that the 
Internet contributed to this new era of globalization); JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & 
ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, A FUTURE PERFECT: THE ESSENTIALS OF GLOBALIZATION 29 
(2000) (arguing that technology, capital markets, and management are each 
powerful tools, but that the interaction of all three has been the driving force 
behind globalization). 
22 See generally David R. Dollar & Aart Kraay, Spreading the Wealth, FOREIGN 
AFF., 120, 127–28 (2002) (arguing that, contrary to popular belief, globalization has 
not resulted in higher inequality within economies but has promoted equality and 
reduced poverty). 
23 See, e.g., Michael Vatikiotis & David Murphy, With Aggressive Trade Pacts, 
China Quietly Builds Clout in Region, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2003, at A12 (describing 
China’s use of free-trade agreements with other Asian nations and tariff 
reductions as tools to shape its vibrant economy); Gurcharan Das, The India Model, 
85 FOREIGN AFF. 2 (2006) (recounting India’s integration efforts in the 1990s and 
identifying its long-lasting results in the form of high economic growth today); see 
also Benn Steil, The End of National Currency, 86 FOREIGN AFF. 83, 95 (2007) (arguing 
that since “economic development outside the process of globalization is no 
longer possible[,]” countries should abandon national currencies in the ever-
increasing globalized market); Andrew Batson & Shai Oster, As China Booms, the 
Poorest Lose Ground, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2006, at A4 (recognizing that China’s role 
in globalization has helped the country get many people out of poverty, but also 
questioning why many people are now more impoverished). 
24 See, e.g., David Held, Democracy and Globalization, in RE-IMAGINING 
POLITICAL COMMUNITY: STUDIES IN COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY 11, 13, 18 (Daniele 
Archibugi et al. eds., 1998) (discussing globalization as a source of deep 
interconnectedness between countries across the world and describing its effect 
on cultural and communication trends, such as the Internet); DAVID HELD ET AL., 
GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE 345, 363 (1999) 
(arguing that technological innovations have “facilitated an increase both in 
national communication patterns and in transnational cultural flows[,]” especially 
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while not benefiting everyone equally, have led to higher rates of 
economic growth, productivity, and formal employment in those 
developing countries that have been able to take advantage of 
these trends.25  Moreover, globalization has helped to create a 
higher level of “global consciousness” which has benefited the 
efforts of human rights activists to draw attention to the plight of 
the world’s poor and the deterioration of the earth’s environment.26 
For its skeptics and detractors, globalization has a different 
face.  It represents the sheer acceleration of economic activity and 
exploitation of the earth’s resources beyond the point of social and 
environmental sustainability.27  The great decade of globalization, 
the 1990s, saw a sharp increase in global warming accompanied by 
the specter of environmental catastrophe in such poster children of 
globalization as India and China.28  The worldwide expansion of 
market-based capitalism has brought with it massive waves of 
deregulation, privatization, and social spending cuts that have 
destroyed already frayed safety nets for hundreds of millions of 
 
because of shared languages and linguistic competencies); THE POWER OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 
1999) (describing how global human rights norms have improved human rights 
practices in a number of countries, including Tunisia, Kenya, Chile, Morocco, and 
others). 
25 Contra Bob Davis, IMF Fuels Critics of Globalization, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 
2007, at A9 (describing the International Monetary Fund’s report findings that 
globalization contributes to increasing income inequality). 
26 See, e.g., MIKE MOORE, A WORLD WITHOUT WALLS: FREEDOM, DEVELOPMENT, 
FREE TRADE AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 187–96 (2003) (discussing globalization as 
being a tool to engage civil society by increasing informational flows and 
accountability, thus helping increase NGOs and international organizations’ 
reach). 
27 See Sean O. Riain, States and Markets in an Era of Globalization, 26 ANN. REV. 
SOC. 187, 188 (2000) (describing the effect globalization has on the relationship 
between states and markets and stating that “[s]tates find themselves trying to 
respond to pressures from local societies and global markets simultaneously 
without the breathing room previously offered by controls on transnational trade, 
finance, and production”).  Contra John Micklethwait & Adrian Woolridge, The 
Globalization Backlash, 126 FOREIGN POL’Y 16 (2001) (arguing that some critics 
unfairly blame globalization for many of the world’s ills).  
28 See, e.g., Ming Wan, China’s Economic Growth and the Environment in the 
Asia-Pacific Region, 38 ASIAN SURVEY 365, 366 (1998) (analyzing the impact of 
China’s own rapid economic growth and high energy use on the economic climate 
in the Asia-Pacific region and the world, including issues such as global warming, 
air pollution,  and diminishing of biodiversity). 
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people in Latin America, China, and Eastern Europe.29  Global 
communication technologies have become the key means by which 
the United States relentlessly exports its consumerist, capitalist 
culture, thereby transforming other cultures in its image, and 
destroying the traditional values, cultural identity, and ways of life 
of hundreds of millions of others.30  Under globalization, CNN and 
Hollywood threaten to establish American cultural hegemony over 
many parts of the world.31  Meanwhile, massive increases in 
international trade, investment, and capital flows seem to have 
benefited disproportionately large multinational corporations and 
small local elites allied with them, while putting downward 
pressure on wages, labor protections, and the environment 
everywhere.32  Under the titanic stress of global competition, social 
Darwinism has flourished if not in name at least in practice. 
 
29 See, e.g., Jane Spencer, Clean-Energy Firms Make Pitch to Asia, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 18, 2007, at A9 (revealing China and India’s decision to pledge substantial 
amounts of money to U.S. trade mission efforts to capitalize on growing 
commitment to renewable energy).  For a more detailed analysis of the 
environmental issues facing China, see Elizabeth C. Economy, The Great Leap 
Backward? The Costs of China’s Environmental Crisis, 86 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 38, 46 
(2007) (describing the high costs China suffers when dealing with its 
environmental issues). 
30 See, e.g., Noam Chomsky, Globalization and its Discontents, 
http://www.chomsky.info/debates/20000516.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2011) 
(stating that in trade relations between the United States and other nations, 
“ordinary people” from both the United States and other nations do not have their 
rights protected since U.S. corporations and investors are exclusively benefited). 
31 For an examination of the expanding scope of communication due to 
globalization, as well as its contribution to cultural change and homogeneity, see J. 
Michael Greig, The End of Geography?: Globalization, Communications, and Culture in 
the International System, 46 J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 225, 234–35, 238 (2002) 
(finding that despite the fact that as the range of interaction and communication 
increases, cultural variation decreases, increased communication can also 
maintain areas of cultural uniqueness).  But see Mario Vargas Llosa, The Culture of 
Liberty, 122 FOREIGN POL’Y 66 (2001) (arguing that globalization does not suffocate 
local cultures, but rather liberates them from the ideological rigidities of 
nationalism). 
32 See, e.g., Vito Tanzi, Globalization without a Net, 125 FOREIGN POL’Y 78, 78–79 
(2001) (describing how globalization decreases the ability of governments to 
provide welfare programs because it encourages countries to decrease tax rates, 
thus reducing funding that can be used to help the poor, and it introduces 
deregulatory pressures that restrict the rights of workers and members of 
vulnerable groups); Dani Rodrik, Sense and Nonsense in the Globalization Debate, 107 
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Admirers and detractors alike have compelling points to make 
about the impact of globalization on human welfare in general and 
human rights in particular.  It is also clear that globalization seems 
threatening to many people not necessarily because it is linking the 
world more closely at all levels, but because in its current form it is 
also erasing individual and communal identities, replacing them 
with a more homogeneous set of global values and allegiances 
rooted in U.S.-based versions of consumerism and individual 
economic competition.33  For many cultures and societies, this 
cultural and social homogeneity, and the resultant loss of identity 
it engenders, is indeed one of the most disturbing and resented 
aspect of globalization.34  For societies with a strong sense of 
individual identity that pride themselves on their cultural, social or 
political uniqueness, the threat of globalization looms particularly 
large.  Costa Rica in Central America is an example of such a 
society for which globalization, regardless of its other advantages 
and disadvantages, seems highly threatening because of its impact 
on the specific social, economic, and political institutions that 
define its polity.  
3. THE ORIGINS OF COSTA RICA’S UNIQUE SOCIAL, POLITICAL  
AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
A small country slightly larger than the state of Maryland, with 
a population of 4.5 million people,35 Costa Rica has an identity 
 
FOREIGN POL’Y 19, 26 (1997) (describing how globalization increases the demand 
for social insurance, but decreases governments’ ability to provide it). 
33 See Robert Holton, Globalization’s Cultural Consequences, 570 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 140, 142 (2000) (describing the homogenization effect of 
globalization on culture as one of “convergence toward a common set of cultural 
traits and practices” and stating that many criticize the global culture as being 
exclusively based on American consumerism).  But see David Rothkopf, In Praise 
of Cultural Imperialism?, 107 FOREIGN POL’Y 38, 39 (1997) (recognizing the positive 
results of globalization and declaring that “globalization promotes integration 
and the removal not only of cultural barriers but many of the negative dimensions 
of culture.  Globalization is a vital step toward both a more stable world and 
better lives for the people in it”). 
34 See generally Holton, supra note 33 (describing how globalization can result 
in the loss of identities and the homogenization of cultures). 
35 See The World Factbook: Costa Rica, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library 
/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cs.html (last updated on Nov. 4, 2011) 
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uniquely shaped by its special history.36  In pre-Columbian times, 
the country was a sparsely populated area separating the more 
advanced civilizations of upper Central America and the Andes.37  
The arrival of Spanish settlers in the mid-sixteenth-century led to 
the decimation of the small, existent indigenous communities.38  
With no gold or silver mines with which to attract speculators and 
no ready supply of cheap labor with which to work large 
landholdings, Spain largely neglected the area.39  As a result, the 
emergent economic and social structures displayed more 
egalitarian and democratic characteristics than elsewhere in 
Spanish America, with many of the settlers practicing subsistence 
farming on small plots.40  With few indigenous peoples left, little 
intermarriage occurred; hence, there were fewer class distinctions 
between “mestizos” and “criollos.”41  With the exception of some of 
the coastal areas, where African slaves worked large estates for the 
production of export crops, the country’s heartland evolved into a 
rural democracy dotted by a few cities, each with their own sense 
of unique identity, who practically functioned as city-states in the 
ancient Greek model.42  Isolation from the rest of the Spanish 
 
(listing general political, economic, historical, geographic, and demographic 
information about Costa Rica). 
36 See generally Thomas L. Karnes, The Origins of Costa Rican Federalism, 15 
AMERICAS 249 (1959) (chronicling Costa Rican history from Spanish colonial rule to 
independence, while underscoring its separatist nature in comparison with the 
rest of Central America); CHESTER LLOYD JONES, COSTA RICA AND CIVILIZATION IN 
THE CARIBBEAN (2d ed. 1967) (distinguishing Costa Rica from the rest of the 
Caribbean nations and using it as a model for political and economic 
development). 
37 CHRISTOPHER BAKER, HISTORY OF COSTA RICA 1 (1995). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 See id. at 5; MITCHELL A. SELIGSON, PEASANTS OF COSTA RICA AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF AGRARIAN CAPITALISM 6–7 (1980) (arguing that the absence of 
gold and geographic isolation helped lead to “the development of a strong 
yeomanry” in which settlers “preferred to set up homesteads which were isolated 
from the other settlers”). 
41 See BAKER, supra note 37. 
42 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 37, at 6; see CHARLES D. AMERINGER, DEMOCRACY 
IN COSTA RICA 10 (1982) (positing that rural democracy may have emerged partly 
due to a uniformly poor and culturally homogenous colonist class that could not 
afford to import slaves and largely could not similarly subjugate the indigenous 
population or other peoples); see also ADELA F. DE SAENZ & CARLOS MELENDEZ, 
NUEVA HISTORIA DE COSTA RICA (5th ed., Imprenta Las Americas Ltda, 1982) 
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empire aided the development of a highly individualistic, 
independent spirit among Costa Ricans.43 
In 1821, the country became peacefully independent following 
the secession of Mexico and the rest of Central America from the 
Spanish empire.44  After a brief civil war in 1823 between 
conservative and liberal factions for political control in which the 
liberal forces prevailed, the country entered a long period of 
progressive reforms characterized by an emphasis on an 
independent judiciary, freedom of the press, public education, and 
the extension of credit to small farmers.45  In 1869, the constitution 
made primary education for both sexes free and compulsory, and it 
abolished capital punishment.46  As early as 1917, efforts were 
made to establish a system of direct, progressive income taxation.47  
Costa Rica’s democratic progress and egalitarian ethos were 
sharply at odds with conditions prevailing throughout the rest of 
Central America and most of South America, where civil strife, 
gaping social and economic inequalities, despotic reactionary 
regimes, and massive poverty were the norm.48  In the early 1940s, 
Costa Rica embarked on further reforms along the lines of Franklin 
Roosevelt’s “New Deal” in the United States, including the 
establishment of a guaranteed minimum wage, paid vacations, 
 
(“The Costa Rican lifestyle in the Eighteenth Century differed little from that of 
the prior Century.  The greater evils were poverty, depopulation, a lack of roads, 
and therefore, of communications.”). 
43 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 37. 
44 Id. 
45 See RICHARD BIESANZ ET AL., THE COSTA RICANS 21–22 (1982) (chronicling the 
rise of a “liberal” democracy in the late 1800s that aimed to educate the 
population and secularize national institutions). 
46 See JOSE LUIS VEGA CARBALLO, ORDEN Y PROGRESO: LA FORMACION DEL 
ESTADO NACIONAL EN COSTA RICA 250–51 (1981) (discussing the general 
progression toward Democracy evinced in the 1869 Constitution, despite the fact 
that it was produced during a two-year period in between two military coups). 
47 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 37. 
48 See generally Terry Lynn Karl, The Hybrid Regimes of Central America, 6 J. 
DEMOCRACY 72 (1995) (describing Costa Rica as an outlier in terms of enjoying 
relative peace and political stability).  But cf. WILLIAM EVERETT KANE, CIVIL STRIFE 
IN LATIN AMERICA: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT (1972) (investigating 
U.S. relations with conflict-ridden Latin America while largely—and 
conspicuously—omitting Costa Rica, thereby implicating the country’s stable and 
peaceful status).  
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unemployment compensation, and the codification of workers’ 
rights.49 
3.1. The 1948 Revolution and 1949 Constitution 
Although initially triggered by the government’s efforts to 
manipulate that year’s elections, a popular and largely peaceful 
revolution in 1948 quickly led to far-reaching changes, including 
the adoption of the Constitution of 1949, which is in force to this 
day.50  The Constitution not only consolidated the liberal and social 
reforms of the previous century, but also created a constitutional 
order explicitly founded on the ideals of social democracy.51  Its 
most significant achievements, unique in the Western Hemisphere, 
included the abolition of the army,52 the establishment of a welfare 
state with broad social and economic protections, and the further 
strengthening of the rule of law and the judiciary.  Its highly 
progressive character and impact on the country’s legal and social 
institutions over the past half century make the Constitution a 
 
49 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 37, at 12.  
50 See JOHN PATRICK BELL, CRISIS IN COSTA RICA: THE 1948 REVOLUTION 155–61 
(1971) (narrating how revolutionary leader José Figueres initially sought to 
transfer power to Otilio Ulate, the perceived winner of the fraudulently 
overhauled 1948 election, only to head the interim government that passed 
sweeping progressive reforms before installing Ulate into power).  
51 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 Y SUS 
REFORMAS [CONSTITUTION], Preamble (Costa Rica) (Georgetown University 
Political Database of the Americas), available at 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Costa/costa2.html (explicitly 
expressing faith in democracy as a foundation of the Constitution); see also Robert 
S. Barker, Taking Constitutionalism Seriously: Costa Rica’s Sala Cuarta, 6 FLA. J. INT’L 
L. 349, 366 n.102 (1991) (noting the constitutionally granted individual rights in 
Articles 10–49, social rights and guarantees in Articles 50–74, and political rights 
and duties in Articles 90–98); THE COSTA RICA READER: HISTORY, CULTURE, POLITICS 
141–42 (Steven Palmer & Iván Molina eds., 2004) (characterizing the Constitution 
of 1949 as marking “the beginning of a fundamentally distinct phase in the 
political life of the country,” grounded in social justice and the exercise of the 
right to vote as the sources and objectives of legitimate political power). 
52 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 Y SUS 
REFORMAS [CONSTITUTION], art. 12 (Costa Rica) (Georgetown University Political 
Database of the Americas), available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu 
/Constitutions/Costa/costa2.html. 
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pivotal milestone in Costa Rica’s development as a peaceful social 
democracy with a strong commitment to human rights.53 
Title IV of the Constitution guaranteed, as early as 1949, a wide 
range of civil and political rights such as were embodied 
eventually in the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.54  It includes many rights that were not made part of many 
Latin American constitutions until the 1980s.  In addition to 
declaring the inviolability of human life,55 it guarantees:  complete 
freedom of movement and travel;56 the “right to privacy, liberty, 
and inviolability” of all private documents, written and oral 
communications;57 the security of one’s home and any other 
private space, subject to exceptions requiring a magistrate’s 
warrant in writing;58 freedom of association;59 the right to petition 
public officials and to receive a prompt response to such 
petitions;60 freedom of speech and of the press;61 and freedom from 
compulsory banishment.62  There is a guarantee, unusual for its 
time, “assuring free access to government departments for 
purposes of gaining information about matters of public interest.”63  
Costa Rica’s national territory was declared “a site of asylum for 
anyone persecuted for political reasons . . . and if for lawful 
 
53 See generally Ethan Katz & Matthew Lackey, Costa Rica as a Peaceful State: 
One Costa Rican Lawyer’s Odyssey v. His Nation’s Establishment, COUNCIL ON 
HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS (Mar. 19, 2010), http://www.coha.org/costa-rica-as-a-
peaceful-state-one-costa-rican-lawyer%E2%80%99s-odyssey-v-his-
nation%E2%80%99s-establishment/ (briefly surveying Costa Rica’s history and 
characterizing the country as a “pacifist state”). 
54 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 (representing an international push to adopt basic universal political 
and human rights in the 1960s—was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 
1966 although it did not come into force until ten years later).   
55 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 Y SUS 
REFORMAS [CONSTITUTION], art. 21 (Costa Rica) (Georgetown University Political 
Database of the Americas), available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu 
/Constitutions/Costa/costa2.html (“La vida humana es inviolable.”).  
56 Id. at art. 22.  
57 Id. at art. 24.  
58 Id. at art. 23.  
59 Id. at arts. 25–26.  
60 Id. at art. 27. 
61 Id. at art. 29. 
62 Id. at art. 32. 
63 Id. at art. 30. 
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reasons such a person were to be expelled, he shall never be 
expelled to a country where he would be persecuted.”64 
There are also extensive protections involving due process of 
law.  Everyone is equal before the law, and no discrimination 
“contrary to human dignity” is permitted.65  There are guarantees 
against self-incrimination, as well as against incriminating one’s 
spouse and relatives up to the third degree.66  No one can be tried 
by a judge or tribunal especially appointed for the case, but only by 
regularly constituted courts and judges.67  Detention without a 
judicial order cannot exceed twenty-four hours.68  Cruel or 
degrading treatment or punishment, life sentences, and the 
confiscation of goods are banned.69  A 1989 constitutional 
amendment explicitly guaranteed the right of habeas corpus.70 
 Title V, dealing with social rights, remains one of the most 
progressive aspects of the Constitution.  It proclaims that “[t]he 
State shall achieve the highest degree of welfare for all of the 
country’s inhabitants, stimulating production . . . and the most 
adequate distribution of wealth.  Everyone has the right to a 
healthy and ecologically balanced environment.”71  The 
Constitution also explicitly protects:  the right to work;72 the right 
to a minimum wage “that provides well-being and a dignified 
existence;”73 an eight-hour workday and forty-eight hour 
workweek;74 a day of rest after six consecutive days of work, and 
paid vacations “that shall be no less than two weeks for every fifty 
weeks of work;”75 the right to organize labor unions;76 and the right 
to compensation when fired without just cause.77  The Constitution 
also established a Social and Health Insurance System (Caja 
 
64 Id. at art. 31. 
65 Id. at art. 33. 
66 Id. at art. 36. 
67 Id. at art. 35. 
68 Id. at art. 44. 
69 Id. at art. 40. 
70 Id. at art. 48. 
71 Id. at art. 50. 
72 Id. at art. 56. 
73 Id. at art. 57. 
74 Id. at art. 58. 
75 Id. at art. 59. 
76 Id. at art. 60. 
77 Id. at art. 63. 
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Costarricense de Seguro Social or CCSS) to provide protection 
against the risks of “sickness, disability, maternity, old age, death . 
. . .”78  All the rights of Title V are “inalienable,” and their 
implementation has as its goal “achieving a permanent policy of 
national solidarity.”79  
The Constitution’s provisions on educational and cultural 
rights are also advanced.  The State is constitutionally required to 
spend no less than 6% of GDP on education annually,80 and 
although this requirement is not strictly enforced, it serves as a 
powerful political tool through which opposition parties prod the 
government into spending more on education.  The Constitution 
also specifies that education up to the high-school level is 
compulsory and free of charge.81  The State must provide to 
indigent students school uniforms and food during school hours.82  
The State is obligated to respect academic freedom, and to support 
two major on-site national universities, as well as a long-distance 
learning university.83  Although Costa Rica remains a developing 
nation, the nation’s lack of a military budget helps to make some of 
these provisions more affordable than they would otherwise be. 84  
Indeed, it is thanks to these provisions that the country has a high 
literacy rate of 95%. 
In keeping with its social democratic, communitarian 
orientation, the Constitution explicitly lists a series of national 
resources and assets that it considers part of the national 
patrimony under the stewardship of the State, which can never be 
owned by private sector entities: hydroelectric power; coal, oil, and 
all other hydrocarbons; any radioactive minerals; all wire 
 
78 Id. at art. 73. 
79 Id. at art. 74. 
80 Id. at art. 78. 
81 Id. at art. 78. 
82 Id. at art. 82. 
83 Id. at art. 87, 85. 
84 For data from the 2000 though 2004 period, see At a Glance: Costa Rica, 
UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/costarica_statistics.html (last 
updated Mar. 2, 2010).  See also, 2007-2008 Human Development Report: Costa Rica, 
U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN 
_Indicator_tables.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2011) (indicating that Costa Rica has no 
military budget); Background Note: Costa Rica, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Sept. 14, 2011), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2019.htm (confirming the absence of a 
military budget). 
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transmission services; railroads, ports, and airports.  These are all 
placed under the State’s dominion and control, and can be 
exploited by the private sector only through special, time-limited 
concessions granted by the State through legislation approved by 
the Legislative Assembly.85  The Constitution also provides for 
autonomous state-owned banks and insurance companies that 
enjoy administrative independence.86  Although private banks are 
allowed to operate in Costa Rica today,87 they have to compete 
with the state-owned Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, while all 
insurance services in the country remain under the aegis of the 
state-owned Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS).88 
Among all Latin American states, Costa Rica has one of the 
soundest judicial systems as well as some of the highest indices of 
rule of law.  The Constitution provides for a strong judicial branch 
headed by a Supreme Court of Justice.89  A 1975 constitutional 
amendment created a Supreme Elections Tribunal with the 
responsibility to oversee and adjudicate all electoral matters, 
including voter lists, voting recounts, and challenges to the validity 
of any particular election.90  A further amendment in 1989 created a 
Constitutional Chamber (also known as the “Sala Cuarta” or “Sala 
 
85 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 Y SUS 
REFORMAS [CONSTITUTION], art. 121 (Costa Rica) (Georgetown University Political 
Database of the Americas), available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu 
/Constitutions/Costa/costa2.html. 
86 Id. at art. 189. 
87 Background Note: Costa Rica, supra note 84 (indicating that private banks are 
allowed to operate in Costa provided that they do not compete with state-owned 
entities). 
88 See Costa Rica: Constitutions and Institutions, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, 
(Oct. 28, 2003) (explaining monopoly power and the broad reach of the INS); see 
also Jean-Pierre Unger et al., Costa Rica: Achievements of a Heterodox Health Policy, 98 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 636, 637–38 (2008) (indicating that insurance agencies are 
under the Caja Costarricense de Seguridad Social, or CCSS).  
89 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 Y SUS 
REFORMAS [CONSTITUTION], art. 152 (Costa Rica) (Georgetown University Political 
Database of the Americas), available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu 
/Constitutions/Costa/costa2.html.  See generally Barker, supra note 51, at 365–67 
(outlining the power structure of the judicial branch). 
90 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 Y SUS 
REFORMAS [CONSTITUTION], art. 9 (Costa Rica) (Georgetown University Political 
Database of the Americas), available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu 
/Constitutions/Costa/costa2.html. 
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Constitucional”) within the Supreme Court of Justice, which has 
absolute jurisdiction over all constitutional issues, including 
conflicts among the branches of government and the 
constitutionality of treaties and international agreements.91  
Moreover, under the Constitutional Chamber’s own jurisprudence, 
the human rights, including labor rights, stipulated in treaties such 
as conventions from the International Labor Organization, become 
a part of Costa Rican constitutional law itself, reviewable only by 
the Constitutional Chamber.92  The development over several 
decades of this intricate network of courts, and the extensive 
framework of authoritative constitutional jurisprudence, attests to 
the public commitment to strong legal institutions that can 
safeguard the constitutional order, protect the human rights of all 
members of society, and reduce the risks of abuse of power.93 
Although not a part of the judicial branch, there is also a strong 
office of the Defensoria de los Habitantes del Pueblo (The Defender 
of the People of the Nation), created in 1992 by the Legislative 
Assembly.  This office answers only to the legislative branch94 and 
is tasked with defending the common good and the interests and 
 
91 Id. at art. 10.  See also, Robert S. Barker, Stability, Activism and Tradition: The 
Jurisprudence of Costa Rica’s Constitutional Chamber, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 523, 526–28 
(2007) (detailing the origins of the “Sala Cuarta”).  See generally Barker, supra note 
51 (providing a detailed description of the advent of the “Sala Cuarta”). 
92 LA DEFENSORIA DE LOS HABITANTES DE LA REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA, INFORME 
DE LA DEFENSORIA DE LOS HABITANTES EN RELACION CON EL PROYECTO DE LEY NO. 
16047 TRATADO DE LIBRE COMERCIO [The Advocacy of the People of the Republic of 
Costa Rica, Report of the Ombudsmen in Connection with Free Trade Bill No. 
16047] (describing the scope of the Constitutional Chamber’s power) [hereinafter 
INFORME DE LA DEFENSORIA].  See also Barker, supra note 51 at 372 (citing Ley de la 
Jurisdiccion Constitucional, ley no. 7135 de 11 de Octubre de 1989, indicating that 
the “norms and principles” of international human rights law are subject to 
constitutional adjudication in Costa Rica). 
93 See Fernando Cruz Castro, Costa Rica’s Constitutional Jurisprudence, Its 
Political Importance and International Human Rights Law: Examination of Some 
Decisions, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 557 (2007) (underscoring the concern for human rights 
reflected by Costa Rican jurisprudence); see also, Michael Knox, Continuing 
Evolution of the Costa Rican Judiciary, 32 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 133 (2002) (detailing how 
the evolution of the Costa Rican judiciary has continued to favor the protection of 
human rights and guard against the arbitrary exercise of government power). 
94 See Ley De La DHR [Law of the DHR], LA DEFENSORIA DE LOS HABINANTES, 
http://www.dhr.go.cr/acerca-ley.html (citing la Ley No. 7319 of November 17, 
1992 as creating the “Office of the Defender of the People of the Nation” after 
legislative discussion beginning in 1985). 
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welfare of the nation’s citizens.95  This remarkable institution has 
the legal authority to sue the government, and one of its 
responsibilities is to examine the impact of legislation or treaties on 
the social, economic, and political rights of the citizens, with a view 
toward expanding the scope of human rights protected in the 
country.96  The Defensoria played a key role in the long debate 
over CAFTA.  It first published a highly skeptical report on the free 
trade agreement, and served as a rallying point for its critics. The 
Defensoira subsequently sued the government before the 
Constitutional Chamber over the agreement’s constitutionality. 
3.2. The Fraying of the 1948 Settlement 
The social-democratic model upon which the 1948 revolution 
founded, articulated legally with great detail in the 1949 Costa 
Rican Constitution, frayed considerably during the decades of the 
1980s and 1990s as a result of wider international trends.  This was 
an impact that Costa Rica was unable to avoid.  The 1980s, known 
as Latin America’s “lost decade,” were particularly hard on Costa 
Rica.  The rise in oil prices during the late 1970s, combined with a 
slowdown in economic growth, runaway government spending, 
and large fiscal and trade deficits took their toll in the 1980s as the 
country faced successive financial and economic crises, a sharp 
devaluation of its currency in 1981,97 and a massive external debt of 
 
95 Often translated as “Office of the Ombudsman,” its full proper name is 
“Office of the Defender of the People of the Nation.”  See generally OXFORD 
SPANISH DICTIONARY 1382 (Beatriz Galimberti Jarman ed., 1994) (supporting this 
version of the office’s name). 
96 See Competencia y Responsabilidades [Authority and Responsibilities], LA 
DEFENSORIA DE LOS HABITANTES, http://dhr.go.cr/acerca-respon.html (highlighting the 
purpose and responsibilities of the Defensoria de los Habitantes). 
97 See Jorge Rovira Mas, The Crisis: 1980–1982, in THE COSTA RICA READER: 
HISTORY, CULTURE, POLITICS 212, 213 (Steven Palmer & Ivan Molina eds., 2004) 
(detailing the currency crisis of the 1980s, during which time inflation increased 
drastically); see also 15 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 675 (2007) (“[In 1982], 
in return for extending Costa Rica’s debts, the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank insisted that Monge impose severe austerity measures, including 
devaluation of the colón, budget and tax cuts, and suspension of some 
subsidies.”). 
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$5 billion, amounting to some 120% of annual GDP,98 which the 
country could not pay.  A succession of governments in the 1990s 
responded to this long-running crisis by applying “neo-liberal” 
policies embodied in the “Washington consensus.”99  Under the 
guidelines of structural adjustment laid down by the International 
Monetary Fund, Costa Rica cut back its spending on social services 
and took steps to open up its economy to foreign investment and 
trade.  From 1980 to 2000, the country’s index of openness to 
international trade went up from 0.49 to 0.79.100 
These policies failed to prevent a decline in the standard of 
living for the country’s disadvantaged population.  In fact, critics 
argued that these policies actually contributed to a noticeable 
fraying of the country’s social safety net.  In spite of the 
constitutional requirement to spend 6% of GDP on education,101 
spending on education declined to 3.9% in 1990,102 3.8% in 1995,103 
and as of 2004 it was only 5.5%.104  From 1991 to 2005, Costa Rica’s 
index of human development dropped from 0.92 to 0.83,105 and its 
ranking among countries in the index went down from 28 to 47.106  
Costa Rica’s ranking among Latin American countries also 
declined from second to fifth.107  While the proportion of 
households living in poverty declined from 51% to 29% during the 
1960s and 1970s,108 it reached a plateau around 20% throughout the 
 
98 Costa Rica, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE (2009), 
http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-272333 (indicating that the country’s 
external debt was $5 billion). 
99 INFORME DE LA DEFENSORIA, supra note 92, at 11–13 (indicating adoption of 
the policies championed in the Washington Consensus). 
100 Id. at 14–15. 
101 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 Y SUS 
REFORMAS, art. 78, available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions 
/Costa/costa2.html. 
102 See The State of the Nation in Sustainable Human Development: Summary, 26 
(2004), 
http://www.estadonacion.or.cr/Info2005/Ponencias/State_of_the_Nation%20Su
mmary.pdf (indicating a decline in education spending through the early 2000s).  
103 Id.  
104 Id.  
105 INFORME DE LA DEFENSORIA, supra note 92, at 17 (tracking the country’s 
declining position on the human development index). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 18. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
03 COLL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2011  8:23 PM 
482 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 33:2 
1980s and 1990s.109  Opening to imports displaced many domestic 
agricultural producers but did not lead to lower food prices.  
Meanwhile, wages stagnated.110  For a country that prided itself on 
avoiding the large-scale inequalities that are prevalent in Latin 
America, it must have been uncomfortable to watch its Gini 
coefficient (which measures income distribution) rise unfavorably 
from 0.41 in 2000 to 0.45 in 2004 and 0.48 in 2006.111 
To make matters worse, the country’s political institutions also 
suffered a sharp decline in credibility, as three of the country’s 
presidents who oversaw the implementation of “neo-liberal” 
policies were eventually implicated in corruption scandals 
involving paybacks and improper ties to foreign investors.112  For 
many Costa Ricans, the scandals were yet another example of the 
noxious impact of globalization, runaway free trade, and foreign 
investment in the once proud but now highly vulnerable 
institutions of their small country.  As a critic put it—perhaps 
somewhat harshly—Costa Rica, considered by many in the 1960s 
and 1970s as the “Switzerland” of Central America, was quickly 
becoming just another “banana republic.”113 
It is indisputable that the political scandals further eroded the 
already shaky legitimacy of “neo-liberal” prescriptions, and 
eventually contributed to a growing sense that the country was on 
the wrong track—that is its cherished political, social, and 
economic institutions, including its social-democratic model based 
on principles of social solidarity and equity.  Increasingly, the 
feeling that the nation needed to be rescued from the inexorable 
 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 19. 
111 Id. at 14–22.  See also ANDREW D. MASON & CARLOS SOBRADO, WORLD BANK, 
REP. NO. 35910-CR, COSTA RICA POVERTY ASSESSMENT: RECAPTURING MOMENTUM 
FOR POVERTY REDUCTION 31 (2007), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/05/2
3/000020953_20070523093115/Rendered/PDF/359100CR.pdf (noting a gini 
coefficient of 0.5 in 2001 to 0.48 in 2004). 
112 See Emily Alves & Michael Johnson, Paradise Lost: Costa Rica Falls Victim to 
Corruption and Clientelism, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFF. (Dec. 8, 2004), 
http://www.coha.org/paradise-lost-costa-rica-falls-victim-to-corruption-and-
clientelism (explaining issues of corruption in Costa Rica including “[a]t least 
three former presidents . . . accused of heavy involvement in bribery scandals”).  
113 See id. (“The ‘Switzerland of the Western Hemisphere’ is being severely 
shaken by numerous allegations of political corruption.”) 
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assault of forces perceived to be an intrinsic part of globalization 
permeated.  Additionally, an attitude persisted that the policies of 
the 1980s and 1990s, based on higher doses of free trade and 
foreign investment coupled with lower levels of social spending, 
needed to be revised in order to rescue the nation’s unique identity 
as a model of democratic solidarity.  It was in this context of 
growing popular resentment towards globalization, “neo-
liberalism,” and free trade that Costa Rica faced what turned out to 
be a highly contentious and bitter debate over CAFTA.  
4. THE POLITICAL BATTLE OVER CAFTA BEGINS:  
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
For almost a year after CAFTA was signed in 2004 by the weak 
government of President Abel Pacheco, its coming into force 
seemed to be in doubt as a result of powerful opposition to it 
within the U.S. Congress.  Its narrow approval by Congress in the 
late summer of 2005 and subsequent ratification by the United 
States left Costa Rica as the only state that had yet to ratify, and 
opened the way for a vigorous debate in the country on whether it 
should do so.  This debate, which would last two full years, 
coincided with the start of the Costa Rican presidential campaign 
on October 1, 2005.114 
Although the campaign was scheduled to end on February 5, 
2006, with the election of a new president, it dragged on into 
March 2006, culminating with a recount of the votes.115  There were 
2.5 million eligible voters in Costa Rica and fifty-three political 
parties, of which fourteen had presidential candidates running.116  
Four out of the five major parties were pro-CAFTA, and ultimately 
the election came down to two men:  Oscar Arias and Ottón 
 
114 See Comienza la Carrera Electoral por la Presidencia de Costa Rica [The Race for 
the Costa Rican Presidency Begins], LA NACIÓN, Oct. 1, 2005, 
http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2005/octubre/01/ultima-cr2.html (documenting 
the beginning of the Presidential campaign and describing Oscar Arias as the 
frontrunner). 
115 See Arias se Proclama “El Presidente de Todos los Costarricenses,” [Arian 
Proclaims “The President of All Costa Ricans”] LA NACIÓN, March 3, 2006, 
http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2006/marzo/04/ultima-ce19.html (chronicling 
the closely contested election, in which Arias beat his opponent by a mere 1.1% of 
the vote, that included a recount and 696 complaints of electoral irregularities). 
116 See Comienza la Carrera Electoral por la Presidencia de Costa Rica, supra note 
114 (describing the party breakdown and the composition of the electorate). 
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Solis.117  Arias, former president from 1986 to 1990 and winner of 
the 1987 Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts settling the Central 
American military conflict, represented the Partido Liberación 
Nacional (PLN) and supported CAFTA’s ratification.118  Although 
much younger and less experienced, Solis was articulate and 
highly intelligent; he was the candidate of the left-of-center Partido 
Acción Ciudadana (PAC), which opposed CAFTA.119  From the 
beginning, there were confident predictions that the debate over 
CAFTA would dominate the campaign, and that Arias would win 
that debate—and therefore the election—by an overwhelming 
margin on the basis of his prestige.120  To win in the first round, a 
candidate needed at least 40% of the vote; otherwise, a second 
round would be held in April.121 
When the campaign began in October 2005, President Pacheco 
had not yet sent CAFTA to the Costa Rican Legislative Assembly 
for ratification.122  The deadline for the agreement’s ratification 
 
117 See id. (analyzing the diverse stances on CAFTA among the Presidential 
candidates). 
118 See Biography: Oscar Arias Sánchez, NOBEL FOUND., 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1987/arias-bio.html (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2011) (providing Arias’s Nobel Peace Prize biography and 
discussing his 1987 peace efforts); see also Background Note: Costa Rica, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/costarica/125678.htm (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2011) (“In May 2006, President Oscar Arias of the National Liberation 
Party (PLN) assumed office . . . .  Arias listed passage of the CAFTA–DR, along 
with fiscal reform, infrastructure improvements, improving education, and 
improving security as primary goals for his presidency.”). 
119 See Comienza la Carrera Electoral por la Presidencia de Costa Rica, supra note 
114 (citing Solís of the PAC as Arias’s main opponent); Entrevista con Rolando Laclé 
C.: ‘TLC debe verse después de las elecciones’ [Interview with Rolando Laclé C.: FTA 
must be after the elections'] LA NACIÓN, Oct. 31, 2005, 
http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2005/octubre/31/pais4.html (“Oscar Aviles has 
shown his clear support of the free trade agreement.  If he wins, it means that the 
people endorse his viewpoint.”). 
120 See id. (predicting that Arias would win because of his prior Presidency 
and his Nobel Peace Prize). 
121 See Caída de Arias en Sondeos Abre Posibilidad Segunda Vuelta [Drops in Polls 
Opens a Second Round Possibility for Arias], LA NACIÓN, Feb. 3, 2006, 
http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2006/febrero/03/ultima-cr5.html (noting the 
40% requirement of the vote and the fact that in polls Arias had 42.6% of the vote 
while Solís had 31.5%). 
122 See Comienza la Carrera Electoral por la Presidencia de Costa Rica, supra note 
114 (explaining that CAFTA would be an important campaign issue because it still 
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seemed to be fast approaching; if Costa Rica did not ratify by 
January 1, 2008, it would have had to renegotiate a new 
agreement.123  CAFTA’s fate was in the air because Pacheco had 
not decided whether he was going to send it to the Assembly 
before or after the Christmas break.124  Moreover, there was heated 
debate over whether the Assembly should wait even longer, until 
after the elections, to cast its vote.125  Toward the end of the year, it 
became clear that CAFTA would not go to the Assembly until a 
new president had been elected.126 
Early in the campaign, the conservative press, especially the 
influential daily La Nacíon, went on the offensive with a campaign 
which, though supposedly designed to educate the country about 
CAFTA,127 often seemed intent on persuading the public to support 
 
had not been sent to Congress); Entrevista con Rolando Laclé C.: ‘TLC debe verse 
después de las elecciones’, supra note 119 (discussing the possibility of the free trade 
agreement passing and what effect the Presidential election will have); see also 
Costa Rica: Country Outlook, EIU VIEWSWIRE, Oct. 13, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 
26484426 (explaining that the ratification of CAFTA was delayed because of fiscal 
reform); Costa Rica Politics: Pacheco Administration Weakens, EIU VIEWSWIRE, Sept. 
27, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 26526014 (describing the congressional stalemate 
over CAFTA that arose after Abel Pacheco gained the presidency). 
123 See Larga Peregrinación del TLC [Long Pilgrimage of the TLC] LA NACIÓN, Oct. 
10, 2005, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2005/octubre/10/opinion0.html 
(pointing to Article 22.5 of the Treaty, which mandated that the Treaty be passed 
within two years of the opening date in 2006, or else face renegotiation); see also 
Thomson, supra note 5 (summarizing Costa Rica’s tumultuous ratification debate 
over CAFTA, culminating with the country’s narrow approval of the agreement in 
an Oct. 7, 2007 referendum).  
124 See Larga Peregrinación del TLC, supra note 123 (calling on Pacheco in 
October 2005 to send the agreement to Congress to avoid serious economic 
repercussions); see also Entrevista con Rolando Laclé C.: ‘TLC debe verse después de las 
elecciones’, supra note 119 (arguing that the free trade agreement should be 
discussed before the Christmas vacation to avoid the fervor of the election that 
would begin in earnest in January 2006). 
125 See Entrevista con Rolando Laclé C.: ‘TLC debe verse después de las elecciones’, 
supra note 119 (explaining that if the free trade agreement is not discussed before 
January 2006, there will also be relative calm after the election when the  the treaty 
should be brought to the table). 
126 See id. (noting the probability of a vote on CAFTA after the election since 
the election would present a mandate for or against the agreement). 
127 See, e.g., Larga Peregrinación del TLC, supra note 123 (representing an op-ed 
piece in La Nación strongly supporting the agreement); Eduardo Ulibarri, El Abecé 
del TLC [The ABCs of CAFTA] LA NACIÓN, Oct. 20, 2005, 
http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2005/octubre/21/opinion2.html (lauding a 
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it.  From the outset, the CAFTA debate was colored by high doses 
of emotion.128  One often mentioned risk of not ratifying CAFTA 
within the prescribed time limits was that Costa Rica would be 
forced to renegotiate the entire treaty on less advantageous 
terms.129  Another risk of not ratifying was that the country would 
lose its status as the primary leader of free trade in Central 
America and would cease to be an attractive point for domestic 
and foreign investment.130  The conservative press further 
promoted CAFTA by shining a positive light on the United States, 
portraying a supportive U.S. government that was respectful of 
Costa Rica’s democratic ratification process.131 
 
report written by Ronulfo Jiménez that educated the public about the treaty and at 
the same time championed it). 
128 See Larga Peregrinación del TLC, supra note 123 (exemplifying an 
impassioned op-ed piece, calling on the government to pass CAFTA); see also Rose 
J. Spaulding, Neoliberal Regionalism and Resistance in Mesoamerica: Foro 
Mesoamericano Opposition to Plan Puebla-Panamá and CAFTA, in LATIN AMERICAN 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: RESISTANCE, POWER, AND 
DEMOCRACY 323, 331–32 (Richard Stahler-Sholk et al. eds., 2008) (narrating the 
evolution of Foro Mesoamericano, a coalition of civil activists opposed to regional 
liberalist policies including CAFTA); What is CAFTA-DR?, WASH. OFF. ON LATIN 
AM., http://www.wola.org/cafta (last visited Nov. 16, 2011) (explaining that 
Costa Rica’s non-ratification of CAFTA was due to significant opposition by a 
broad range of civil society groups in the country which included protests and 
marches).  
129 See Larga Peregrinación del TLC, supra note 123 (fearing that upon 
reopening negotiations other countries in the region and the Bush administration 
might be less amenable to offer favorable terms to Costa Rica). 
130 See id. (“The international risk graders would lower their perception and 
change their view concerning the country’s ability to guarantee its obligations, 
interest rates would go up, and the ongoing uncertainty would bring about 
unpredictable volatility in exchange rates.”).   
131 See EE.UU. Respeta Proceso Democrático de Ratificación del TLC por Parte de 
Costa Rica [U.S. Respects the Democratic Process of Ratification of the FTA by Costa 
Rica], LA NACIÓN, Oct. 18, 2005, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2005/octubre 
/18/ultima-sr519245.html (reporting U.S. Secretary of Commerce Carlos 
Gutiérrez’s support of Costa Rica’s democratic process and confidence that the 
country would pass CAFTA); see also Trabajo en Equipo Será el Éxito del TLC Dijo 
Secretario de Comercio de EE.UU [Teamwork will be the success of the FTA said U.S. 
Secretary of Commerce], LA NACIÓN, Oct. 21, 2005, http://wvw.nacion.com 
/ln_ee/2005/octubre/21/ultima-sr522076.html (documenting the United States’s 
desire for Costa Rica to follow Nicaragua and pass the FTA and work with the 
United States). 
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By late fall, however, the tide in the media turned more critical 
of CAFTA and of Arias himself.132  Critics began to wonder about 
CAFTA’s impact on many domestic issues, such as its effects on 
the cultural sector,133 unemployment, and poverty.134  La Nación ran 
a major article on the organized opposition of faculty and students 
at the University of Costa Rica, who had signed a declaration 
 
132 See Julio Rodriguez, En Vela [Sleepless], LA NACIÓN, Nov. 28, 2005, 
http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2005/noviembre/28/opinion4.html (criticizing 
the political uproar surrounding CAFTA and the election, and advocating for 
solutions rather than blind ideology). 
133 See Dra. Alejandra Castro B., TLC y el Sector Cultural [TLC and the Cultural 
Sector], LA NACIÓN, Oct. 2, 2005, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2005/octubre 
/02/opinion6.html (noting the opposition to CAFTA for fear of U.S. cultural 
domination, and arguing against it, claiming that it would actually lead to an 
enriching cultural exchange with many positive cultural effects). 
134 See Katherine Stanley, Trade-Pact Opponents Turn Up the Heat, TICO TIMES 
(Costa Rica), April 15, 2005, http://www.ticotimes.net/dailyarchive/2005_04 
/daily_04_12_05.htm#story1 (identifying Costa Rican social sector representatives 
and labor unions as a source of opposition to CAFTA, reasoning that it may have 
a negative impact on employment); see also Martha Lauer, CAFTA’s October 
Referendum: A Death Sentence for Costa Rican Trade & Foreign Investment?, COUNCIL 
ON HEMISPHERIC AFF. (Aug. 14, 2007), http://www.coha.org/2007/08 
/cafta%E2%80%99s-october-referendum-a-death-sentence-for-costa-rican-foreign-
investment (“While CAFTA is viewed as aiding Costa Rica’s economy . . . it is 
being faulted for not taking into account the fate of workers that will be adversely 
affected by it.”); Daniel Zueras, Companies Eye Pull-Outs if CAFTA Flounders, INTER 
PRESS SERVICE (Aug. 28, 2006), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=34486 (“Not 
only will this free trade agreement fail to generate employment, but we have 
showed in various studies that it actually threatens up to 200,000 service, 
agriculture and manufacturing jobs.”); John Lyons, Costa Rica Balks at Free Trade 
Pact, WALL ST. J., May 3,  2006, at A2 (indicating opposition to CAFTA partially 
due to the uncertain effects on lower-class Costa Ricans, the impact of trade 
agreement clauses governing intellectual property, and the effects on state-run 
insurance and telephone services); Press Release, Oxfam America, DR-CAFTA: A 
Bad Deal for Poor Countries (April 20, 2005), http://www.oxfamamerica.org 
/press/pressreleases/dr-cafta-a-bad-deal-for-poor-countries/?searchterm=cafta 
(describing the harmful effect that CAFTA’s ratification would have on poor small 
farmers in Central America). 
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condemning CAFTA.135  CAFTA’s opponents were organizing 
themselves and speaking out more vigorously against it.136 
In mid-November, anti-CAFTA sentiment exploded with a 
four-hour, peaceful, but highly vocal, march on the capital.137  The 
protesters marched on San José from three different locations 
throughout Costa Rica and joined forces in front of the Assembly 
while shouting anti-CAFTA phrases and urging their 
representatives not to ratify the agreement.138  The estimated 
number of participants in the San José march ranged between 
18,000 to 80,000, while the estimate of total participants in similar 
marches in the country on that day was 200,000 people, a huge 
number in light of the country’s small population.139  The 
organizers articulated their belief that CAFTA would not generate 
more jobs but instead create more poverty.140  In a direct attack on 
Arias, they urged those present to vote for a presidential candidate 
who did not support CAFTA.141  Various community leaders from 
around the country expressed their profound disdain for the 
agreement, and some stated that they would protest at the 
legislators’ homes, if it would prevent CAFTA from being 
ratified.142  The press provided ample coverage of the protests, thus 
 
135 See Fernado Duran Ayanegui, Las Ovejas de Einstein [Einstein’s Sheep] LA 
NACIÓN, Oct. 24, 2005, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2005/octubre/25 
/opinion1.html (outlining one anti-CAFTA signer’s explanation of why he joined 
the movement, led mostly by University students). 
136 See Jairo Villegas S., Pacífica Marcha Contra TLC [Peaceful march against the 
CAFTA] LA NACIÓN, Nov. 18, 2005, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2005 
/noviembre/18/pais0.html (reporting one large march against CAFTA in mid-
November 2005). 
137 See id. (describing the march, which lasted between 10 A.M. and 2 P.M. 
and closed streets in the capital). 
138 See id. (listing the three groups, where they began, and where they ended). 
139 See id. (“Organizers, participants, and observers of yesterday’s march 
disagree over the number of people that attended.”). 
140 Id. 
141 See id. (describing one representative’s message to the public to send a 
clear message of “No to CAFTA” and not to vote for a presidential candidate that 
supports it).   
142 See id. (noting that Eddie Gonzalez, of the National Civic Movement, 
warned that if representatives voted in favor of the agreement, the protestors 
would “serenade them at their houses”). 
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somewhat blunting the effects of its earlier pro-CAFTA 
campaign.143 
In response to the anti-CAFTA march of November 17, CAFTA 
supporters—primarily private sector employers and employees—
marched on the capital on November 23.144  The marchers urged 
immediate ratification by the Assembly, arguing that the treaty 
would guarantee more jobs, enhance exports by expanding Costa 
Rican markets, and eliminate obstacles to foreign investment, 
thereby increasing it by eliminating obstacles.145  Despite the strong 
and vocal opposition movement, there was still considerable 
positive press surrounding CAFTA at the end of 2005.146 
Meanwhile, other factors began to weigh in on the presidential 
campaign and on the CAFTA debate.  While CAFTA opponents 
pointed out the harmful effects of free trade agreements on other 
countries—especially NAFTA’s allegedly devastating impact on 
Mexican agriculture147—CAFTA supporters called attention to 
 
143 See Larga Peregrinación del TLC, supra note 123 (worrying that the 
opposition’s momentum would quash the agreement). 
144 Alvaro Murillo M., Manifestantes Urgen Aprobación del TLC [Protesters Urge 
Approval of CAFTA], LA NACIÓN, Nov. 25, 2005, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee 
/2005/noviembre/25/pais0.html (chronicling the protest in favor of passing 
CAFTA, composed mainly of private sector workers and their employers). 
145 See id. (describing the positions of the protestors involved in the pro-
CAFTA march). 
146 See Impredecibles Términos de Intercambio [Unpredictable Terms of Exchange], 
LA NACIÓN, Dec. 12, 2005, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2005/diciembre/12 
/opinion0.html (editorializing about the benefits of an FTA in years of volatile 
prices in international trade). 
147 See Economistas Piden Renegociación del TLC de EEUU con Mexico [Economists 
Call for Renegotiation of NAFTA between Mexico and the U.S.], LA NACIÓN, Oct. 18, 
2005, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2005/octubre/18/ueconomia-la10.html 
(summarizing Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott’s “NAFTA Revisited” and its 
suggestions about reforming NAFTA); OXFAM INT’L, A RAW DEAL FOR RICE UNDER 
DR-CAFTA: HOW THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT THREATENS THE LIVELIHOODS OF 
CENTRAL AMERICAN FARMERS 25 (2004), available at http://www.oxfamamerica.org 
/files/rice_brief111604.pdf (describing the collapse of the Mexican rice-growing 
sector in the wake of the country’s ratification of NAFTA); James C. McKinley Jr., 
U.S. Trade Pact Divides the Central Americans, With Farmers and Others Fearful, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, at 8 (describing that Costa Rican CAFTA critics fear that 
their country’s experience will mirror Mexico’s, “whose 10-year experiment in 
free trade with the United States has depopulated much of the countryside and 
sent waves of migration north of the border“); see also Larry Birns & Sarah E. 
Schaffer, CAFTA and its Discontents, LA PRENSA SAN DIEGO (June 3, 2005), 
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subtle pressures exerted by other Central American countries on 
Costa Rica to ratify CAFTA, lest it be left out of the treaty and its 
supposed benefits altogether.148  At a meeting with the U.S. 
Commerce Secretary, representatives of the other CAFTA members 
pointedly referred to “CAFTA [as] part of a privileged relationship 
of the Central-American region," as they urged Costa Rica to 
ratify.149  CAFTA supporters also drew attention to the agreements 
under negotiation between the United States, Panama, and 
Singapore, in emphasizing that Costa Rica must not fall behind in 
the race to obtain full guaranteed access to the U.S. market.150  With 
Arias holding a strong, uncompromising position in favor of 
ratifying the treaty151 Solis struck a more politically pragmatic tone, 
 
http://laprensa-sandiego.org/archieve/june03-05/cafta.htm (noting that more 
than one million Mexican farmers lost farmland because they could not compete 
in the wake of NAFTA); Hansen-Kuhn, supra note 16 (“Central Americans look 
with alarm at the experience of Mexican farmers under NAFTA, realizing that 
their own agricultural sectors, which are the source of up to half of local 
employment, could be devastated by imports of low-cost farm goods from the 
United States.”).  But see Lionel Beehner, Q&A: The CAFTA Debate, N.Y. TIMES, July 
18, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/slot3_071805.html 
?pagewanted=print (proposing the alternative theory that the post-NAFTA 
deficiencies in Mexico’s economy could be attributed to the devaluation of the 
peso and a financial crisis in 1994). 
148 See, e.g., Autoridades Centroamericanas Inician Reunión Sobre TLC con 
Secretario de Comercio de EE.UU [Central American Authorities Begin Meeting on FTA 
with U.S. Secretary of Commerce], LA NACIÓN, Oct. 20, 2005, 
http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2005/octubre/20/ultima-sr520984.html (“The 
Salvadoran President said . . . that the FTA ‘is an important commercial 
instrument that will greatly help our countries, above all because it will 
incentivize investments, strengthen existing business, and create new exportation 
businesses.’”). 
149 Id. (quotation translated from Spanish). 
150 See Ambos Países Firmarán en Diciembre Acuerdo de Libre Comercio [Both 
Countries Will Sign the Free Trade Agreement in December],  LA NACIÓN, Nov. 16, 
2005, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2005/noviembre/16/ueconomia-la15.html 
(pointing to the two free trade agreements in the works in Panama and 
Singapore); see also Fabián Borges, Investment Board Chief: No Foreign Investment 
Without CAFTA, TICO TIMES (Apr. 14, 2004), http://www.ticotimes.net 
/dailyarchive/2004_04/Week2/04_14_04.htm#story1 (describing a Costa Rican 
business leader’s support for CAFTA who pointed to catching up to other 
countries in foreign direct investment such as Singapore). 
151 Michael Lettieri, Costa Rica’s Elections: Not the Cleanest Game Around, 
COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFF. (Feb. 4, 2006), http://www.coha.org/2006/02 
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by arguing that although free trade could be beneficial, CAFTA 
should be renegotiated so as to eliminate its alleged 
asymmetries.152  In spite of these sharp differences, however, both 
candidates shared the prevailing consensus that, regardless of 
CAFTA’s eventual fate, the country would have to work more 
vigorously in the future to address the problems of unemployment 
and poverty.153 
Although Arias’ victory had seemed inevitable earlier, his 
strong pro-CAFTA stance, coupled with widespread perceptions 
that he was arrogant and felt entitled to the presidency, led to a 
sharp swing of the political tide against him in January.154  
According to a La Escuela de Estadística de la Universidad de Costa 
Rica study, 24% of undecided voters decided to vote for Solís, 
while only 10% decided to vote for Arias based upon the final 
week of campaigning.155  Of those who voted for Solís, 20% 
decided their votes during the final week of the campaign; 
furthermore, Solís’ campaign influenced the decision of 18% of 
voters while Arias’s campaign only influenced 5% of voters.156  The 
CAFTA debate ultimately appeared to benefit Solís because 18% of 
 
/costa-rica%e2%80%99s-elections-not-the-cleanest-game-around (noting Arias’s 
“vocal support for the yet to be ratified [CAFTA]”). 
152 Mauricio Herrera, Ottón Solís: El Retador Sin Promesas [Ottón Solís: The 
Challenger That Makes No Promises], LA NACIÓN, Jan. 29, 2006, 
http://wvw.nacion.com/proa/2006/enero/29/reportajes1.html (noting Solís’s 
desire to renegotiate CAFTA). 
153 See Expertos Analizan Estrategias Para Crear Trabajo y Bajar Pobreza en Costa 
Rica [Experts Analyze Strategies for Creating Jobs and Lowering Poverty in Costa Rica], 
LA NACIÓN, Oct. 20, 2005, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2005 
/octubre/20/ultima-sr521270.html (profiling a forum dedicated to job creation 
and eliminating poverty that even if CAFTA were passed, with one participant 
explaining that CAFTA was not a “panacea”). 
154 Enrique Gomariz Moraga, Elecciones 2006: El Efecto Placebo [Elections 2006: 
The Placebo Effect], LA NACIÓN, Feb. 19, 2006, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee 
/2006/febrero/19/opinion6.html (explaining why Arias received less support in 
the election than predicted by earlier polls). 
155 Pablo Fonseca, Estudio de la UCR Afirma que Propaganda del PAC Influyó 
Más en Gotantes que la del PLN [UCR study Sustains that Political Advertising by PAC 
Influenced Voters More than That of the PLN], LA NACIÓN, Feb. 10, 2006, 
http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2006/febrero/10/ultima-sr623817.html (detailing 
a study on voting behaviors in the Costa Rican presidential election and providing 
explanations for voting fluctuations). 
156 Id. 
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those who voted for him took the issue into consideration, whereas 
only 2% of voters who voted for Arias were actually voting for 
CAFTA.157 
The electoral campaign officially ended on February 2, 2006 at 
midnight, and February 3 began with the “dry law,” which 
prohibited the distribution of alcoholic beverages until after the 
election.158  At the end of the campaign, Arias was still favored to 
win.  Polls predicted he would garner 42.6% of the vote (a loss of 
7% in one week) over Solis’s 31.5% of the vote (a 5.2% increase over 
the same period).159  However, there was also a large percentage of 
undecided voters in conjunction with the 2.8% margin of error.160  
Therefore, there was a good chance that the presidential election 
would go to the second round between the two leading candidates.  
Arias maintained that CAFTA would polarize the elections, but 
that he would win the elections in the first round.161  He also 
emphasized that although many people—including him—were not 
happy with CAFTA, the pros outweighed the cons.162 
Ultimately, Arias almost lost the election.  On February 6, the 
Supreme Electoral Tribunal announced that Arias had obtained 
40.73% of the counted votes and Solis 40.06%—a difference of only 
0.67% or 8,741 votes.163  The election also possessed the highest 
percentage of abstentions in any first round election.164  At the 
 
157 Id. 
158 Caída de Arias en Sondeos Abre Posibilidad Segunda Vuelta [Arias’ Drop in 
Polls Opens Possibility of Ballotage], LA NACIÓN, Feb. 3, 2006, 
http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2006/febrero/03/ultima-cr5.html. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 See Candidato Oscar Arias Dice Que TLC Polarizará las Elecciones [Candidate 
Oscar Arias Says FTA Will Polarize Elections], LA NACIÓN, Feb. 4, 2006, 
http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2006/febrero/04/ultima-sr618448.html. 
(explaining that Arias anticipated that debate over CAFTA would polarize the 
election). 
162 Id. 
163 See Ronald Matute, Arias Confía en la Victoria [Arias Confident of Victory], LA 
NACIÓN, Feb. 6, 2006, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2006/febrero/06 
/pais0.html (reporting on the extremely close election based upon preliminary 
counts). 
164 Id.; Costa Rica Sigue a la Espera de Conocer a Su Presidente Electo [Costa Rica 
Still Awaiting to Know Its President-Elect], LA NACIÓN, Feb. 7, 2006, 
http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2006/febrero/07/ultima-cr2.html [hereinafter 
Costa Rica Sigue] (estimating an abstention rate of approximately 34.4%). 
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conclusion of the first round of elections, the race was clearly 
between only Arias and Solis:  the third place candidate only 
obtained 8.31% of the vote.165  On February 7, the Tribunal 
commenced a manual recount of the votes.166  Of all the votes, only 
11.56% could not be computed electronically; however, the 
Tribunal decided to recount all of the votes due to the close race.167  
The Tribunal concluded its recount on February 22 and announced 
in early March that Oscar Arias officially had defeated Ottón Solís 
by 18,165 votes—a 1.1% margin of victory.168 
While experts were divided on the degree of influence CAFTA 
played in the election’s close results, the trade agreement clearly 
presented the chief—as well as the most contentious—issue at the 
heart of the electoral campaign.169  Although Arias had originally 
possessed a seemingly insurmountable advantage over his closest 
rival in terms of name recognition, experience, and prestige, Arias 
was fighting for his political life by the conclusion of the election.170  
 
165 Matute, supra note 163. 
166 See Costa Rica Sigue, supra note 164 (detailing the recount and the 
estimated vote tallies). 
167 See Analistas Consideran que TLC Influyó en Resultado Elecciones [Analysts 
believe that CAFTA Influenced Election Results], LA NACIÓN, Feb. 7, 2006, 
http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2006/febrero/07/ultima-cr3.html (reporting that 
the the Tribunal elected to conduct a manual recount due to the narrow margin 
between the leading candidates); Costa Rica Sigue, supra note 164 (stating that due 
to various reasons, 11.56% of the votes could not be cast electronically). 
168 Arias se Proclama “El Presidente de Todos los Costarricenses,” supra note 115.  
See also Costa Rica: Free-Trade Backer is President-Elect, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2006, at 
A14 (reporting that Arias defeated Solís by “a little more than 18,000 votes of the 
1.6 million cast”). 
169 See Costa Rica: Free-Trade Backer is President-Elect, supra note 168 
(highlighting the two leading candidates’ positions on CAFTA in a report on the 
election results); Lorna Chacón, TLC con EE.UU. Divide a Principales Candidatos 
Presidenciales en Costa Rica [FTA with U.S. Divides the Major Presidential Candidates 
in Costa Rica], LA NACIÓN, Feb. 1, 2006, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2006 
/febrero/01/ultima-sr614713.html (emphasizing CAFTA as one of the key points 
of contentions between Arias and Solís); Analistas Consideran que TLC Influyó en 
Resultado Elecciones, supra note 167 (noting that analysts believed that the Costa 
Rican presidential candidates’ positions on CAFTA influenced the election’s 
outcome). 
170 See Lettieri, supra note 151 (observing that Arias’s previously strong 
political standing had eroded directly prior to the election due to his stalwart 
support for CAFTA); see also Costa Rican Election May Give Support to Cafta Foes in 
U.S., WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2006, at A13 (noting Solís’s surprising surge to a “virtual 
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While also coming across as aloof and removed from the daily 
problems of the average Costa Rican, Arias’s focus upon CAFTA as 
his signature campaign issue also obviously harmed his 
campaign.171  As the debate over the treaty intensified during the 
last months of the campaign and more Costa Ricans came to have 
serious misgivings about CAFTA, Arias’s poll numbers 
correspondingly suffered.172  By challenging Arias directly on the 
central question of CAFTA’s ratification, Solís gained widespread 
support that almost put him over the top in the first round.173 
But Solís also maneuvered far beyond simply opposing 
CAFTA.  As his campaign progressed, he came to articulate the 
voice of middle class voters such as small farmers, public 
employees, and labor union members who perceived CAFTA and 
its agenda as a threat to the Costa Rican social democratic model.174  
The presidential campaign thus was the beginning of a political 
process of mobilizing the forces opposed to neo-liberalism and 
 
tie with the campaign  front runner, Oscar Arias,” whose lead was previously 
thought to be “insurmountable”). 
171 See Lettieri, supra note 151 (noting that debate over free trade was 
“beginning to envelop Arias’ previously unimpeachable stature”); see also Frank 
Kendrick, Costa Rica’s Politics of Change, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFF. (Mar. 8, 
2006), http://www.coha.org/2006/03/costa-ricas-politics-of-change (describing 
the Arias campaign as “haughty”); Costa Rica’s Oscar Arias, A Man not Without 
Flaws, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFF. (Mar. 8, 2006), 
http://www.coha.org/2006/03/costa-ricas-oscar-arias-a-man-not-without-flaws 
(describing Arias as “[v]ain and with a dismissive personality often accompanied 
by an unsettling sense of self importance”). 
172 See Nobel Winner Slips at Costa Rica Election, THE AUSTRALIAN, Feb. 7, 2006, 
at 8, available at 2006 WLNR 2058006 (recalling that presidential race was the 
tightest in the history of Costa Rica as Arias’s favor “eroded in the days before the 
election.”).  See generally Costa Rican Poll Shows Solis Gaining Strength, Arias Losing 
Support, BBC MONITORING LATIN AMERICA—POLITICAL, Feb. 4, 2006 (reporting 
Solís’s gain in the polls). 
173 See Costa Rica Politics: Tight Election Result, EIU VIEWSWIRE, Feb. 6, 2006, 
(“The PAC owes much of its success to the energy of its leader, Mr Solis, and to its 
centre-left policy stance.  The party appealed to the many Costa Ricans sceptical 
about the free-trade agreement . . . [CAFTA].”). 
174 Id. (stating that Solis opposes the treaty); see also Costa Rica Sigue, supra 
note 164; Costa Rican Poll Shows Solis Gaining Strength, Arias Losing Support, supra 
note 172 (“Solis practically doubled his level of support in the rural areas of the 
Central Valley and in the urban and rural areas in the rest of the country.  In fact, 
in the February 2002 election those where the regions that gave the PAC candidate 
the least support.”). 
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globalization.175  As Arias officially assumed the presidency in 
March of 2006,176 it was clear that he lacked a mandate for CAFTA, 
and that the forces mobilized against CAFTA—far from being 
demoralized by the election’s results—were prepared for further 
battle using the full range of peaceful legal and political 
instruments available to them.177 
5. WIELDING HUMAN RIGHTS AGAINST CAFTA:  THE DEFENDER OF 
THE PEOPLE OF THE NATION JOINS THE FRAY 
Just a few days after Arias’s inauguration, the Defensoria de Los 
Habitantes del Pueblo (“Defender of the People of the Nation”) 
published a comprehensive 400-page report raising serious 
questions about CAFTA’s impact on human rights.178  The report 
received a great deal of attention in the Legislative Assembly and 
the news media.  Additionally, its timing, coinciding with the 
presidential election, was hardly fortuitous.  The report formed the 
 
175 See Costa Rica: Political Forces, EIU VIEWSWIRE, Apr. 20, 2005 (discussing 
disillusionment with established parties, including Arias’s party, and the rise of 
Solís’s PAC party which opposes neo-liberalism); see also Pablo Gámez, 
Referendum Rocks Costa Rica to its Foundations (CAFTA), FREE REPUBLIC (Oct. 5, 
2007), available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/1907636/posts 
(noting that CAFTA’s opponents fear neo-liberalism will end the country’s free 
education, good social provisions, and low-cost electricity and 
telecommunications). 
176 Background Note: Costa Rica, supra note 84. 
177 Posponen Trámite de TLC en Congreso Hasta Conocer Presidente Electo 
[Congresional Step postponed FTA in Congress to Meet President-Elect], LA NACIÓN, 
Feb. 9, 2006, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2006/febrero/09/ultima-
sr622655.html (Presenting differing views of whether it was legitimate for 
Congress to move towards ratifying CAFTA in the light of the narrow electoral 
results and given resistance measures which may arise if Congress addressed 
CAFTA).  See also Costa Rica Politics: A President at Last, EIU VIEWSWIRE, Mar. 9, 
2006 (“[Arias’s] victory will not secure him carte blanche with Congress, however, 
where his party will not have a majority.  In particular, he will struggle to gain 
legislative approval for the Dominican Republic Central America Free-Trade 
Agreement (DR-CAFTA) . . . .“). 
178 Defensoría de los Habitantes Alerta Sobre Impactos del TLC en Costa Rica 
[Ombudsman warns of impact of CAFTA on Costa Rica], LA NATION, March 30, 2006, 
http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2006/marzo/30/ultima-sr668340.html (stating 
potential negative effects of CAFTA, including, unfairness stemming from free 
trade in agriculture, the risk of job losses, and the uncertainty surrounding job 
creation). 
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intellectual backbone of the opposition to CAFTA, and it became 
an authoritative source for many of its arguments against the 
treaty.  It is thus worth examining in detail. 
The report began with a net assessment of the impact of 
globalization and “neo-liberal” policies on the country over the 
preceding two decades.179  On the positive side, the Costa Rican 
economy had become more diversified and more attractive to 
foreign capital, including high-technology firms.180  The tourist 
sector had grown, yielding important benefits to the country’s 
economy and its international image.181  In spite of recent setbacks, 
Costa Rica continued to possess some of the highest educational 
and public health standards in Latin America.182  Furthermore, 
protection of its environment had been placed on a solid footing.183 
On the negative side, economic growth had disproportionately 
benefited only a few groups tied closely to foreign trade, tourism, 
and the financial sector, while leaving behind small businessmen 
and farmers.184  The labor market was increasingly divided 
between highly paid professionals and poorly qualified workers 
who brought in meager earnings and had no job security operating 
in the informal economy.185  The increasing disparity in income 
distribution between “winners” and “losers” in the new economy 
threatened to weaken the middle class, historically the foundation 
 
179 See INFORME DE LA DEFENSORÍA, supra note 92, at 3 (describing globalization 
and neoliberalism as the “transformative” forces in Costa Rica in the last twenty 
years, largely criticizing the “Washington Consensus”). 
180 See id. at 52 (listing the comparatively few positive features of neoliberal 
policy in the last two decades, including industrial goods and services such as 
tourism). 
181 See id. (“It has safeguarded the environment, and it has made the tourism 
sector an important asset for the generation of foreign currency, scientific 
development, and the international image of the country.”). 
182 Id. 
183 See id. (explaining that the tourism industry helped environmental 
conservation efforts).  
184 See id. at 53 (explaining that the development helped four groups: 
exporters, commercial importers, businessmen in the tourism industry, and those 
in the private financial sector). 
185 See id. (implying that because the average Costarican either was not 
qualified enough to find a high-paying job or the job paid too little, he or she was 
forced to enter the informal market). 
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of Costa Rica’s democratic stability.186  Low levels of public 
investment, triggered by cutbacks in government spending, had 
led to infrastructural deterioration.187  Costa Rica’s abandonment of 
public functions—functions it had once considered a social 
obligation—was contributing to the increase in “social exclusion.”  
This “social exclusion” was defined by a growing number of 
individuals who were not only poor, but increasingly outside the 
network of basic social services and institutions. 
The report then proceeded to raise basic questions regarding 
CAFTA’s potential impact on Costa Rica within the context of the 
changes that occurred in the preceding two decades.  More than 
50% of Costa Rica’s exports went to the United States and 40% of 
its imports came from the United States; thus, the question was not 
whether trade between the two countries was a desirable goal, but 
rather whether CAFTA was the optimal way to structure such a 
relationship.188  With a home market 657 times larger than Costa 
Rica’s, U.S. firms were highly competitive relative to Costa Rican 
enterprises.189  Moreover, in 2002, President Bush signed a ten-year 
Farm Bill allocating $180 billion to agricultural subsidies, placing 
American food exporters in an unbeatable position vis-à-vis small 
Central American farmers.190  Drawing on figures from U.S. NGOs, 
the report singled out repeated instances of U.S. dumping of 
agricultural products on world markets from 1990 to 2002, with 
dumping margins as high as 35% for rice, 61% for cotton, and 13% 
for corn in 2002 (all vital commodities to Costa Rican 
agriculture).191  As a consequence of U.S. agricultural subsidies, 
and CAFTA’s failure to place effective limits on such subsidies, 
Costa Rican farmers would be unable to compete in any of the 
above commodities after dropping import tariffs as CAFTA 
 
186 See id. (explaining that the distribution of wealth has slowly chipped away 
at the middle class, which jeopardizes political stability). 
187 See id. (criticizing the cutbacks of government spending in favor of free 
market policies). 
188 See id. at 30 (expressing concern about the disparity between the benefits 
received by the United States and those received by Costa Rica).   
189 See id. at 55 n.59 (citing figures from a 2005 report to the Costa Rican 
president authored by Alvar Antillón Salazar).   
190 See id. at 66 (indicating the U.S. Farm Bill drastically raised agricultural 
subsidies, assigning $180,000 million to U.S. farmers over the ten year period from 
2002-2012 and representing a 70% increase on preexisting agricultural subsidies).   
191 See id. at 36.   
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requires.192  Indeed, Mexico’s experience with NAFTA illustrates 
why, far from being a panacea, free trade agreements can devastate 
vulnerable developing economies.193  Between 1994 and 2002, 
Mexico added 500,000 new jobs in the manufacturing sector but 
lost 1.3 million agricultural jobs.194  The report’s reference to 
NAFTA was highly significant, as it reinforced CAFTA critics’ 
invocation of NAFTA as a harbinger of Costa Rica’s fate under 
CAFTA.   
After setting out the broad economic and social context for 
CAFTA, the report began its substantive analysis of the agreement 
by examining its controversial provisions on intellectual property, 
focusing on the intellectual property provisions pertaining to 
pharmaceuticals.195  Two major issues surfaced immediately.  First, 
CAFTA provided that a patent’s term may be extended as a 
consequence of delays attributable to government conduct.  
Second, it granted a minimum five-year period during which data 
disclosed during patent registration can be protected from public 
access.196  These provisions go beyond the TRIPS requirements of 
the World Trade Organization.  Thus a developing country like 
Costa Rica—committed to improving its public health standards 
within its limited resources—might view these provisions as tilting 
the balance too far in favor of large U.S. pharmaceutical 
companies.197   
 
192 See id. at 65–67 (criticizing the United States’ use of subsidies to artificially 
deflate the prices of U.S. agricultural products to the detriment of other countries 
in free trade blocs).   
193 See id. at 55–56, n.61 (citing another report that exposed shortcoming of 
free trade agreements, pointing specifically to NAFTA). 
194 See id. (“[O]n one hand, 500,000 new jobs were created in the 
manufacturing sector, but on the other, 1.3 million jobs in the agricultural sector 
were lost between 1994 and 2002.”). 
195 See id. at 175–76 (introducing the chapter about intellectual property 
rights). 
196 See id. at 177–80 (setting out some of the issues with CAFTA’s intellectual 
property rights regime). 
197 See Pedro Roffe et al., A New Generation of Regional and Bilateral Trade 
Agreements: Lessons from the US-CAFTA-DR Agreement, in TRADE AND HEALTH: 
SEEKING COMMON GROUND 41, 58, 61 (Chantal Blouin et al. eds., 2007) (noting that 
CAFTA allows for extensions on patent terms in certain cases and explaining the 
provision of the TRIPS Agreement requiring protection of test data during the 
drug approval process); see also Maria Victoria Stout, Crossing the TRIPS 
Nondiscrimination Line: How CAFTA Pharmaceutical Patent Provisions Violate TRIPS 
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The report also alluded to the Memorandum of Understanding 
Concerning Public Health Measures, dated August 5, 2004, in 
which CAFTA’s signatories guaranteed access to medications 
related to pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, or 
in circumstances of extreme urgency or national emergency.198  The 
report lamented that the Memorandum was attached to the treaty 
as a statement of understanding rather than a binding provision.199  
Nevertheless, the Defensoria concluded that the Memorandum 
would provide future Costa Rican governments a legal and moral 
basis for resisting pharmaceutical companies’ efforts to restrict the 
availability of medications or setting prices excessively high.200   
Without reaching a definitive conclusion on the issue, the 
report noted widespread concern about whether CAFTA’s 
intellectual property regime would increase the Costa Rican 
government’s cost of subsidizing medication prices for 
disadvantaged members of society.201  In a 2005 letter to the 
Defensoria, Dr. Albin Chaves, Director of Pharmaceuticals of the 
Costa Rican public health service (CCSS), expressed concern that 
21% of the CCSS pharmaceutical budget was devoted to innovative 
medicines and therapies for which generic substitutes are 
unavailable.202  The five-year protection period for marketing test 
data and the time extensions provided for patents due to 
administrative or bureaucratic delays, implied that cheaper generic 
drugs would be unavailable for a longer period of time, in turn 
 
Article 27.1, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 177, 192–98 (2008) (arguing that CAFTA 
violates the TRIPS Article 27.1 nondiscrimination provision by discriminating in 
favor of pharmaceutical patent holders).   
198 See INFORME DE LA DEFENSORIA DE LOS HABITANTES supra note 92, at 185–86 
(representing one of three “fundamental agreements” that were signed in a letter 
by Central American countries and the United States, assuring that the rights to 
adequate health care would not be denied).   
199 See id. at 186–87 (“[It] is clear that [this letter] is not part of the treaty.”). 
200 See id. at 201 (recommending that the Memorandum be used to justify 
future laws that provide maximum access to medications for Costa Ricans).   
201 See id. at 201-02 (recommending that a comprehensive study be conducted 
to anticipate what sort of effect the agreement would have on access to medicine). 
202 See id. at 184; see also Ángela Ávalos R., Albin Chaves: Este Tema Es un 
Desafio [Albin Chaves: This Issue Is a Challenge], LA NACIÓN, Nov. 19, 2006, 
http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2006/noviembre/19/pais883693.html (reporting 
Chaves’s argument that due to an increase in medication prices, Costa Rica must 
overcome many challenges in order to provide the poor access to medication).   
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increasing the cost burdens on the public health care system.203  
While it was impossible to estimate the severity of these burdens, 
they were certainly a risk meriting careful consideration.   
While the Defensoria did not find any CAFTA clauses that 
posed a definitive Costa Rican public health risk, the Defensoria 
argued that the government could only take advantage of some 
CAFTA exceptions if it was quite agile and firm in holding the line 
on others, so as to protect the population’s human right to 
health.204  It also rather sharply noted that an ethos of “possessive 
individualism”—which was at odds with human solidarity and 
distributive justice principles—underlined CAFTA’s intellectual 
property provisions.205  Relying upon bioethics principles, the 
report challenged the Costa Rican state to take its moral obligations 
to the weak and disadvantaged more seriously so as to ensure their 
full access to affordable and adequate health care.206 
With regard to CAFTA’s impact on the environment, the report 
underlined a series of significant concerns and urged the 
Legislative Assembly to enact provisions to clarify and strengthen 
environmental protections, which may have been ambiguous in 
the wake of the agreement.207  It stressed that the constitutional 
guarantee to the “right to a healthy and ecologically balanced 
environment”208 should guide Costa Rica’s environmental policies.  
 
203 See Roffe et. al, supra note 197, at 58, 61 (describing the market exclusivity 
that is created by protection periods and time extensions, and the resulting delay 
for market entry of generic competitors).   
204 See INFORME DE LA DEFENSORIA, supra note 92, at 200–02 (advocating for, 
among other things, the strengthening of legal mechanisms to give the greatest 
degree of possible effectiveness to obligatory licensing,  parallel importation, and 
other practices permitted by the proposed law).   
205 Id. at 198 (defining possessive individualism as the belief and practice of 
treating everyone as sole owner of their own capabilities and productivity 
without owing anything to society as a whole).   
206 See id. at 203 (arguing that the state should seek to buttress trade 
agreements with the transfer of resources to the disadvantaged by seeking out 
greater access to financial resources, new knowledge, and more advanced 
technology). 
207 See id. at 216–21 (listing water conservation, soil use, marine resources, 
and the management of energy resources among the areas of legislation that are 
excluded from the treaty’s basic definition). 
208 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 Y SUS 
REFORMAS, art. 50, available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions 
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According to the report, this human right was considered a higher 
priority than the goals of increasing trade and foreign 
investment.209  Moreover, the environment had to be considered a 
“common patrimony” of all Costa Ricans rather than a public good 
that could be simply auctioned off to the highest private sector 
bidder.210 
The report concernedly highlighted CAFTA’s requirement that 
disputes be settled through international arbitration, and that the 
decisions of such arbitral tribunals took precedence over Costa 
Rica’s domestic courts.211  While foreign investors challenging 
Costa Rica’s environmental measures would find recourse through 
arbitration, Costa Rican citizens, NGOs and other non-
governmental entities—whose interests would be affected by the 
rulings of the arbitral tribunals—would not be able to appear 
directly in the arbitration proceedings.212  Rather, only the Costa 
Rican government and its officials would be permitted to do so.  
This meant that environmental protection issues would be decided 
by private arbitral tribunals with ample opportunity to consider 
the interests of foreign investors, but none to hear those 
individuals whose lives and human rights would be most directly 
affected by their rulings.213  
Yet another problem was that, under CAFTA, foreign investors 
could impugn environmental regulatory measures as disguised 
restraints on trade.  Such disputes must ultimately appear before 
 
/Costa/costa2.html (stating that all persons have the right to a healthy and 
ecologically balanced environment). 
209 See INFORME DE LA DEFENSORIA, supra note 92, at 213 (describing Costa 
Rica’s development model as an effort to balance economic growth and 
conservation with the aim of promoting human rights). 
210 See id. (reasoning that there is a constitutional right to enjoy the 
environment and an implied right to denounce any efforts to impede that 
enjoyment). 
211 See id. at 229 (quoting Manrique Jiménez Meza) (arguing that binding 
resolutions and injunctions from arbitration will lead to the subordination of 
internal courts to arbitration justice). 
212 See id. 246 (finding that article 10.28 defines the potential plaintiff as an 
investor and the potential defendant as the government). 
213 See id. at 246–47  (describing several previous arbitrations, including those 
involving Harken Energy and Vanessa Ventures, in which local groups were not 
permitted to participate or voice their concerns). 
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private arbitral tribunals,214 which are naturally more attuned to 
the interests of trade and investment protection than 
environmental interests.215  All CAFTA members, with the 
exception of the United States, placed themselves in a 
disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the United States, by agreeing 
that trade in services would be wide open except for categories 
specifically listed in so-called “negative lists,” or lists of specific 
exceptions.  This CAFTA provision was sharply different from the 
standard terms of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS), under which trade in services is liberalized only to the 
extent that a state party makes a specific concession.216  Under 
CAFTA, all signatories agreed to open up trade in services 
completely, except for specific negotiated exceptions listed in the 
“negative lists.”217  A Unlike the other CAFTA members, however, 
the United States succeeded in negotiating a sweeping clause 
attached to its “negative list,” indicating that it opened up its 
markets to services only to the extent of its similar, and more 
restricted, commitments under the GATS.218  In practice, this means 
that, while the Central American nations open up their markets 
widely in the service sector widely to U.S. companies, the United 
States restricts its opening in that sector to the same level it already 
has under the GATS.219  This asymmetrical opening of its services 
sector leaves Costa Rica highly vulnerable to a broad swath of 
future legal attacks on its environmental protection legislation in 
the guise of challenges to disguised restraints on trade.220 
 
214 See id. at 247 (concluding that the arbitration regime allows investors to 
modify regulations even if these modifications effect public interest). 
215 See id. at 248 (recognizing that decisions of a clearly public character will 
be relegated to private panels wherein the state becomes more vulnerable to the 
pressure of transnational corporations). 
216 See id. at 233–34. 
217 See id. at 250 (concluding that a system utilizing negative lists is more 
likely to lead to legal uncertainty). 
218 See id. (noting that Annex II of the treaty grants the United States a blanket 
provision for excluding future service imports). 
219 See id. (contrasting the potentially relaxed standard to which the United 
States is subject to the exacting negative lists that would govern other CAFTA 
countries). 
220 See id. (considering that even the extraction of hydrocarbons could fall 
within the broad definition of services). 
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Another issue of concern was access to water.  Under CAFTA, 
Costa Rica is obligated to open up its state monopoly over the 
production and distribution of water to foreign companies.221  
Currently, access to water is considered a human right guaranteed 
by the state through the provision of a public service.222  Under 
CAFTA, however, water would become a commercial resource.  
The report noted the well-known experience of Cochabamba in 
Bolivia, where the state privatized water services to foreign 
providers, resulting in sharply increased water fees, thereby 
decreasing access to water by some of the poorest citizens.223 
CAFTA also may undermine Costa Rica’s 1998 Biodiversity 
Statute, through which the country has sought to protect and 
 
221 See id. at 254–55 (identifying the possibility that state and municipal water 
service providers who priority in water rights could come under attack from 
foreign investors interested in exploiting local water resources). 
222 See Manuel Chavez, Trade and Environment in Latin America: When 
Institutions, Transparency and Accountability are Essential, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 226, 
240–41 (2006).  
In 2002 the UN Commission on Human Rights declared the need for 
water as a basic human right.  The Commission ensured that the concept 
of ‘the right to water’ was part of the future convention of the UN on 
water.  But because of pressure exerted by the World Bank and the IMF, 
this notion has shifted to classify water as an economic good instead of a 
public good.  
Id. (citing Fritz Brugger, Some Water for All or More Water for Some?, in BREAD FOR 
THE WORLD (2004), available at http://www.waterjustice.org/uploads 
/attachments/pdf39.pdf); U.N. Committee on Econ. Soc. and Cultural Rts., 
Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, arts. 11, 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 
20, 2003), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0 
/a5458d1d1bbd713fc1256cc400389e94/$FILE/G0340229.pdf (arguing that the 
right to water has been recognized in many international documents and is 
essential to the survival of human beings); see also Melina Williams, Note, 
Privatization and the Human Right to Water: Challenges for the New Century, 28 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 469, 472–78 (2007) (discussing international treaties that explicitly 
recognize water as a human right, and other documents, such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which may be interpreted as including 
water as a human right). 
223 INFORME DE LA DEFENSORIA, supra note 92, at 238–40; see also SUSAN ARIEL 
AARONSON & JAMIE M. ZIMMERMAN, TRADE IMBALANCE: THE STRUGGLE TO WEIGHT 
HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS IN TRADE POLICYMAKING 1–2 (2008) (describing the 35% 
rise in the price of water that the impoverished people of Cochabama, Bolivia 
faced after the government auctioned off the city’s water utility). 
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regulate the commercialization of its rich biological and genetic 
resources.224  Under CAFTA’s provisions dealing with trade in 
services, Costa Rica has the right to require that foreign companies 
“that supply services of scientific investigation and bio-inspection 
with regard to Costa Rica’s biodiversity” must designate a legal 
representative in the country.225  The Costa Rican Biodiversity 
Statute defines “bio-inspection” as “the systematic search, 
classification and research for commercial purposes of new sources 
of chemical compounds, genes, proteins, microorganisms and 
other products with current or potential economic value that may 
be found in the biodiversity sphere.”226  The report found 
substantial flaws with CAFTA’s approach.227 
First, under the Costa Rican Biodiversity Statute, genetic and 
biochemical resources are goods that are part of the public weal 
and therefore remain under the control of the State, which 
regulates permits for their commercial use.228  By placing bio-
inspection under the rubric of trade in services, thereby linking it 
to the agreement’s rules on investment, a foreign company 
carrying out bio-inspection could claim investor rights protection 
over collected materials.  Foreign companies could then demand 
intellectual property rights over the biochemical or genetic 
properties of such material.229 
 
224 INFORME DE LA DEFENSORIA, supra note 92, at 256–57 (noting the differences 
between Costa Rica’s Biodiversity rules and the CAFTA agreement). 
225 Id. at 257–58.   
226 Id. at 256 n. 244.   
227 See id. at 259 (concluding that bio-inspection is transformed from an 
opportunity for systematic classification into scientific service subject to investor 
regulation). 
228 Ley No. 7788: Ley de Biodiversidad, LA GACETA: DIARIO OFICIAL, May 27, 
1998, available at http://www.glin.gov/search.action (follow glin.gov hyperlink 
and search for 129338; then click on title hyperlink and click on Full Text 1 for 
.pdf) (providing an article by article summary of the Law on Diversity, which 
grants the total and exclusive authority of biodiversity to the nation of Costa 
Rica).   
229 See Vivian H.W. Wang, Investor Protection or Environmental Protection? 
“Green” Development under CAFTA, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 251, 277–80 (2007) 
(supporting the possibility of demanding investor rights in collected materials); 
see also James McCarthy, Privatizing Conditions of Production: Trade Agreements as 
Neoliberal Environmental Governance, 35 GEOFORUM 327, 333 (2004) (raising 
concerns that corporate trade arbitration could overrule national and sub-national 
environmental regulations). 
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The impact of CAFTA’s intellectual property protections’ 
impact on the environment presented another set of problems.230  
Under CAFTA, Costa Rica is obligated to join the International 
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV).231  Adopted in 1961, and revised in 1972, 1978 and 1991, 
the Convention seeks to protect new varieties of plants by securing 
intellectual property rights for their inventors and developers.232  
Under UPOV, U.S. companies can prohibit Costa Rican farmers 
from using for commercial purposes seeds from crops obtained 
through “patented seeds,” for commercial purposes.233  The report 
noted with serious concern measures adopted by foreign 
companies to control access to their seeds, such as payments to 
farmers to spy on their neighbors, and development of “suicide 
seeds,” which produce sterile seeds in the second generation.234  
On the whole, CAFTA will increase the cost of seeds and restrict 
access to them.235  The millennial rights of farmers to the seeds 
produced by their crops, and the traditional relations of social 
solidarity revolving around the sale and exchange of seeds among 
farmers, would take second place to intellectual property rights.236 
With regard to the key human rights area of labor rights, the 
report raised the question of whether CAFTA placed Costa Rica at 
a distinct disadvantage.237  Reflecting its focus on protecting the 
rights of investors, exporters, and holders of intellectual property 
rights, CAFTA does not set any labor standards, nor does it seek to 
raise them in the future, but simply leaves it up to each signatory 
 
230 INFORME DE LA DEFENSORIA, supra note 92, at 243. 
231 See id. at 245, at 260 (noting that intellectual property protection over plant 
varieties is obtained either through the ratification of the UPOV or the granting of 
patents). 
232 See International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, 
art. 14, Dec. 2, 1961, as revised 33 U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 89 (providing and 
promoting an effective system of plant variety protection to encourage the 
development of new breeds of plant life to benefit society). 
233 See id.  
234 INFORME DE LA DEFENSORIA, supra note 92, at 264-65 (noting that steps have 
been taken to ban so called terminator seeds in countries like Brazil and India). 
235 See id. at 265.  
236 See id. (describing the situation as the transformation of a millenial right 
into a crime). 
237 See id. at 292 (considering that labor standards may be viewed as an 
incentive or disincentive to investment). 
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to comply with its own labor laws.238  As a concession to critics 
who argued that the free trade agreement did not place enough 
emphasis on labor rights, CAFTA has a chapter dedicated to 
enforcement of labor law standards.239  Article 16.1(2) states: 
 
238 See Dominican Republic—Central America Free Trade Agreement art. 
16.2, Aug. 5, 2004, 43 ILM 514, available at http://www.ustr.gov 
/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/cafta/asset_upload_file320_3936.pdf 
(“Each Party retains the right to exercise discretion with respect to investigatory, 
prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters and to make decisions 
regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to other labor 
matters determined to have higher priorities.”); see also Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, 
Leveling the Playing Field: Labor Provisions in CAFTA, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 386, 
432–33 (2005) (“CAFTA . . . does not require . . . Costa Rica . . . to revise [its] labor 
standards to more closely mirror international core labor rights.”). 
239 See Dominican Republic—Central America Free Trade Agreement art. 
16.2, Aug. 5, 2004, 43 ILM 514, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/cafta/asset_uplo
ad_file320_3936.pdf (affirming that each Party can establish their own domestic 
labor standards and ensure that their labor standards are consistent with 
internationally recognized labor rights); see also Neighborly Trade, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 11, 2003, at A16 (stating that Guatemala and El Salvador revamped its labor 
laws in preparation for CAFTA negotiations); see also Washington Office on Latin 
America, DR-CAFTA and Workers Rights: Moving from Paper to Practice, INT’L LAB. 
RIGHTS FORUM (Oct. 12, 2011, 8:24 PM), http://www.laborrights.org/creating-a-
sweatfree-world/changing-global-trade-rules/resources/2099. 
 Similar congressional concerns over labor rights nearly caused the 
defeat of the Dominican Republic—Central America Free Trade 
Agreement in 2005 in both chambers.  To guarantee its passage, former 
U.S. Trade Representative Robert Portman and Senator Bingaman (D-
NM) agreed to provide roughly $20 million to improve labor rights 
practice and enforcement, based on the recommendations outlined in the 
White Paper “The Labor Dimension in Central America and the 
Dominican Republic—Building on Progress: Strengthening Compliance 
and Enhancing Capacity.” 
Id.; see also Jim Lobe, Labor, Rights Groups Vow to Stop CAFTA in Congress, 
COMMONDREAMS.ORG, (Dec. 10, 2003), http://www.commondreams.org 
/headlines03/1210-10.htm. (arguing that “[s]ince multinational companies could 
challenge environmental and public interest protections before international 
tribunals . . . how many Central American countries will still take action to 
safeguard their citizens and environment?”); see Labor Rights Protections in CAFTA, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2003), 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/usa/cafta1003.pdf (discussing the 
adequacy of labor rights and the enforcement of labor laws under CAFTA); see 
also Greg Hitt, Latin Nations Vow Labor Overhauls To Get Trade Pact; To Placate U.S. 
Lawmakers, Cafta Partners Will Pledge To Assure Workers’ Rights, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 
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The Parties affirm their full respect for their Constitutions.  
Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own 
domestic labor standards, and to adopt or modify 
accordingly its labor laws, each Party shall strive to ensure 
that its laws provide for labor standards consistent with the 
internationally recognized labor rights set forth in Article 
16.8 and shall strive to improve those standards in that 
light.240 
Although Chapter 16 urges parties to ensure that their laws 
comply with internationally recognized standards,241 critics of the 
agreement, including many members of the U.S. Congress, believe 
that the language used in the CAFTA chapter on labor will not 
improve labor standards in the participating nations.242  As part of 
Chapter 16, CAFTA also establishes a ministerial-level Labor 
Council through which the Ministers of Labor of the signatory 
states meet periodically to review cooperation on labor matters and 
the enforcement of each country’s own labor standards.243 
But while CAFTA is not a labor rights agreement per se, it will 
have important implications for labor issues, not all of them 
positive.  The Defensoría report pointed out 50 International Labor 
Organization conventions, stretching all the way from 1919 to 1999, 
which Costa Rica had ratified.244  The other CAFTA members, 
 
2005, at A15 (“[C]ritics complain that [CAFTA] . . . would do nothing to improve 
working conditions or ease the culture of hostility toward the labor movement 
that is pervasive [in Latin America].”). 
240 Dominican Republic—Central America Free Trade Agreement art. 16.1, 
Aug. 5, 2004, 43 ILM 514, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/CAFTA 
/CAFTADR_e/chapter13_22.asp#Article16.1. 
241 INFORME DE LA DEFENSORIA, supra note 92, at 259.  
242 See Hitt, supra note 239, at A15. 
243 See Central American Free Trade Agreement art. 16.4, Aug. 5, 2004, 43 ILM 
514,  available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements 
/cafta/asset_upload_file320_3936.pdf (“The Council shall meet within the first 
year after the date of entry into force of this Agreement and thereafter as often as 
it considers necessary to oversee the implementation of and review progress 
under this Chapter, including the activities of the Labor Cooperation and 
Capacity Building Mechanism . . . .”). 
244 INFORME DE LA DEFENSORIA, supra note 92, at 278–81 (including the eight 
fundamental conventions of the 1998 ILO Declaration). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
03 COLL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2011  8:23 PM 
508 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 33:2 
including the United States, had not ratified all of them.245  By 
lowering trade and investment barriers without requiring a 
uniform upgrade of labor standards for all signatories up to the 
highest levels of labor rights protection, CAFTA could encourage 
business firms to seek out the producers with the lowest labor costs 
and lowest labor standards.246  This would be a classic “race to the 
bottom” that would punish the Costa Rican economy for its higher 
levels of labor protection and lead to higher unemployment in the 
country.247 
Thus, rather than leading to a strengthening of labor rights, 
CAFTA could wind up putting pressures on Costa Rican 
employers and the government to relax the enforcement of existing 
protections, so as to make the country more attractive to foreign 
investors.248  The report noted that even before Costa Rica signed 
CAFTA, the country already was showing a disturbing tendency in 
this direction.249  From 2001 to 2003, for example, out of 695 formal 
complaints to the Ministry of Labor regarding labor rights 
violations, in 55% of the cases where government inspectors 
concluded that remedial action by the employer was required such 
action was delayed beyond the sixty-day period required by law.250  
In those cases where the government decided that a formal 
complaint or prosecution was necessary, only 21% of those actions 
were started within the required 60-day period, with 45% being 
started between 120 and 180 days.251  From 2001 to 2005, along with 
widespread non-enforcement of the deadlines required by law for 
handling and resolving workers’ complaints, there was a marked 
decline in the number of employers inspected.252  Given these 
 
245 See id. at 278 (considering that as a signatory to more ILO conventions the 
agreement will create greater obligations). 
246 See id. at 280 (finding that even Art. 16.2 of the proposed agreement 
creates the obligation of the parties to not use the lowering of labor standards as a 
means of generating investment). 
247 See id. at 279 (comparing Costa Rica’s higher standards to those of the 
United States). 
248 See id. (noting the relative weakness of the agreements phrasing of 
provisions discouraging the weakening of labor protections). 
249 Id. at 282–83 (noting a series of disputes with ILO standards including the 
right to collective bargaining and free association).   
250 Id. at 269. 
251 Id. 
252 Id. 
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trends, the report concluded that Costa Rica was not prepared for 
the downward pressures that CAFTA may place on workers’ 
rights, and it urged the government to strengthen enforcement of 
existing labor legislation and to work more vigorously for an 
upgrade in labor standards among all CAFTA signatories.253 
Another concern underlined by the report was CAFTA’s 
impact on Costa Rica’s state monopolies.254  As explained earlier, 
the Constitution requires that certain areas of economic life, such 
as banking, insurance, telecommunications, and water resources be 
under the control of the State,255 although the State may allow 
private entities to offer services in these areas in accordance with 
its regulations.256  Up until now, insurance and 
telecommunications services have been exclusively in the hands of 
two state monopolies, the INS (Instituto Nacional de Seguros) and 
ICE (Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad), although there has 
been a multimillion dollar “black market” private insurance 
industry operating in the country for some time.257  Under CAFTA, 
 
253 Id. at 267. 
254 See id. at 286–87. 
255 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 Y SUS 
REFORMAS, Title XIV, available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions 
/Costa/costa2.html (asserting that the state retains power over certain sectors of 
the economy); see also Background Note: Costa Rica, supra note 84 (listing the 
industries that have historically been subject to a state monopoly); see INFORME DE 
LA DEFENSORIA, supra note 92; see Neftali Garro, Insurance Privatization in Costa 
Rica: Lessons from Latin America With Special Reference to Uruguay, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 
359, 409–11 (2001) (detailing the history and development of the National 
Insurance Institute); see generally Eleanor D. Kinney & Brian Alexander Clark, 
Provisions for Health and Health Care in the Constitutions of the Countries of the World, 
37 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 285 (2004) (examining how countries’ constitutions address 
issues related to healthcare). 
256 INFORME DE LA DEFENSORIA, supra note 92, at 283–86. 
257 See Costa Rica: Constitution and Institutions, EIU VIEWSWIRE, July 18, 2006, 
(describing how the ICE and INS enjoy state sponsored monopolies); see Costa 
Rica: Constitution and Institutions, EIU VIEWSWIRE, April 1, 2008 (asserting that 
despite attempts to break up state run monopolies, “public opposition . . . 
prevented any changes”); see R. Victoria Lindo, Hydroelectric Power Production in 
Costa Rica and the Threat of Environmental Disaster Through CAFTA, 29 B.C. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 297, 301 (2006) (contending that Costa Rica has a several laws that 
regulate the private exploitation of its water supply); see also Neftali Garro, supra 
note 255, at 409–13, 415 (illustrating the history of the Instituto Nacional de 
Seguros (INS) and noting that the INS is the only entity which can legally provide 
insurance). 
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however, Costa Rica is obligated to permit access and competition 
by foreign entities in these markets.258 
The report emphasized that opening up the insurance market 
to competition would require the creation of an insurance 
regulatory authority to make sure that private providers comply 
with certain basic legal and regulatory norms.259  The report’s main 
concern was not so much the commercial insurance market, 
although that too would require regulatory oversight, but what it 
called “social insurance”, that is, the provision of basic insurance 
services to individuals, especially lower income persons, who 
might not be able to afford the insurance rates likely to be charged 
by private providers.260  The report pointedly referred to the 
experience of several South American countries, where the 
insurance industry ceased to be a state monopoly only to become a 
private sector oligopoly.261  The result was less access for workers 
and their families to basic insurance services.262 
 
258 See Background Note: Costa Rica, supra note 84.  
Costa Rica's insurance, telecommunications, electricity distribution, 
petroleum distribution, potable water, sewage, and railroad 
transportation industries have been state monopolies.  However, under 
the U.S.-Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA-DR), Costa Rica accords substantial market access in a wide 
range of services, subject to very few exceptions.  The wireless telephony, 
data telecommunications, and insurance markets opened to market 
competition in 2010.  As part of the implementing agenda for CAFTA-
DR, Costa Rica intends to strengthen and modernize the state monopoly 
telecommunications provider (ICE) so that it can remain competitive 
with new companies entering the market. 
Id. 
259 INFORME DE LA DEFENSORIA, supra note 92, at 322 (recognizing the need to 
create a regulatory entity prior to the liberalization of the insurance market). 
260 Id. (noting that any solution should consider how to achieve a balanced 
outcome that does not leave the insured without protection). 
261 See The Americas Shift Toward Private Health Care, 351 ECONOMIST 27, 28 
(May 8, 1999) (contending that by privatizing their healthcare systems, Latin 
American countries may restrict the poorest citizens from gaining access to health 
services). 
262 See Denis Drechsler & Johannes Jütting, Different Countries, Different Needs: 
The Role of Private Insurance in Developing Countries, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L., 
497, 506–07 (2007) (arguing that the high premiums that private health insurance 
companies in Latin America command preclude the poor from purchasing private 
health insurance); see also Celia Ariart et al., Managed Care Goes Global: Latin 
America Confronts the Multinational Health Insurers, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Oct. 
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Regarding the expected opening of the telecommunications 
market, the report began its analysis by linking access to 
telecommunications services to the most basic human right:  the 
right to an adequate standard of living.263  The report noted that, in 
spite of its flaws and limitations, Costa Rica’s model for developing 
its telecommunications, based on principles of social solidarity and 
access to all, had resulted in high levels of coverage coupled with 
tariffs appropriate to the modest living standards of the average 
citizen.264  As of 2004, the country had 32 public telephones per 
1,000 inhabitants, comparing favorably with China at 24 telephones 
per 1,000 inhabitants, and even the much wealthier countries of 
Spain and Italy with 42 and 45 telephones per 1,000 inhabitants 
respectively.265  In Latin America, Costa Rica has the highest 
density of fixed telephone lines coupled with the lowest rates for 
fixed line service, as well as the lowest rates for cellular phone 
service.266  In 2004, Costa Rica also had the highest per capita 
internet usage for Central America, and in Latin America it was 
surpassed only by Chile.267  The report pointed out that the Latin 
American experience with breaking up state telecommunications 
monopolies through privatization and opening to foreign 
 
2004, at 15–16 (“[C]ritics of managed care in Latin America argue that establishing 
the profit motive as the guiding principle of the healthcare system has restricted 
access for vulnerable groups . . . .”). 
263 See Int’l Covenant on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts. art. 11, opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 7 (“The States Parties to the present 
Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for 
himself and his family . . . .”). 
264 INFORME DE LA DEFENSORIA, supra note 92, at 323 (arguing that adequate 
Access to telecommunications is a means of achieving the human right to an 
adequate standard of living). 
265 Id. at 334 graph 12. 
266 Id. at 334–35; see also Human Development Report 2009: Gender-Related 
Development Index and Its Components, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2009_EN_Table_J.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 
2011) (providing statistics which reveal the number of telephone mainlines per 
1,000 people in 2007, noting that Costa Rica lags behind Argentina, Chile, and 
Uruguay).  
267 INFORME DE LA DEFENSORIA, supra note 92, at 311; see also Human 
Development Report 2009, supra note 266 (presenting statistics for the year 2005 
demonstrating that Costa Rica had 254 Internet users per 1,000 people in 2005, 
ranking behind Barbados, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay).  
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competition raised serious questions.268  The result generally had 
been concentration of market share in the hands of one or two 
major providers, along with a less competitive environment and 
higher rates.269 
In response, the report urged the Costa Rican government to 
prepare the country for the challenges that CAFTA would entail.  
In particular, the ICE had to be reformed in order to make it more 
efficient and competitive, if it was to retain its role as the country’s 
telecommunications provider of last resort.270  The country also 
had to articulate a post-CAFTA policy of universal access to 
telecommunications that would obligate private sector providers to 
extend services to individuals and geographical areas that were not 
profitable.271  And a new regulatory agency would have to be 
created, as in the field of insurance, to oversee telecommunications 
from the standpoint of the public interest.272 
6. THE PUBLIC DEBATE’S FOCUS ON CAFTA’S IMPACT ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS:  ECONOMIC HUMAN RIGHTS 
The public debate in the country during the year following the 
election’s conclusion echoed the issues raised by the Defensoria’s 
report.  Foremost in the minds of CAFTA’s opponents were 
economic human rights and the right to health.  In the area of 
economic human rights, concerns revolved around CAFTA’s 
impact on agriculture, industry, and the public services provided 
by Costa Rica’s state monopolies in water, electricity, and 
telecommunications.  Although, by Central American standards, 
Costa Rica has a relatively stable developing economy,273 20% of its 
 
268 INFORME DE LA DEFENSORIA, supra note 92, at 375 (arguing that a policy of 
universal service is necessary for the expansion of telecommunications networks 
to high cost areas). 
269 Id. at 370 (demonstrating the tendency towards concentration in cellular 
telephone markets across Latin America). 
270 Id. at 371–74 (listing a wide array of policy suggestions, including freedom 
to create new subsidiaries and engage in advertising). 
271 Id. at 376 (inquiring in particular as to what new reforms will be needed to 
retain the current level of density and inclusion). 
272 Id. at 364–71 (envisioning as potential regulatory options the strengthening 
of the national public services regulator, the creation of a new regulatory agency, 
or the assignment of telecommunications to antitrust authorities). 
273 See Andrew D. Mason & Carlos Sobrado, Costa Rica: Recapturing Momentum 
for Poverty Reduction, 96 EN BREVE 1, 1 (World Bank, Oct. 2006), available at 
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population lives in poverty, and much of that poverty is 
concentrated among farmers and single women.274  Many of the 
country’s poorest people live in rural farming communities.275  
These communities became closely involved in massive anti-
CAFTA demonstrations throughout 2006 and the first half of 2007 
as their members demanded answers from the Arias government 
concerning their future livelihood as farmers.276 
Agriculture contributes to 8.7% of the country’s GDP and 
employs 20% of its workforce.277  Key crops include fruits, coffee, 
and sugarcane.278  As the Defensoria’s report pointed out, the 
primary fear of the agricultural sector was that small farms would 
be unable to compete with highly subsidized U.S. farm products.279  
 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTENBREVE/Newsletters/21181757/Oct0
6_96_CR_Regaining_ENv2.pdf (noting that Costa Rica is well known for socio-
economic achievements given its “low levels of poverty and inequality by Latin 
American standards” and also its steady performance in “health, access to 
improved water supplies, suitable housing and other basic services”). 
274 Eva Carazo Vargas, Costa Rica: Why We Reject CAFTA, FEMINIST INT’L RADIO 
ENDEAVOR (Aug. 3, 2007), http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/1077 (noting 
that Costa Rica’s poverty level hovered at roughly 20% from 1992 to the article’s 
publication in 2007); Estadísticas Sociales (1997–2009): Pobreza [Social Statistics 
(1997-2009: Poverty], ESTADO DE LA NACIÓN, http://www.estadonacion.or.cr 
/index.php/estadisticas/costa-rica/compendio-estadistico/estadisticas-sociales 
(click “Pobreza” to download the spreadsheet detailing poverty levels). 
275 Estadísticas Sociales, supra note 274 (stating that rural areas have more 
poverty, but does not mention agriculture). 
276 At this time, some public opinion surveys found as many as 60% of all 
Costa Ricans in favor of CAFTA, a figure that turned out to be much higher than 
the number who actually voted in favor of it in the October 2007 referendum.  The 
President of the Horticulture Corporation, Giovanni Masis, representing the 
agricultural business interests as opposed to the wage laborers in the sector, came 
out strongly in favor of CAFTA, claiming that most agricultural producers were in 
favor.  See Daniel Zueras, Costa Rica: Multitudinaria Marcha Contra El DR-CAFTA 
[Costa Rica: Massive March Against DR-CAFTA], INTER PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 26, 2007, 
available at http://ipsnoticias.net/nota.asp?idnews=40231 (reporting on 
demonstrations against CAFTA even after pro-CAFTA Arias won the presidential 
election).  
277 See Background Note: Costa Rica, supra note 84 (estimating that agriculture 
accounted for 6.5% of Costa Rica’s GDP in 2010). 
278 Id. 
279 See Amy Angel, Transition Policies for the Agricultural Sector, in CAFTA-DR, 
CAFTA-DR Agrifood Market Integration Consortium 3, available at 
http://camic.tamu.edu/sanjose/angel_english.pdf (“CAFTA-DR generated many 
expectations to improve access to export markets.  But it also created fear that 
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Meanwhile, U.S. special interests made sure that CAFTA would 
not open U.S. markets as widely to Central American agricultural 
commodities as the Bush administration and other CAFTA 
supporters publicly claimed.280  For example, members of the U.S. 
sugar industry were highly influential in the agreement’s terms 
regarding sugar tariffs.281  During the negotiations, Carolyn 
Cheney, chair of the U.S. sugar industry lobby, was quick to 
remind Congress that “[CAFTA] only adds to the burden placed 
upon the American sugar industry, which faces an already 
oversupplied market and further strengthens our resolve to work 
diligently to defeat the sugar provisions of the CAFTA-DR.”282  The 
 
reduced protection would result in more imports, lowering prices in domestic 
markets and harming the profitability of agricultural products.”); Fabian Borges, 
CAFTA: A View From Central America, INSIDECOSTARICA (Mar. 9, 2004), 
http://insidecostarica.com/special_reports/2004-03/cafta_a_view_from_central 
_america.htm (explaining that “[s]mall farmers . . . fear[ed] CAFTA would drive 
them out of business by forcing them to compete with highly subsidized U.S. farm 
staples”); McKinley, supra note 147, at 8.  
Rice farmers here see the agreement as an unmitigated disaster.  Even 
though they have 10 years before the 35% duty on imported rice begins 
to disappear, most say they will never be able compete with rice farmers 
in the United States, who have better technology and receive huge 
subsidies.  It costs about $250 to produce a ton of rice in both countries, 
but the Americans sell it on the world market for much less, farmers here 
said.  “It’s impossible for is [sic] to be competitive with all the subsidies 
that the North Americans have,” said Emilio Rodriguez Pacheco, 48, who 
farms about 25 acres of rice here.  “For the rice sector it’s a tragedy.” 
Id. 
280 See REMY JURENAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32110, AGRICULTURAL TRADE 
IN A U.S.-CENTRAL AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (CAFTA) 10 (2003) (outlining 
agricultural associations for and against CAFTA but not detailing their effect on 
the final agreement); see also Press release, Oxfam Int’l, Backroom Deals Enable 
Bad Trade Agreement to Pass (Nov. 1, 2005), available at 
http://www.oxinfra.org/en/grow/news/pressreleases2005/pr050728_cafta.htm 
(criticizing DR-CAFTA’s final terms); Sandra Polaski, Issue Brief, How to Build a 
Better Trade Pact with Central America, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, (July 
2003), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/pdf/files/TED_CAFTA 
_Polaski_July_2003.pdf (noting that CAFTA proposals appeared to be driven by 
politically-connected U.S. special interest groups). 
281 See Free-Trade Pact Isn’t So Sweet for Sugar Lobby, THE HILL, Feb. 1, 2005, 
http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/2923-free-trade-pact-isnt-so-sweet-for-
sugar-lobby (discussing the U.S. sugar lobby’s opposition to CAFTA terms, which 
would increase the amount of sugar allowed to enter U.S. markets). 
282 Id.  
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American sugar industry feared that cheap Central American 
sugar would saturate the U.S. market.283 
The U.S. sugar lobby ultimately succeeded in keeping the terms 
of sugar in its favor.  CAFTA allows only a small expansion of 
sugar imports into the United States, up to less than 2% (120,000 
tons) of total U.S. sugar consumption, phased in over a 15-year 
period.284  Costa Rican sugar producers were obviously 
disappointed, because sugar is a crop in which they have a 
comparative advantage, yet they will be unable for a long time to 
export to their full potential.  CAFTA critics feared that with Costa 
Rican farmers unable to compete, unemployment would swell, 
along with the ranks of those employed in low paying jobs in the 
informal sector, thereby worsening poverty and income inequality.  
In the end, while CAFTA might help to boost Costa Rica’s overall 
GDP, agriculture could suffer. 
CAFTA supporters cautioned against assuming such a gloomy 
outcome.  Using rice as an example, they pointed out that although 
rice is subsidized in the United States, it is also subsidized in Costa 
Rica, giving Costa Rica an advantage over other Central American 
countries.285  Further, they argued that Costa Rican farmers 
produce only enough staple crops such as corn, rice and beans to 
cover half the country’s needed supply, so imports were needed 
anyway.286  As part of CAFTA’s provisions, Costa Rica would have 
 
283 See Crystal Bolner, Free Trade Trade-Offs, INSIDECOSTARICA (Aug. 4, 2003), 
http://insidecostarica.com/specialreports/CAFTA_free_trade_trade_offs.htm 
(relaying that “some U.S. [sugar] producers fear a tidal wave of sugar that could 
cause the U.S. sugar market to collapse”). 
284 See Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement: Hearing 
Before the H. Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the H. 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 95, 98 (2005) (statement of Russell 
Roberts, Prof. of Economics, George Mason University). 
Despite the words “free trade” in the title of the agreement, CAFTA 
would allow only the tiniest of expansions in sugar imports phased in 
over 15 years . . . .  CAFTA limits the expansion of sugar imports into the 
United States to less than 2% of US consumption over the next 15 years. 
Id. 
285 See John Murphy, Costa Rica’s CAFTA Choice, LATIN BUS. CHRON., Oct. 1, 
2007, http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=1674 (noting 
that rice is subsidized in both the United States and Costa Rica). 
286 Id. (“Costa Rican farmers produce only about half of the rice Costa Ricans 
consume. . . .”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
03 COLL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2011  8:23 PM 
516 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 33:2 
ten years before the tariff elimination on imports began, and the 
phase-out would not be completed for twenty years,287 so as to 
allow farmers and the government time to adjust to the treaty. 
The fate of Costa Rican industry under CAFTA was also the 
subject of intense public debate.  The industrial sector contributes 
22.5% of the country’s GDP, with textiles and electronics as the 
primary products.288  There is, of course, extreme competition in 
the global economy with respect to textiles, with mammoth textile 
producers like China and India leading the race.  With their large 
pool of cheap labor, these countries are able to export textiles at 
extremely low prices.289  CAFTA supporters argued that, in order 
to compete with these large economies, Costa Rica needed to take 
 
287 Id. (“Costa Rican negotiators won an extremely long phase out for the 
country’s tariffs on rice imports, a phase out which doesn’t start for 10 years and 
doesn’t finish for 20.”). 
288 See Background Note: Costa Rica, supra note 84; see Costa Rica: Manufacturing, 
EIU VIEWSWIRE, Apr. 1, 2008 (listing statistics for integrated circuits and electronics 
microstructures, microprocessors, textiles, transfusion and infusion equipment for 
2004–2007).  “After the first plant built in Costa Rica by a US microprocessor 
company, Intel, was inaugurated in April 1998, the production of microprocessors 
became the largest single area of manufacturing activity.  Food-processing, 
medical supplies, chemical products, textiles and metal-processing are also 
important.”  Id. 
289 See Denis Audet, Smooth as Silk? A First Look at the Post MFA Textiles and 
Clothing Landscape, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 267, 268 (2007) (indicating that countries can 
gain a competitive advantage through low wage rates); John Lyons, The Economy: 
Costa Rica Balks at Free-Trade Pact, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2005, at A2 (noting that 
Costa Rica is obligated to use U.S. textiles instead of cheaper Asian-made ones); 
Froma Harrop, Central American Trade, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 24, 2005, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0524/p09s02-usfp.html. 
Labor-intensive industries in America continue to fight a hopeless war 
against competitors paying pennies-an-hour wages.  The futility of it all 
can be seen in the following numbers, provided by A.T. Kearney, a 
consulting firm: It costs $135 to make 12 pairs of cotton trousers in the 
US.  It costs $57 to make the trousers in China and ship them here.  It 
costs $69 to do so in other parts of the world. 
Id.; Textiles: Losing Their Shirts: Central America and the Caribbean Face an Onslaught 
from Rivals, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 2004, at 92 (“Labour costs are the biggest area of 
concern[,]” as wages paid by Mexican textile chambers are about three times as 
high as in China); J. F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31870, THE 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-CENTRAL AMERICA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
(CAFTA-DR) 11 (2008) (noting that over the past five years, “U.S. imports from 
Central America increased by 19.3%”). 
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advantage of free trade agreements that allow greater market 
access to the United States for its products.  Under CAFTA, Costa 
Rica would be able to export its manufactured goods to the United 
States without facing high tariffs, supposedly giving it an 
advantage over Asian economies. 
Supporters also argued that CAFTA would help Costa Rica to 
remain competitive.290  They cited as examples the case of thread 
producer Hilos A&E, whose output fell to less than 25% of its 
former levels as it moved its production capacity elsewhere, and 
that of zipper factory YKK, which left Costa Rica altogether.291  In 
February 2007, a large Wrangler Jean company closed, leaving 400 
people without jobs.292  The closing produced a domino effect, as 
manufacturers of sub-component materials such as zippers and 
elastics threatened cutbacks.293  Many of the newly unemployed 
were women, including single mothers, who would find it difficult 
to support their families.  In all these cases, the companies had 
found it cheaper to establish businesses in other Central American 
countries that, besides having lower labor standards than Costa 
Rica, already had ratified CAFTA, thereby guaranteeing easy 
access to the U.S. market.294 
CAFTA’s proponents also claimed that ratification would 
increase direct foreign investment.295  As an example, they cited the 
case of Intel, which has been operating in Costa Rica for over ten 
 
290 E.g., Marvin Barquero, Atraso en TLC Cobra Víctimas [Delay in CAFTA 
Creates Victims], LA NACIÓN, Mar. 28, 2007, available at 
http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2007/marzo/28/economia1045393.html 
(describing how the textile industry in Costa Rica struggled because CAFTA had 
not been approved and implemented yet). 
291 Id. 
292 See Marvin Barquero, 400 Sin Empleo por Cierre de Otra Textilera en Costa 
Rica [400 Out of Work Because Another Textile Plant Closes in Costa Rica], LA NACIÓN 
(Jan. 6, 2007), available at http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2007/enero/06 
/economia950418.html (discussing the effect a textile plant’s closing will have on 
workers). 
293 E.g., Barquero, supra note 290 (“For example, Hilos A&E reduced its 
activity by a quarter and the zipper factory YKK left the country.”). 
294 Id. (explaining why companies that produce raw materials have found it 
necessary to leave Costa Rica).   
295 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 285 (contending that CAFTA will increase 
direct foreign investment and create jobs for Costa Rica as demonstrated by the 
growth each of Costa Rica’s four neighbors have seen since implementing 
CAFTA). 
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years, and today has two manufacturing plants and a distribution 
center employing over 3000 people.296  Intel claims it has 
contributed to Costa Rica’s economic growth, with its products 
accounting for 20% of the country’s manufactured exports.297  In 
response, CAFTA skeptics were quick to deplore what they 
perceived to be the tendency of trans-national corporations to 
move to Central American countries where they could exploit 
workers.  These countries often have low labor standards, and even 
when, as in Costa Rica’s case, there are strong labor protection 
laws, they are not strictly enforced.298  Intel tried to prove these 
skeptics wrong by becoming three times the recipient of Costa 
Rica’s Social Responsibility Award and a five-time winner of the 
National Safety Responsibility Award.299 
The service sector is the largest contributor to Costa Rica’s GDP 
at 71%,300 and at the center of the debate within this sector was the 
fate of the state monopolies over electricity, telecommunications, 
and water services.  Like the Defensoria’s report, CAFTA 
opponents argued that, through the Costa Rican Electricity and 
Telecom Institute (ICE), Costa Rica had been able to provide cheap 
services to most citizens, including the poorest ones.301  CAFTA 
 
296 See Background Note: Costa Rica, supra note 84 (“In recent years, Costa Rica 
has successfully attracted important investments by such companies as Intel 
Corporation, which employs 3,200 people at its $1.996 billion microprocessor 
plant . . . .”); see also Jobs at Intel: Heredia, Costa Rica, INTEL, 
http://www.intel.com/jobs/costarica/sites/heredia.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 
2011) (describing Intel’s facilities and operations in Costa Rica since March 1998). 
297 See Jobs at Intel: Heredia, Costa Rica, supra note 296 (demonstrating the 
impact that the large, multi-national corporation has had on the Costa Rican 
economy).   
298 See Murphy, supra note 285 (indicating that single mother heads of 
households account for up to 90% some textile firms’ employees, and referencing 
a study by Procomer, Costa Rica’s export promotion agency, which found that 
without CAFTA, 73,000 jobs in Costa Rica are vulnerable to cuts, with the majority 
in the textile sector).   
299 See Jobs at Intel: Heredia, Costa Rica, supra note 296 (illustrating the 
proposition that international companies can be socially responsible while 
simultaneously promoting economic growth).   
300 See, e.g., The World Factbook: Costa Rica, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos 
/cs.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2011) (2010 estimate). 
301 See Borges, supra note 279 (“An important segment of the country’s 
population and politically influential labor unions have seen the . . . [ICE] as [a] 
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supporters countered that the agreement would allow competition 
and lead to lower prices and higher quality.  Costa Ricans would 
have a broader range of service providers, forcing the ICE to offer 
modern, efficient telecommunications and electricity.302 
In fact, the revolution in telecommunications over the last 
decade, especially the advances in free Internet voice 
communication, where calls are free regardless of where or how 
long is the conversation, has been posing a major challenge for ICE 
independently of CAFTA.303  It is estimated that within the next 
three years, 197 million subscribers around the world will use 
Internet calling.304  With or without CAFTA, the Costa Rican state 
no longer will have a monopoly in telecommunications, as anyone 
with a computer will have access to free telephone calls.  But even 
though the Internet may take business away from ICE, it also could 
provide new business opportunities in the form of installation and 
service contracts.  In Costa Rica alone, half a million new mobile 
GSM lines will be acquired, along with 80,000 new broadband 
Internet sites.305  This could generate a great deal of business for 
ICE, but only if it is able to prepare for competition and change so 
that it can take advantage of these new opportunities.306 
The future of the Costa Rican state monopoly over water was 
an equally contentious subject.  The fear was that CAFTA could 
 
synonym[] [for] the country’s social-democratic development model, which 
helped create a large middle class during the latter half of the 20th century.”). 
302 See Roy Rojas, CAFTA: Point of Disagreement in Costa Rica (Apr. 10, 2007), 
http://globalvoicesonline.org/2007/04/09/cafta-point-of-disagreement-in-costa-
rica/ (contending that competition will only force the ICE to improve its services).   
303 See, e.g., Anabel González, Telecomunicaciones y Tecnología: Aunque Algunos 
No lo Admitan, el Futuro del ICE No lo Define el TLC, Ya lo Definió la Tecnología 
[Telecommunications and Technology: Although Some May Not Admit It, ICE’s Future 
not defined by NAFTA, but by Technology], LA NACIÓN, Sept. 23, 2005, available at 
http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2005/septiembre/23/opinion6.html (discussing 
the impact of Skype on telecommunications and communication costs and 
indicating that such free Internet communication negates ICE’s supposed 
monopoly over telecommunications in Costa Rica). 
304 See id. (“The impact of this technology is so large that it is estimated that 
the number of voice over IP will reach 197 million people in 2010, without 
counting those who use a non-subscription based voice over IP simply by 
downloading Skype, Google or other similar software for free . . . .”).   
305 Id.   
306 See id. (indicating that the future of technology and Internet 
communication determines the future of the ICE). 
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turn water resources that were not specifically protected as part of 
a natural park or forest preserve into commercial assets subject to 
bidding, acquisition, and commercial development by foreign 
companies.307  Under the agreement, if a body of water is 
associated with property rights or otherwise classified as open to 
commercial use, it is subject to its rules on “national treatment,” 
meaning that Costa Rica must treat domestic and foreign water 
providers equally.308  CAFTA’s opponents worried that the treaty’s 
water regime would lead to privatization of water distribution, 
which in turn would lead to price hikes that would impede the 
right of poor people to the enjoyment of the basic right to water.309  
In addition, there were serious concerns that CAFTA would make 
it difficult for the Costa Rican government to set aside certain 
percentages of water resources for local use, leaving many poor 
communities helpless to manage their own water supplies.310  
 
307 See María Flórez-Estrada, CAFTA Threatens to Turn Water into Merchandise, 
39 LATINAMERICA PRESS 1, 6 (Oct. 31, 2007), available at http://www.lapress.org 
/objetos/informe/1PI_LP3920.PDF. 
The Environment and Energy Ministry is currently in charge of 
managing the water resources, and institutions like the Costa Rican 
Electricity, Aqueducts and Sewage System Institute have some 
autonomy in granting concessions, but under CAFTA, state authorities 
will be potentially powerless before commercial priorities . . . .  CAFTA’s 
method of handling disputes between the state and investors will give 
multinational companies the privilege to question decisions by national 
authorities before private international arbitration courts, when they feel 
that their investments have been affected.  
Id. (emphasis added).   
308 See David Beck, Water and US-Central American Free Trade Agreement, AM. 
FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, 1 (July 23, 2004), http://www.afd-pdx.org 
/Articles/CAFTA-and-Water.pdf (describing the implications of CAFTA’s 
treatment of water as a tradable commodity and therefore subject to national 
treatment regulation).   
309 See Flórez-Estrada, supra note 307, at 2 (discussing the current regime 
under which people who consume less water pay more for it than larger 
consumers, such as resorts); see also Fabián Borges, Unions Blast CAFTA, Vow to 
Stop Treaty, TICO TIMES (Jan. 27, 2004), http://www.ticotimes.net 
/dailyarchive/2004_01/Week4/01_27_04.htm#story_one (quoting the secretary 
general of the National Association of Public and Private Employees that “CAFTA 
may lead to the privatization of the country’s water services . . . .  Costa Rica will 
lose its current model of public services based on solidarity.  The most vulnerable 
sectors and even the middle class will be left unable to pay for basic services”). 
310 See Flórez-Estrada, supra note 307, at 6. 
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Many of CAFTA’s opponents appealed to the United Nations 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and its 
declaration that drinking water is a human right fundamental for 
life and health, as they passionately argued that the nation’s 
citizens should be the “owners” of all natural resources within 
their country, including water.311  There were also serious concerns 
about unregulated pollution, which could affect Costa Rica’s 
drinking water.312 
CAFTA opponents also feared that the agreement would lead 
eventually to a larger role for the private sector in education and 
health care, leaving the public health care and education sectors 
starved of resources and incapable of providing adequate services 
for the poor.313  In response, treaty advocates claimed that the trend 
toward greater privatization would be good for the economy by 
offering greater job opportunities for women, even those with little 
education and experience.314  Opponents responded that even if 
 
A major problem to fairer water distribution in Costa Rica is that CAFTA 
prohibits taxes on the exportation of water.  Water is also sold as 
merchandise: bottled.  This means that the country cannot prohibit or 
restrict its exportation by transnational companies . . . [CAFTA] will 
impede Costa Rica from giving priority to improving water access to 
local communities, small businesses or national cooperatives compared 
to US transnational companies. 
Id. (internal quotations omitted); Maria Eugenia Trejos,  CAFTA in Costa Rica 
Would Cause Deepening Inequality, AMERICAS PROGRAM (Sept. 21, 2007), 
http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/925 (arguing that under CAFTA, 
“businesses’ access to the water and natural resources,[sic] and their ‘right’ to 
profits take precedence over any measure (whether human or social) that might 
be taken by the government or municipalities”). 
311 See Expertos Creen Agua Estado Natural No Debe Integrarse Tratados [Experts 
Believe Water in State of Nature Must Not Be Incorporated into Trade Agreements], LA 
NACIÓN, Mar. 17, 2006, available at 
http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2006/marzo/17/ultima-mu4.html (arguing for 
the sovereign right of nations to control and regulate their water resources).   
312 Id.   
313 See Margaret Thompson & María Suárez, Women of Costa Rica Organize to 
Stop CAFTA & Call for Solidarity from US Social Forum, FEMINIST INT’L RADIO 
ENDEAVOUR (June 23, 2007), http://www.radiofeminista.net/junio07/notas 
/cafta_banner.htm (contending that increased privatization has led to higher 
costs, preventing the poor from accessing education and medical services).   
314 See Fabián Borges, The Feminine Side of CAFTA, TICO TIMES (Mar. 14, 2003), 
http://www.ticotimes.net/dailyarchive/2003_03/Week2/03_14_03.htm#story_o
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women could find jobs, their rights would not be adequately 
protected, as CAFTA does not provide protections against gender 
discrimination or sexual harassment, leaving it up to each country 
to enforce its own anti-discrimination laws in these areas.315   
The debate on CAFTA’s impact on labor rights was equally 
heated, and it followed similar lines as those in the Defensoria’s 
report.  The key fear was that, with CAFTA creating a single 
market within which disparate labor standards were allowed, 
market forces would tend to punish the country with the strictest 
labor code, in this case Costa Rica.  As a concession to critics, the 
Bush administration committed over $40 million per year from 
2006 to 2009 to assist all CAFTA members (other than the United 
States) in enforcing their labor standards.316  $8.94 million was 
committed towards implementing comprehensive training 
programs for national laws and international standards, $2 million 
for judicial administration, $5 million for establishing worker 
rights centers, $3 million to improve worker health and safety 
primarily in the agricultural sector, and $3.98 million to reduce 
discrimination and harassment against women.317  Critics argued 
that this small sum would not be enough, considering the poor 
working conditions in CAFTA countries (with the exception of 
Costa Rica) and the widespread corruption rampant in the 
administration of their public finances.318 
 
ne (explaining that proponents of CAFTA believe the agreement will create 
economic opportunities for women and the poor).   
315 See Carol Pier, DR-CAFTA Falls Short on Workers’ Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH 
(July 26, 2005), http://www.hrw.org/news/2005/07/26/dr-cafta-falls-short-
workers-rights (“DR-CAFTA only has one enforceable labor rights requirement: 
that countries apply their own labor laws—even if they are grossly inadequate.  If 
governments change their laws to eliminate rights, that’s okay, too, just so long as 
the new laws are enforced.”).  
316 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, CAFTA-DR—LABOR 
CAPACITY BUILDING: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF LABOR LAWS IN THE 
CAFTA-DR COUNTRIES (July 2007), http://ustraderep.gov/assets 
/Trade_Agreements/Regional/CAFTA/Briefing_Book/asset_upload_file739_132
04.pdf (describing the specific initiatives implemented and money allocated by the 
United States to improve labor conditions in CAFTA-participating countries).   
317 Id.  
318 See Pier, supra note 315. 
Recently, the U.S. Trade Representative, Rob Portman, promised to 
support $40 million a year for labor and environmental capacity building 
in Central America and the Dominican Republic.  But . . . . [t]he other 
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In response, CAFTA supporters drew attention to CAFTA’s 
creation of the ministerial-level Labor Council, through which state 
parties periodically would review the enforcement of their own 
labor codes, with the goal of securing long-term improvements in 
labor conditions.  And they pointed out two specific steps that 
Costa Rica had taken to strengthen enforcement of its labor 
legislation as part of the process of accession to CAFTA.  The 
previous government had appointed thirty-seven new labor court 
judges, and “created a center for alternative dispute resolution.”319  
Both of these measures would alleviate the crowded labor courts 
and allow more labor violations to be remedied effectively. 
7. HUMAN RIGHTS, HEALTH CARE, AND THE AVAILABILITY OF 
PHARMACEUTICALS 
CAFTA’s impact on the price and availability of 
pharmaceuticals was another topic of intense public debate.  As 
with other bilateral free trade agreements promoted by the United 
States in recent years, CAFTA’s intellectual property provisions 
seek to enhance the protections available to U.S. patent holders.  As 
discussed by the Defensoria’s report, two of the most controversial 
of these provisions involved are, first, CAFTA’s extension of patent 
terms as a consequence of administrative delays, and second, strict 
limitations on the use by third parties of data presented by patent 
holders to a government agency for purposes of securing patent 
recognition.320 
 
half of the story is the Bush administration’s proposal to cut by 87%—
from $93.2 million to $12 million—the 2006 budget for the U.S. 
Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB).  
ILAB is the principal U.S. agency charged with providing international 
workers’ rights assistance and houses the Office of Trade Agreement 
Implementation, the national contact point for administering the labor 
chapters of all free trade agreements to which the United States is party. . 
. . [T]he Bush administration should renegotiate DR-CAFTA to 
strengthen workers’ rights protections and provide the funds to make 
them a reality. 
Id.   
319 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, CAFTA FACTS: REAL RESULTS ON 
LABOR RIGHTS: IMPROVEMENTS AS A RESULT OF CAFTA 1 (2005), available at 
http://ustraderep.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Regional/CAFTA/Briefing 
_Book/asset_upload_file823_7189.pdf. 
320 See José Paulo Brenes Lleras, CAFTA and Intellectual Property Rights, 13 
AMCHAM’S BUS. COSTA RICA 1 (2005), available at 
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The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Agreement (TRIPS) allows WTO member countries a minimum 
non-extendable patent term of twenty years.321  As a WTO 
member, Costa Rica is a party to the TRIPS.322  CAFTA, however, 
provides for extension of the patent term beyond the standard 
twenty years to compensate for delays in granting of the patent or 
regulatory approval.323  Article 15.9(6)(a) of CAFTA provides that 
“[e]ach party, at the request of the patent owner, shall adjust the 
term of a patent to compensate for unreasonable delays that occur 
in granting the patent.”324  In addition, Article 15.9(6)(b) provides 
for adjustments to pharmaceutical patents in cases where there 
have been delays in the issuance of the respective health permits,325 
stating that:   
[W]ith respect to any pharmaceutical product that is 
covered by a patent, each Party shall make available a 
restoration of the patent term to compensate the patent 
owner for unreasonable curtailment of the effective patent 
term resulting from the marketing approval process related 
 
http://www.pachecocoto.com/publications/cafta-intellectual-property-rights 
(discussing the controversial nature of certain CAFTA provisions that regulate 
intellectual property rights). 
321 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS].  See Christine A. Chung, A 
Cry for Cheaper Drugs: CAFTA’s Inflexible Intellectual Property Protections Create an 
Ominous Impact on Life-Saving Medicines, 13 SW. J. L. & TRADE AMERICAS 171, 175 
(2006) (“In 1994, the Central American countries adopted the intellectual property 
protections of the World Trade Organization . . . which incorporated” TRIPS). 
322 See Frequently asked questions about TRIPS in the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm#Who’sSigned 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2011) (noting that TRIPS applies to all WTO member 
countries).  
323 See The Dominican Republic-Central American-United States Free Trade 
Agreement, ch. 15, art. 15.9(6), Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov 
/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-
america-fta/final-text [hereinafter CAFTA-DR] (describing provisions that 
provide for extensions of patent terms).  
324 Id. art. 15.9(6)(a). 
325 Id. art. 15.9(6)(b).  
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to the first commercial marketing of the product in that 
Party.326   
This indicates the possibility that the patent period for a 
pharmaceutical drug may well extend over the twenty-year term 
provided in the TRIPS agreement because applications for a patent 
usually are delayed.327 
In addition, CAFTA increases the protection of publicly 
undisclosed test data.328  After a new pharmaceutical product is 
patented, governments typically require that the product be 
proven safe before issuing a health permit authorizing its sale.329  
Companies perform extensive clinical trials, submitting the 
compiled data to the pertinent regulatory agency.  The data from 
these trials is known as marketing “test data.”330  The intellectual 
 
326 Id. 
327 See 3D  TRADE - HUMAN RIGHTS - EQUITABLE ECONOMY, COSTA RICA: 
STRENGTHENING PATENT LAWS, WEAKENING HUMAN RIGHTS (2007) [hereinafter 3D], 
available at http://www.3dthree.org/pdf_3D/3DCESCR_CostaRicaNov07.pdf 
(stating that patent periods could extend beyond the twenty-year terms outlined 
in TRIPS due to delays, which is “tantamount to extending the patent term up to 
twenty five years”).  
328 CAFTA-DR, supra note 323, art. 15.10(1)(b)–(d).  
329 See Carlos M. Correa, Protecting Test Data for Pharmaceutical and 
Agrochemical Products Under Free Trade Agreements, UNCTAD-ICTSD Dialogue on 
Moving the Pro-Development IP Agenda Forward: Preserving Public Goods in 
Health, Education and Learning 1, 2 (Nov. 29–Dec. 3, 2004), available at 
http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/docs/Correa_Bellagio4.pdf 
(describing the use of clinical trial data to establish whether or not a new drug is 
safe and therefore should be approved by national authorities); see also J. F. 
HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CSR REPORT FOR CONGRESS: THE DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC-CENTRAL AMERICA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (CAFTA-DR) 
25 (2008) (explaining that “[to] bring a patented drug to market, a drug company 
must demonstrate through clinical trials that the drug is safe and effective”); RICK 
NG, DRUGS: FROM DISCOVERY TO APPROVAL 209–10 (2d ed. 2009) (noting that “[i]t is 
the role of public regulatory authorities [in major countries] to ensure that 
pharmaceutical companies comply with regulations” so that products are safe for 
consumption).  However, see Pharmaceutical Federation Campaigns Against Generic 
Drugs, TICO TIMES, (Sept. 14, 2005), http://www.ticotimes.net/dailyarchive 
/2005_09/daily_09_14_05.htm#story2, for a discussion on how generics do not 
have to show that they are the same as the brand name drugs in Costa Rica.  
330 Correa, supra note 329, at 2–3.  See generally INT’L FED’N OF PHARM. MFG. & 
ASS’N, A REVIEW OF EXISTING DATA EXCLUSIVITY LEGISLATION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(3d ed., 2004) [hereinafter IFPMA] (discussing the legislation and process in which 
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property rights of pharmaceutical companies are affected in 
several ways by marketing test data.  First, the time spent 
performing clinical trials, submitting data for review, and gaining 
approval cuts into the life of the patent, reducing the time the 
company can profit from its monopoly position.331  Second, the 
research to test a new product is expensive, adding even more to 
the investment costs the company must recoup.332  Third, 
marketing test data is not part of the original patent, so it may not 
receive the same level of protection or compensation for use.333 
Generic drug producers often rely on the marketing test data of 
the original patent holder.334  Instead of performing their own 
clinical trials to prove that their product is safe, they merely show 
that it is chemically equivalent to the original product, thereby 
gaining regulatory approval for use of the generic version.335  
Pharmaceutical researchers complain that this amounts to “free-
riding”.336  Not only have they invested in the original research and 
 
test data is “submitted to regulatory authorities of countries around the world in 
order to obtain approval to market the drug”).  
331 See CARLOS MARÍA CORREA, PROTECTION OF DATA SUBMITTED FOR THE 
REGISTRATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS: IMPLEMENTING THE STANDARDS OF THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT 1-3 (2002), available at http://www.southcentre.org/index.php 
?option=com_content&view=article&id=68%3Aprotection-of-data-submitted-for-
the-registration-of-pharmaceuticals-implementing-the-standards-of-the-trips-
agreement&catid=41%3Ainnovation-technology-and-patent-policy&lang=en 
(discussing the different phases and test data that is required to develop a new 
pharmaceutical product).  
332 Id. at 6 (explaining that the testing involved in bringing a new drug to 
market involves significant investments). 
333 Id. 
334 See WTO and the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/wto_trips/en/index.html (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2011) (explaining that prior to TRIPS coming into effect, generic 
drug manufacturers could rely on “originator test data” in seeking approval of 
pharmaceuticals). 
335 See id. (relaying that, prior to TRIPS, “[g]eneric manufacturers need[ed] 
only to prove that their product [was] chemically identical to the . . . original 
product, and in some countries, that it [was] bioequivalent”); see also CORREA, 
supra note 331, at 6 (noting an argument for data exclusivity that is grounded in 
preventing “competitors [from] rapidly producing and registering an exact copy 
of the drug”).  
336 See Adam Graham-Silverman, Big Pharma’s Free Ride, SALON, Aug. 12, 
2005, http://www.salon.com/2005/08/12/cafta_drugs/ (arguing that 
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development of the new drug, they also have subsidized their 
competition’s costs of market access through the latter’s use of 
their test data.337 
The explicit provisions in CAFTA provide that test data will be 
protected from access by generic producers for five years after 
approval by the country’s regulatory agency, and in addition 
countries “may require that the person providing the information 
in the other territory seek approval in the territory of the [p]arty 
within five years after obtaining marketing approval in the other 
territory.”338  Pharmaceutical companies are allowed to run these 
protections sequentially, so that company X may submit data for 
approval in the U.S., receive five years of data protection from all 
other CAFTA members, and then submit data for approval in 
another CAFTA country for an additional five years of data 
protection.339  In practical terms, this means that drug companies 
can receive up to ten years of exclusive data protection, only five of 
which will run concurrently with the patent.340 
CAFTA’s Article 15.10 provides that the:  
Party shall not permit third persons, without the consent of 
the person who provided the information, to market a 
product on the basis of (1) the information, or (2) the 
approval granted to the person who submitted the 
information for at least five years for pharmaceutical 
products . . . from the date of approval in the Party.341   
In addition, “a Party may require that the person providing the 
information in the other territory seek approval in the territory of 
the Party within five years after obtaining marketing approval in 
 
“[p]harmaceutical companies are using free-trade deals like CAFTA to eliminate 
global competition—and deny poor patients access to cheaper generic drugs”).  
337 See id. (“Generic companies seeking approval of their drugs usually use 
safety data from clinical tests that the name-brand companies conducted, 
obviating the need to repeat expensive and time-consuming work.”). 
338 CAFTA-DR, supra note 323, art. 15.10(1)(b). 
339 See Graham-Silverman, supra note 336 (“The five-year clock starts ticking 
in a given country only when a drug is registered there, meaning that a company 
can prolong its monopoly by registering in countries sequentially.  The result is 
up to 10 years of market protection from generics for a brand-name drug.”) 
340 Id. (same).  
341 CAFTA-DR, supra note 323, art. 15.10(1)(a).  
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the other territory.” 342  CAFTA critics were concerned that these 
provisions for lengthening the terms of protection for marketing 
test data, when coupled with extensions to patent terms as a result 
of delays, would have the overall impact of delaying the 
availability of generic substitutes and raising the price of many 
medications.343 
As noted earlier, relative to Central America and most of Latin 
America, Costa Rica has a long tradition of investment in social 
services and public health.  The country’s social welfare model has 
been successful in guaranteeing a high degree of social peace, and 
is considered to be the key factor in promoting a quality of life 
superior to that of neighboring countries.344  The universal health 
care system is one of Costa Rica’s most prized features.345  In spite 
of the damage done by the “lost decade” of the 1980s and the sharp 
cuts in social spending of the 1990s, Costa Rica ranked third in the 
world in 1995 in life expectancy,346 and thirty-sixth worldwide for 
its public health system’s performance in 1997, with the United 
States one rank below it.347  As of 2000, Costa Rica’s public health 
 
342 Id. art. 15.10(1)(b). 
343 See Jill Replogle, Central American Trade Pact May Limit Access to Generics, 
363 LANCET 1612, 1612 (2004) (relaying criticisms that these provisions would 
significantly delay the availability of generic drugs). 
344 See Cassidy Rush, Despite What President Arias Might Want You to Believe: 
Why Costa Rica Might Not Need CAFTA After All, and Why It May be a Bad Deal for 
the Average Costa Rican, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS, Oct. 5, 2007, available at 
http://www.coha.org/2007/10/05/despite-what-president-arias-might-want-
you-to-believe-why-costa-rica-might-not-need-cafta-after-all-and-why-it-may-be-
a-bad-deal-for-the-average-costa-rican (noting that critics argued CAFTA would 
“wreak havoc on Costa Rica’s outstanding healthcare system”). 
345 The State of the Nation in Sustainable Human Development: Summary, supra 
note 102, at 34 (stating that any changes to the health insurance system in Costa 
Rica should “uphold the principles of universal coverage, solidarity in funding, 
and equitable access”).  
346 WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1995: BRIDGING THE GAPS 
2 fig.1 (1995). 
347 WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2000: HEALTH SYSTEMS: 
IMPROVING PERFORMANCE 152, annex tbl.1 (2000).  See also Press Release, World 
Health Org., World Health Org. Assesses the World’s Health Sys. (June 21, 2000), 
available at http://www.who.int/inf-pr-2000/en/pr2000-44.html (outlining the 
statistics, found in The World Health Report 2000: Health Systems: Improving 
Performance, to the public).  
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care service covered approximately 90.4% of the country’s 
population.348 
These strong results are a reflection of substantial public 
spending on health care.  Although the figures vary depending on 
the source, over 20% of the national budget is devoted to health 
care services, with the Costa Rican government citing the figure of 
21.5%,349 and the CIA estimating that 10.5% of the Costa Rican 
GDP in 2009 went towards health expenditures.350  Out of this sum, 
8% is currently spent on purchasing pharmaceutical goods and 
medicines.351  The availability of cheaper generic drugs has enabled 
the government of Costa Rica to allocate a larger fraction of the 
budget to sustain the high level and coverage of the health care 
system by reducing the cost of obtaining medicines.352  The 
availability of cheaper generic drugs has enabled the government 
of Costa Rica to allocate a larger fraction of the budget to sustain 
the high level and coverage of the health care system by reducing 
the cost in obtaining medicines.353  CAFTA’s critics argued that the 
agreement’s impact on the availability and cost of generic products 
would require that the fraction of the health care budget devoted 
to medications rise from 8% to 45%,354 in order to obtain the same 
amount of medications.  Additionally, CAFTA critics in Costa Rica 
 
348 WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 347.  
349 About Costa Rica: Costa Rica at a Glance, EMBASSY OF COSTA RICA IN 
WASHINGTON DC, http://www.costarica-embassy.org/index.php?q=node/20 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2011).  
350 The World Factbook: Costa Rica, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cs.html 
(last updated Nov. 15, 2011). 
351 CAFTA by the Numbers: What Everyone Needs to Know, PUB. CITIZEN’S 
GLOBAL TRADE WATCH (2004), http://www.citizen.org/documents 
/CAFTAbyNumbers.pdf.  
352 See id. (noting an 800% increase between the 8% of Costa Rica’s healthcare 
budget spent on pharmaceuticals in 2004 and the estimated 45% of Costa Rica’s 
healthcare budget that would need to be spent on pharmaceuticals under 
CAFTA’s restricted generics competition provisions); see also Núria Homedes & 
Antonio Ugalde, Multisource Drug Policies in Latin America: Survey of 10 countries, 
83 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 64, 68 tbl.4 (2005) (noting that “generic drug policies 
have been promoted as strategies to improve access to pharmaceuticals and 
control” costs and indicating that Costa Rica has regulations which require certain 
drugs to be prescribed using their International Nonproprietary Name, or INN). 
353 See CAFTA by the Numbers: What Everyone Needs to Know, supra note 351.  
354 Id. 
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associated with the Costa Rican pharmaceutical industry offered 
estimates suggesting that the total cost of medicines in Costa Rica 
under CAFTA’s intellectual property provisions could increase by 
as much as 800%.355  Assuming that the fraction of Costa Rica’s 
national budget spent on the health care system would remain 
unchanged, Costa Rica would be left with the equally unpalatable 
options of either maintaining universal coverage by substantially 
diminishing the quality of the service, or maintaining the quality of 
the service by giving up universal coverage and requiring 
uncovered citizens to pay for the increased cost of medicines and 
services. 
CAFTA advocates were quick to point out that the chief 
purpose of strengthening intellectual property rights is to provide 
incentives for innovation.356  The development of new 
pharmaceutical products, in turn, benefits everyone over the long 
run, even the poorest members of society, as medications become 
cheaper and more accessible over time.357  Increases in the price of 
medicines may be an unfortunate, but temporary consequence of 
the effort to prevent the unfair commercial use of data by 
 
355 See id. (estimating the effect of the “CAFTA intellectual property 
provisions” on the cost of medications in Costa Rica).  
356 See Jill Replogle, Profit or the Right to Health, INSIDECOSTARICA, June 19, 
2004, http://insidecostarica.com/special_reports/2004-06/profit_or_right.htm.  
CAFTA supporters . . . say the agreement will assure access to safe, 
quality drugs for the population through stricter pharmaceutical testing 
and approval standards.  They also say it will stimulate innovation by 
providing protection for pharmaceutical research and development. . . . 
Meanwhile, multinational pharmaceutical companies applaud the 
measures as defending the average US$900 million investment required 
to turn a single chemical entity into a marketable pharmaceutical 
product.  “What we want is a fair, open market,” said Dr. Rodolfo 
Lambour, executive director of the Central American Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Laboratories, which represents major international 
pharmaceutical companies in the region.  “We’re not against generics,” 
Lambour said, “they can come into the market once intellectual property 
rights expire.” 
Id.  
357 See id. (“Th[e] Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health specifically called for the provision of access to medicine for all.  It also 
assured member nations the right to do this within TRIPS provisions.”).  
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unauthorized third parties.358  Prior to CAFTA, so went the 
argument, Costa Rican law did not provide adequate protection to 
pharmaceutical companies seeking to protect undisclosed data 
submitted for regulatory approval.  CAFTA could wind up 
encouraging such companies to enter the Costa Rican market, 
increasing trade between the United States and Costa Rica, and 
eventually lowering drug prices in the small country.359 
CAFTA opponents, however, argued that Costa Rica presents a 
unique situation compared to its neighboring nations due to its 
high-standard universal health care system.  While corporations 
may need incentives to innovate and market their products in the 
more backward countries of Central America and the Caribbean, 
this is not the case in Costa Rica, where the health care system 
depends on dramatically lower-priced medicines, facilitated by 
competition from generic substitutes, and its focus is broad access 
to needed medicines by all of its citizens.360   
This was, indeed, the position taken by Álvaro Camacho Mejía, 
President of the National Pharmaceutical Industry Association, 
and an outspoken opponent of the free trade agreement.  He stated 
that the success of the country’s health care system lay in the 
existence and accessibility of generic medicines, as well as the 
quality of medical human resources.361  He argued that while 
 
358 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS: COSTA 
RICA TRADE SUMMARY 159 (2007) (discussing U.S. concerns regarding “Costa Rica’s 
inadequate enforcement of intellectual property laws”).  
359 See id. at 157 (“When implemented, the CAFTA-DR will remove barriers 
to trade and investment in the region and strengthen regional economic 
integration.”).   
360 See, e.g., Robert Weissman, Dying for Drugs: How CAFTA Will Undermine 
Access to Essential Medicines, 25 MULTINATIONAL MONITOR 4 (2004), available at 
http://multinationalmonitor.org/mm2004/04012004/april04corp2.html 
(explaining that compulsory drug licensing introduces competition while drugs 
are still covered by patents, lowering prices even before generics are permitted to 
compete with patented pharmaceuticals); see also Álvaro Camacho Mejía, Un 
problema que no existe [A problem that Does Not Exists], LA NACION, Feb. 22, 2005 
http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2005/febrero/22/opinion6.html.  
(“This was the case of NAFTA, since it contemplates reforms on aspects beyond 
the country’s current regulations, generating a shift in society from access to 
generic drugs, encouraging the monopoly of multinational pharmaceutical 
companies in the local market, with the implications that this entails.”). 
361 See Mejía, supra note 360 (indicating that such access and quality 
incentivizes investment by multinational pharmaceutical enterprises).  
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CAFTA’s intellectual provisions could have a positive effect on 
other CAFTA members by encouraging pharmaceutical companies 
to make advanced health care products available, this would not 
be the case in Costa Rica, where a high-quality health care system 
was already established based on the easy availability of generic 
medicines.362  With social security coverage of more than 90%, and 
an average life expectancy matching that of developed countries, 
the country should not subject itself to the same kind of regime as 
that of its less developed Central American and Caribbean 
neighbors.363  “It [was] necessary for Costa Rica to realize the social 
balance that has allowed Costa Rican population’s access to 
medicines, and to understand that displacement of such system 
will only be an attempt to solve a problem that does not exist.” 364 
CAFTA proponents, while granting that there would be some 
price increases for medications as a result of the agreement, were 
quick to argue that the intellectual property provisions themselves 
would not affect the Costa Rican Social Security System (Caja 
Costarricense de Seguro Social [CCSS]), nor lead to privatization of 
the health care system.365  According to this line of argument, all 
that CAFTA did was moderately lengthen the terms of protections 
for some patents and marketing test data.366  Eduardo Doryan 
Garrón, Executive President of CCSS and a CAFTA supporter, 
reassured the public that CAFTA would not damage the health 
care system or prevent access to generic medicines, as more than 
98% of existing medicines funded by the CCSS were on the WHO’s 
 
362 See id. (arguing that there is widespread availability of high quality 
generic versions of medications in Costa Rica). 
363 See id. (“Coverage by the Social Security system reaches 90% of the 
population.”). 
364 Id. (translation by author) (“We must reflect on the social balance that has 
allowed access to these drugs and understand that their displacement is only 
intended to solve a problem that does not exists.”). 
365 See Elías Jiménez F., TLC y el sistema de salud [CAFTA and the Health 
System], LA NACION, Feb. 23, 2007, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee 
/2007/febrero/23/opinion1005429.html (explaining that the TLC will not 
negatively effect the health industry nor the financial status of CCSS, and will not 
change the structure and autonomy of the CCSS).  
366 See id. (“What the FTA does regulate, in the area of medication, is the 
protection of undivulged information: the test data that provide the necessary 
information about security and effectiveness that are indispensable to the 
registration and commercialization of a product in Costa Rica . . . .”). 
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list of essential medicines and did not have patents.367  While his 
lack of concern was in marked contrast to the letter, mentioned 
earlier, which his predecessor had written to the Defensoria in late 
2005, Doryan Garrón admitted that it was the remaining 2% of the 
medicines, and the development of new medicines, that might be 
affected by CAFTA.  Even with regard to the latter, however, 
CAFTA contained exceptions, as admitted in the Defensoria’s 
report, which allowed governments to issue compulsory licenses 
or take other steps to facilitate access to medications necessary for 
the treatment of AIDS and other epidemics.368 
CAFTA opponents, however, stuck to their guns and 
questioned why its intellectual property provisions were even 
more stringent than those of the TRIPS, which foes of globalization 
argue are too stringent anyway.369  In recent years, the application 
of the TRIPS Agreement to pharmaceutical products has come 
under scrutiny as critics have argued that the TRIPS may prevent 
developing countries from providing cheaper medicines to patients 
with AIDS and other highly distressing illnesses.370  In order to 
address this issue, WTO members unanimously adopted in 2001 
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health.371 
The 2001 Doha Declaration states that “the TRIPS Agreement 
does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures 
to protect public health” and affirms that “the Agreement can and 
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of 
 
367 See Eduardo Doryan Garrón, El Seguro está seguro: TLC y CCSS [The 
Insurance System is Safe: TLC and CCSS], LA NACION, July 8, 2007, 
http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2007/julio/08/opinion1159621.html (arguing 
that CAFTA will not endanger the Health Insurance System of Costa Rica). 
368 See Sylvia Varela, Sin empleos no hay medicinas [Without Jobs there are no 
medicines], LA NACION, Aug. 31, 2007, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee 
/2007/agosto/31/opinion1222908.html (arguing that the protection of Intellectual 
Property benefits investigation and development of new pharmaceutical 
products). 
369 See Weissman, supra note 360 (providing an overview of arguments 
supporting and opposing TRIPS and WTO licensing standards). 
370 See CAFTA & Public Health: Will poor people have access to medicines?, OXFAM 
AMERICA (Mar. 22, 2004), http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2004-
April/006280.html (citing CAFTA as a threat to the development of cheap drugs, 
AIDS medications in particular).  
371 See id. (“The [Doha] Declaration affirmed that TRIPS provisions should be 
interpreted so as to prioritize public health over patent rights.”). 
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WTO Members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to 
promote access to medicines for all.”372  While maintaining the 
WTO members’ commitments to intellectual property rights made 
in the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha Declaration recognizes the need 
for flexibility, including the right of every member “to grant 
compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds 
upon which such licenses are granted.”373  A compulsory license is 
a license issued by a government to a non-patent holder to allow it 
temporarily to produce the patented product or process “without 
the consent of the patent owner,” thereby allowing the non-patent 
holding companies to produce cheaper generic drugs.374  The key 
benefit of compulsory licensing is that it creates competition for a 
pharmaceutical product while the product is still covered by the 
patent.375 
Developing countries have used the threat of a compulsory 
license as negotiating leverage against large patent-holding 
pharmaceutical companies.376  In some cases, including several 
involving Brazil, even when the government does not issue a 
compulsory license, the mere prospect that such a license may be 
issued will encourage patent holders to lower prices voluntarily.377  
Critics argued that CAFTA, by making it more difficult for generic 
companies to bring products to the market, could affect adversely 
Costa Rica’s prerogatives under the 2001 Doha Declaration.378  In 
 
372 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2 (2002).  
373 Id.  
374 See TRIPS and Health: Frequently Asked Questions: Compulsory Licensing of 
Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Sept. 2006) [hereinafter WTO 
Compulsory Licensing], http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public 
_health_faq_e.htm (discussing the logistics and rules of compulsory licensing of 
pharmaceuticals under TRIPS). 
375 But see Weissman, supra note 360 (quoting opponents of CAFTA as saying 
“CAFTA's patent and other intellectual property rules will . . . delay generic 
competition and artificially raise the price of drugs“). 
376 See, e.g., AARONSON & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 223, at 109 (describing 
negotiating tactics used by Brazil in its health initiative, which includes its “trade-
related intellectual property issues”). 
377 See id. (“Brazil also noted that, although it had not used compulsory 
licensing, the threat to do so ‘has led a number of foreign laboratories to lower 
their prices.’”); see also WTO Compulsory Licensing, supra note 374 (clarifying 
misconceptions about compulsory licensing and generic medicines under TRIPS).  
378 See Replogle, supra note 356.  
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response, CAFTA advocates insisted that the Costa Rican 
government’s right to issue compulsory licenses would remain 
undiminished in case of a public health emergency, a point on 
which the Defensoria’s report was in agreement with.379 
8. WIELDING CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE AGAINST CAFTA 
While the public debate over CAFTA was taking place, either 
in the streets through peaceful demonstrations, or on radio, 
television, and the nation’s newspapers, it was clear that neither 
side had a convincing edge over the other.  Arias had vowed at his 
inauguration in March of 2006 to push the agreement through the 
Legislative Assembly, and he spent the first few months of his 
presidency during the summer and early fall trying to cobble a 
majority to ratify CAFTA.  In accordance with the Constitution, the 
treaty would require the vote of two-thirds of the members of the 
Legislative Assembly, or thirty-eight out of fifty-seven.380  While 
the government commanded the support of exactly thirty-eight 
members of the Assembly, this support was wobbly.  Many 
legislators, including some of Arias’s close allies, were hesitant to 
bring the treaty to a vote, fearful that at the last moment there 
would be enough defections to hand the government an 
embarrassing defeat.381  Public opinion polls were not helping.  In 
 
This Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
specifically called for the provision of access to medicine for all.  It also 
assured member nations the right to do this within TRIPS provisions.  
“The Doha Declaration was the product of the international community 
at its best, recognizing an overriding commitment to healthcare that 
cannot be subordinated to commercial considerations,” Robert 
Weissman of the Washington-based organization Essential Action wrote 
in a recent analysis on CAFTA.  Weissman and other health activists say 
these priorities would be reversed under CAFTA. 
Id.; see also Graham-Silverman, supra note 336 (arguing that CAFTA protects the 
pharmaceutical industry at the expense of public health).  
379 See INFORME DE LA DEFENSORIA, supra note 92, at 176.  
380 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 Y SUS 
REFORMAS, art. 105, available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions 
/Costa/costa2.html (passing legilsation requires “the approval of two thirds of 
the total members”). 
381 Costa Rica: Slow Coach, BUS. LATIN AM., Sept. 18, 2006, at 4. 
As the PLN does not have an inter-party alliance in the highly 
fragmented Legislative Assembly, the prospects for headway on its 
reform agenda hinges on extensive bargaining over each of its proposed 
 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
03 COLL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2011  8:23 PM 
536 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 33:2 
September 2006, 51% of Costa Ricans were in favor of CAFTA and 
23% against, but by March 2007 the numbers had changed to 39% 
in favor, almost 33% against, and 22% undecided.382 
As the political process stalled, the battle over CAFTA entered 
a new phase in which both sides tried to use Costa Rica’s complex 
system of courts and constitutional procedure to prevail.  On 
November 22, 2006, an anti-CAFTA group of citizens, including 
several anti-CAFTA legislators, presented a petition to the 
Supreme Electoral Tribunal seeking permission to collect the 
requisite number of signatures to convoke a national referendum 
to decide whether Costa Rica should ratify CAFTA.  Article 105 of 
the Constitution provides: 
The power to legislate resides in the people, which 
delegates this power, by means of suffrage, to the 
Legislative Assembly . . . .  The people also can exercise this 
power through the referendum, to approve or disapprove 
laws and amendments to the Constitution; such 
referendum can be convoked by at least five per cent of the 
citizens registered in the electoral list, or by the Legislative 
Assembly through a vote of two-thirds of all its members, 
or by the Executive with an absolute majority of all 
members of the Legislative Assembly . . . .383 
On April 12, 2007, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal gave the go-
ahead to the collection of signatures.384  If five per cent (132,270) of 
 
projects . . . .  Among these controversial projects are the fiscal reform 
bill; the ratification of the Dominican Republic-Central American Free-
Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA).   
Id.  
382 See Most Costa Ricans Approve of CAFTA, ANGUS REID PUBLIC OPINION (Sept. 
27, 2006), http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/7555/most_costa_ricans_approve 
_of_cafta/; Costa Rica Still Wonders About CAFTA, ANGUS REID PUBLIC OPINION 
(Mar. 28, 2007), http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/3851/costa_rica_still 
_wonders_about_cafta/. 
383 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 Y SUS 
REFORMAS, art. 105, available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions 
/Costa/costa2.html. 
384 See Álvaro Murillo, Gobierno oficializa petición de consulta popular sobre TLC 
[Government makes formal requirement for referendum regarding the Free Trade 
Agreement], LA NACION, Apr. 18, 2007, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee 
/2007/abril/18/pais1066202.html (reporting on the governmental decision to 
request a referendum regarding the Free Trade Agreement). 
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all registered voters (2,645,391) signed up within a nine-month 
period, the referendum would be convoked.385  Once the required 
number of signatures were collected and properly validated, the 
Supreme Electoral Tribunal would convoke the referendum.386  
Until then, the Legislative Assembly could continue to debate 
CAFTA.387  For the referendum to be valid at all, 30% (793,618) of 
all registered voters had to participate in it.388  For its outcome to be 
binding, such outcome would have to receive the support of at 
least 40% of all registered voters.389  The constitutional and 
historical significance of these events cannot be overstated, as this 
would be the first referendum in the country’s history. 
Meanwhile, treaty supporters and opponents had just emerged 
from a separate constitutional battle that was brief but intense.  In 
early February, pro-CAFTA parliamentarians approved an 
amendment to a 1999 rule of internal legislative procedure that 
would allow for expedited debate and vote by a qualified majority 
of thirty-eight votes on international treaties, such as CAFTA, in 
the space of twenty-two legislative sessions (twenty-two weeks).  
Anti-CAFTA legislators immediately appealed this legislative act 
to the Constitutional Chamber, citing several constitutional 
irregularities.  On March 1, the Constitutional Chamber ruled that 
 
385 See id. 
Beginning with the notification of the completed vote, Corrales and a 
group of people and institution that support him should begin to collect 
signatures amounting to 5% of registered voters, composed of 2,645,391 
Costa Ricans, according to recent figures from February. This would 
require 132,270 signatures. The law gives nine months for the collection 
of signatures, although Corrales said yesterday that a month and a half 
would be enough for them. 
Id. 
386 See id. (Collecting sufficient signatures is the primary requirement for 
carrying out a binding referendum like the one requested by the former delegate 
José Miguel Corrales for the FTA.“). 
387 See id. (“The proceedings can continue in Congress and the suspension 
would only be valid when the eventual convocation occurs and for purposes of 
the plenary vote, according to the ‘as such’ of the ruling.”). 
388 See id. (“When the TSE validates the completion of the requisites it can call 
for a referendum that requires the participation of at least 30% of the population, 
796,618 voters, in order to be binding.”). 
389 See id. (“The percentage of participation necessary for the outcome to be 
one of obligatory compliance can be up to a 40%, if it is determined that 38 and 
not 28 votes are necessary for the eventual ratification of the FTA legislation.”). 
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the approved expedited legislative procedure amendment was 
constitutionally permissible, improving somewhat the prospects 
that the government would be able to bring CAFTA to a vote in the 
near future.390 
The success of anti-CAFTA forces in securing a decision from 
the Supreme Electoral Tribunal authorizing a popular referendum 
for the first time in the nation’s history left the government in an 
awkward position.  All along, the government had opposed the 
idea of a popular referendum on CAFTA.  The successful move by 
CAFTA’s foes to secure a referendum suggested that they were so 
confident of having public opinion on their side that they, and not 
the government, were in favor of consulting the Costa Rican 
people.  Not wanting to be upstaged, Arias, taking advantage of 
the Constitutional provision that permits a referendum to be 
convoked by “the Executive with an absolute majority of all 
members of the Legislative Assembly,”391 submitted to the 
Legislative Assembly on April 18 a decree convoking a 
referendum.392  Brushing aside the opposition’s taunts of political 
opportunism, he argued that convoking the referendum by 
executive decree with a legislative majority would make it 
unnecessary to collect 132,270 signatures and would permit the 
referendum to take place sooner.393  In truth, the government 
 
390 See, e.g., Ismael Venegas C., Diputados retoman vía rápida para planes de TLC 
[Deputies fast track to retake TLC plans], LA NACION, Apr. 18, 2007, 
http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2007/abril/18/pais1066203.html (discussing the 
possibility of the legislature resuming talks to approve the agreement in April, 
2007). 
391 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 Y SUS 
REFORMAS, art. 105, available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions 
/Costa/costa2.html. 
392 See Murillo, supra note 384 (reporting on the government’s presentation on 
April 17th of a decree that formally permites a public referendum on CAFTA). 
393 See Katherine Stanley, Referendum Decree Moves Forward, TICO TIMES (Apr. 
25, 2007), http://www.ticotimes.net/dailyarchive/2007_04/0425071.htm.  
Though all legislators say they support a referendum, some, including 
Oscar López, say they want it to happen not through the decree, but 
through citizens’ collection of signatures.  The TSE gave a group of 
citizens the right to start collecting signatures earlier this month (TT, 
April 13), but President Oscar Arias sent a decree to the assembly that 
could eliminate the signature-collection period (TT, April 20). 
Id.; see also Arturo Gudiño, TSE afirma que referendo puede evitar confrontación social 
[Supreme Electoral Tribunal says that the referendum can avoid social turmoil], LA 
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feared that the opposition would use the process of collecting 
signatures for the referendum as an additional tool for mobilizing 
popular sentiment against the treaty. 
Not wanting to appear two-sided themselves, the anti-CAFTA 
legislators voted for Arias’s referendum decree, enabling it to 
obtain an absolute majority in the Assembly easily two days later.  
The government immediately asked the Supreme Electoral 
Tribunal to convoke the referendum on the basis of the 
government’s Executive-legislative procedure, as allowed by the 
Constitution.394  The anti-CAFTA forces responded to the 
government’s petition by filing their own counter-petition to the 
Tribunal asking that, since the Tribunal already had authorized the 
process of convoking a referendum by popular collection of 
signatures, this process should be allowed to go forward and 
should not be preempted by the government’s subsequent move.395  
CAFTA opponents knew that their favored procedure could be 
delayed up to nine months, bringing the referendum’s date close to 
March of 2008, by which time the treaty itself provided that Costa 
Rica’s option to join CAFTA would expire.396  For the same 
 
NACION, Apr. 27, 2007, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2007/abril/27/ultima-
sr1077885.html (reporting on the opinion of the Supreme Elections Tribunal 
regarding the need of a referendum concerning the approval of the Free Trade 
Agreement); Álvaro Murillo, Costa Rica planea el primer referéndum de su historia 
[Costa Rica plans the first referendum of its history], EL PAÍS, Apr. 16, 2007, 
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Costa/Rica/planea/primer/refe
rendum/historia/elpepuint/20070416elpepuint_4/Tes (reporting on the 
referendum and the positions of supporters and opponents); Costa Rica mulls 
referendum for CAFTA trade pact, BDNEWS24, Apr. 13, 2007, 
http://www.bdnews24.com/details.php?id=58599.  
“If the agreement is passed before the nine-month period, the tribunal 
would have to decide whether to shelve the referendum or allow the 
vote to proceed if enough signatures are gathered,” said Antonio 
Sobrado, interim president of the tribunal.  Complicating the issue—the 
court could close the nine-month voting period to show support for a 
referendum early if the requisite votes were collected more quickly 
Id. 
394 See, e.g., Murillo, supra note 384 (“The minister of the Presidency, Rodrigo 
Arias, brought before congress decree 33717-MP which activates one of the three 
mechanisms established by law in order to celebrate a binding referendum.”). 
395 Stanley, supra note 393. 
396 See Costa Rica: Yes to CAFTA?, LATIN BUS. CHRONICLE (May 1, 2007), 
http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=1172. 
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reasons, the government was eager to ensure that, if a referendum 
were to occur, it would take place as soon as possible to avoid the 
prospects of missing the treaty’s deadline for accession.397  On May 
2, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal ruled that, given the choice 
between two constitutionally valid avenues for a referendum, the 
simpler, more expeditious, and less expensive procedure was 
preferable.398  Hence, the government’s decree convoking a 
referendum was valid, and a date could be set for the referendum 
as long as ample time was provided for both sides to organize their 
campaigns.399 
While this complicated set of battles before the Supreme 
Electoral Tribunal was taking place, CAFTA’s opponents had been 
eyeing another possible instrument, in addition to a judicially-
sanctioned popular referendum, with which to delay or injure the 
treaty, perhaps fatally:  the Constitutional Chamber itself, which 
had full authority to rule on all constitutional questions, including 
the validity of treaties.  They argued with increasing vehemence 
that, even before the referendum took place, the treaty should be 
submitted to the Constitutional Chamber for review of, what they 
had perceived as, serious constitutional flaws.400  There was no 
 
[I]nstead of waiting for up to nine months to hold the referendum once 
all the requisites are filled, the referendum can be held within three 
months . . . avoiding an unnecessary delay . . . .  [T]he anti-CAFTA forces 
in Congress have been using all legal maneuvers to avoid a final vote. 
Id.  
397 See Stanley, supra note 393 (“In a statement, the Union of Chambers 
praised the legislators’ ‘patriotism’ and expressed hopes that the referendum will 
take place in a timely manner, given that Costa Rica risks being left out of CAFTA 
if it does not make a decision by March 2008.”). 
398 See Katherine Stanley, Tribunal Says CAFTA Referendum Could be Held in 
September, TICO TIMES (May 4, 2007), http://www.ticotimes.net/dailyarchive 
/2007_05/0504071.htm (“Interim TSE president Luis Antonio Sobrado told 
reporters that he and his fellow justices have discarded an initiative to convene a 
nationwide CAFTA referendum by collecting signatures.  This method would 
have meant a wait of up to 14 months before a vote could take place.”). 
399 See Resolucion Electoral No. 977-E-2007 (Tribunal Supremo De Elecciones) 
[Supreme Electoral Tribunal], April 12, 2007) (Costa Rica), available at 
http://www.tse.go.cr/juris/electorales/0977-E-2007.htm. 
400 See Costa Rica Politics: CAFTA Approval Under Threat, EIU VIEWSWIRE, June 
6, 2007, available at ProQuest, Doc. No. 1298610351.  
A recent study carried out by the Universidad de Costa Rica concluded 
that there are 17 issues in DR-CAFTA’s text which may be at odds with 
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point in having a referendum, with all of its high economic costs 
and delays, if in the end the Constitutional Chamber ruled that the 
treaty was unconstitutional anyway.  Moreover, the citizens had a 
need and a right to know whether the treaty on which they would 
vote in a referendum was constitutional and only the 
Constitutional Chamber could provide such review.401  
Sensing an obvious danger to the treaty’s viability, the 
government, speaking through the Minister of the Presidency, 
Rodrigo Arias (brother of the President), stated on April 17 that a 
constitutional review before the referendum was unnecessary.402  
The treaty had been analyzed in great detail by experts and 
approved by the Legislative Assembly’s International Relations 
Committee, where it had been the subject of intense legal 
scrutiny.403  According to Arias’s reasoning, if a citizen found any 
minor constitutional flaws, such flaws should be examined by the 
Constitutional Chamber, but only after the treaty had been ratified 
 
the country’s constitution.  Most of these are either related to the creation 
of obligations to the state that are not envisaged in the constitution, or 
the delegation of what are considered to be state’s responsibilities to 
commissions that should be created if the treaty goes into effect. 
Id.; Sala IV to Review CAFTA, TICO TIMES (May 14, 2007), 
http://www.ticotimes.net/dailyarchive/2007_05/0514072.htm. 
The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court (Sala IV) Friday 
accepted a request from Ombudswoman Lisbeth Quesada to review 
[CAFTA] before the country votes on it in a referendum . . . .  In a 
statement released by Quesada’s office when she requested that the court 
review CAFTA April 27, she listed workers’ rights, health benefits, 
intellectual property and the protection of minority groups as areas she 
sees as problematic or not included in the trade pact. 
Id.  
401 See Marina Ramírez Altamirano, Consulta Constitucional del TLC 
[Constitutional Consultation about the Free Trade Agreement], LA NACION, May 5, 
2007, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2007/mayo/05/opinion1085601.html 
(arguing in favor of the review of the constitutionality of the referendum).  But see 
Rubén Hernández Valle, Supremacia constitucional [Constitutional Supremacy], LA 
NACION, Apr. 18, 2007, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2007/abril/18 
/opinion1065785.html (arguing that the Supreme Court cannot review the 
Constitutionality of the referendum regarding the approval of CAFTA). 
402 See Murillo, supra note 384 (“The Minister of the Presidency ruled out 
submitting the TLC to a revision before the electorate decides ‘yes’ or ‘no’ for the 
TLC.”). 
403 See id. (Arias urged, “[T]he FTA has been negociated by people of great 
experience,  processed in a legislative comisión and analized in depth.”) 
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and came into force.404  The government’s refusal to submit the 
treaty to review by the Constitutional Chamber served only to 
prod the opposition even more into calling for such a procedure. 
Just ten days after Arias’s statement, on April 27, the Defender 
of the People of the Nation (La Defensoria de los Habitantes del 
Pueblo) jumped into the fray again by presenting a formal petition 
to the Constitutional Chamber asking it to review the free trade 
treaty, thereby handing the government another legal and political 
embarrassment.405  The Defender questioned the treaty’s 
constitutionality on the narrow grounds of its potential impact on 
human rights.406  Under Article 96 of Costa Rica’s Constitutional 
Jurisdiction Statute, the Defender can request an advisory opinion 
from the Constitutional Chamber regarding legislative proposals it 
deems could infringe on “fundamental rights or liberties 
recognized by the Constitution or by international human rights 
instruments binding upon Costa Rica.”407 
On May 12, the Chamber agreed to review the treaty’s 
constitutionality and stated it would issue its ruling prior to the 
referendum then scheduled for September 23.408  The government, 
while disagreeing with the court’s decision to review the treaty’s 
constitutionality, responded with a brief statement indicating its 
respect for the Constitutional Chamber’s authority.409  On May 24, 
nineteen members of the Legislative Assembly presented a 130-
page petition to the court seeking to impugn CAFTA on 
constitutional grounds beyond those related to human rights, 
 
404 See id. (Arias argued, “If any doubt remains, any citizen may request the 
review of a specific topic that is in tension with the constitution.”). 
405 Ana Lupita Mora, Sala IV admite consulta de constitucionalidad del TLC [IV 
Courtroom Admits the Constitutionality Review of the Free Trade Agreement], LA 
NACIÓN, May 12, 2007, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2007/mayo/12 
/pais1093994.html (reporting on the decision of the IV Courtroom of Costa Rica’s 
Supreme Court in revising the constitutionality of the referendum about the 
approval of CAFTA). 
406 See id. (highlighting the fact that the Defender under Article 96 of the 
Constitution could mandate an opinion on any piece of legislation if it threatened 
Constitutional or international human rights). 
407 Id. 
408 See id. 
409 See id. (noting a government spokesmen’s respect for the court’s decision 
while hoping that it won’t interfere with the planned referendum date). 
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which had been the scope of the Defensoria’s petition.410  On June 
2, the court announced that it would carry out a full constitutional 
review of the treaty, meaning it would not limit itself to human 
rights issues.411  The court explained it would issue its ruling no 
later than July 11, so as to allow plenty of time for the referendum 
to take place if necessary.412  Meanwhile, the main pro-CAFTA 
civic association, led by Alfredo Volio, also submitted to the court a 
brief explaining why the treaty did not violate Costa Rica’s 
constitution.413 
8.1. The Constitutional Chamber’s Ruling 
On July 3, by a majority of five to two, the court upheld the 
constitutionality of CAFTA.414  The Supreme Electoral Tribunal 
immediately issued the formal convocation for the popular 
referendum, to be held on October 7.415  The court limited its 
review of the treaty to the narrow question of whether any of its 
provisions violated or in any way altered the Constitution.416  The 
 
410 Ana Lupita Mora, 19 diputados consultan constitucionalidad del TLC a Sala IV 
[19 Deputies Contest the Constitutionality of the TLC at the IV Courtroom of the 
Supreme Court], LA NACIÓN, May 24, 2007, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee 
/2007/mayo/24/ultima-sr1108774.html (reporting the presentation made by 
nineteen deputies challenging the constitutionality of the TLC). 
411 Álvaro Murillo, Sala IV revisará todo el TLC antes del referendo [IV Supreme 
Courtroom of the Supreme Court will Revise the Entire TLC Before the Referendum], LA 
NACIÓN, June 2, 2007, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2007/junio/02 
/pais1117952.html (reporting the judicial proceeding developed before the 
Supreme Court of Costa Rica). 
412 Álvaro Murillo, Sala dará fallo de TLC a más tardar el 11 de julio, LA NACIÓN, 
June 12, 2007, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2007/junio/12/pais1129413.html 
(detailing the timing of the review process). 
413 See Murillo, supra note 411 (describing how Defensoria de los Habitantes 
and 18 delegates of the national assembly presented their opposition before the 
court). 
414 Álvaro Murillo, Sala IV Declara Constitucional el TLC [IV Supreme 
Courtroom of Costa Rica Supreme Court Declares the Free Trade Agreement 
Constitutional], LA NACIÓN, July 3, 2007, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2007 
/julio/03/ultima-sr1155196.html (reporting the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Costa Rica declaring the Free Trade Agreement constitutional). 
415 See id. 
416 See id. (citing in its totality the Court’s opinion wherein it chooses to 
answer the constitutional question while the majority chose to ignore questions of 
the legislative procedure). 
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majority found no such instance as it analyzed each of the 
challenges to CAFTA.417 
By a five-to-two majority, the court ruled that the treaty’s 
provisions for arbitration did not violate the Constitution because 
Costa Rica would be able to choose some of the arbiters in every 
case, and also could object to an arbitral decision if it violated the 
Constitution.418  The treaty’s Free Trade Commission, composed of 
representatives of the signatory states, and which has authority to 
adopt by consensus interpretations of the treaty binding for the 
arbitral tribunals, also was not per se unconstitutional, since the 
Costa Rican representative always would be able to object to treaty 
interpretations that violated the country’s constitutional order.419 
On the salient human rights issues highlighted by the 
Defensoria’s earlier report and its subsequent petition to the 
Constitutional Chamber, the same five-to-two majority of the court 
found no constitutional violations.420  The treaty preserved the 
authority of its parties to adopt justifiable and non-discriminatory 
measures to protect human, animal, and plant life and health.421  
The highly controversial Article 15 dealing with intellectual 
property protections of pharmaceuticals also did not violate the 
Constitution.422  The court interpreted CAFTA as reaffirming 
respect for the Doha Declaration of 2001 on the right of states to 
take public health measures and as not prohibiting compulsory 
 
417 See JORGE ENRIQUE ROMERO-PÉREZ, SALA CONSTITUCIONAL, VOTO 9469-07 
TLC-USA, ANÁLISIS Y COMENTARIOS [CONSTITUTIONAL COURTROOM, VOTE 9469-07, 
TLC-USA, ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARIES], (LEX, 1st ed. 2007) (providing the 
Court’s opinion with commentaries). 
418 See id. at 26–32 (holding that CAFTA does not force parties to choose 
arbitration). 
419 See id. at 26–34 (citing the Court’s presumption that the interests of the 
country will be protected both because of the presence of a representative on the 
Free Trade panel and the court’s ability to intervene in particular cases in which a 
fundamental right may be violated). 
420 See Murillo, supra note 412 (quoting in full an opinion wherein Magistrates 
Solano, Mora, Calzada, Vargas and Jinesta hold that there was no constitutional 
violation). 
421 See ROMERO-PÉREZ, supra note 417, at 55 (noting that article 21.1 establishes 
the duties of the parties to protect human and animal life). 
422 See id. at 55–57 (holding that the impact of CAFTA on the price of 
medication falls outside the constitutional domain). 
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licensing.423  The treaty did not alter the State’s obligation to 
guarantee effective access to a universal system of social insurance 
based on principles of social solidarity.424 
According to the court, the treaty also did not affect any of the 
existing laws on environmental protection, nor did it diminish the 
State’s regulatory authority in environmental matters.425  Under 
CAFTA, foreign investors would still be obligated to comply with 
all existing environmental regulations, as long as these regulations 
had a rational basis and were nondiscriminatory in nature.426  In 
the future, the State would have undiminished powers to adopt 
new environmental regulations as necessary, so long as they met 
these minimum requirements.427  The treaty’s provisions on 
telecommunications were equally constitutionally neutral.  The 
State would retain its authority to regulate private sector 
telecommunications providers and to adopt policies to insure 
access by the poor to basic telecommunications services.428 
By a majority of six to one, the court also found that Costa 
Rica’s “list of exceptions” or “list of non-conforming measures,” 
found in the treaty text itself, and in which the country affirmed its 
right to grant special protections to disadvantaged groups, 
including indigenous groups, was constitutionally adequate.429  
 
423 See id. (arguing that petitioners are not correct both because there is no 
direct contradiction of Doha and because the agreement explicitly states its 
agreement in article 15.9.3). 
424 See id. at 55–61 (affirming that the treaty did not become unconstitutional 
because the negotiation did not take place with specialists and dismissing). 
425 See id. at 68 (holding that the absence of environmental regulations within 
the treaty does not void those regulations if they are present in national 
legislation). 
426 See Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement, 19 
U.S.C. § 4001 et seq. (2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-
fta/final-text (granting broad environmental regulatory powers to parties despite 
conflicts with CAFTA investment guidelines to the extent environmental laws and 
regulations meet Article 10.9 standards). 
427 See ROMERO-PÉREZ, supra note 417, at 68–70 (recognizing that all laws 
currently in force regarding the environment are preserved). 
428 See id. at 63–67 (holding that because any internal regulation of the treaty 
must remain consistent with the principles of the state’s rule of law the treaty’s 
treatment of telecommunication is not unconstitutional). 
429 See id. at 62–63 (arguing that the state has reserved its right to adopt 
measures for social well being even if they are incompatible with the treaty). 
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CAFTA opponents also had argued that the definition of 
“territory” in the treaty’s text implied a modification of Costa 
Rica’s territorial boundaries, including especially its 200-mile 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) with its valuable fishing and 
mineral resources.430  By a six-to-one majority the court ruled that 
CAFTA did not impair Costa Rica’s territorial boundaries as 
defined in its Constitution, nor did it abridge any other territory-
related rights or prerogatives the country might enjoy as a result of 
other treaties or provisions of public international law.431 
The court ruled unanimously on several other important legal 
and human rights issues.  First, it ruled that, contrary to the 
allegations of critics who claimed that Costa Rica would be unable 
to renounce the treaty once it joined, the country could leave the 
treaty regime after giving six-months notice, as specified in the 
treaty itself.432  Second, CAFTA’s provisions on 
telecommunications were not discriminatory against the state’s 
electricity and telecommunications monopoly (ICE), nor would 
they enable foreign companies to skirt the country’s legal 
procedures for bidding for licenses for use of the communications 
channel spectrum.433 
Third, the court also ruled unanimously that CAFTA’s 
Environmental Council (a ministerial-level group set up to review 
trade-related environmental issues) permits modalities for the 
participation of citizens in its deliberative processes and does not 
 
430 Stephen Bindman, Contentious CAFTA—A Turning Point for Costa Rica?, 
COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFF. (Apr. 24, 2008), available at 
http://www.coha.org/contentious-cafta-a-turning-point-for-costa-rica/ 
(explaining that the United States does not recognize the law of the sea, which 
would grant Costa Rica seabed rights “up to 200 miles off its coast”); Patricia 
Forkan, Global Trade Watch’s Letter to HSUS’ Humane Society International, 
GLOBAL JUST. FOR ANIMALS & ENV’T (May 12, 2005), available at 
http://freetradekillsanimals.org/?page=WallachHSI (explaining the 
environmental effect CAFTA would have due to various provisions within, 
including the non-recognition of the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone by the 
United States). 
431 See ROMERO-PÉREZ, supra note 417, at 75–82 (detailing the Court’s stance on 
CAFTA’s impact on the country’s sovereignty). 
432 See id. at 34 (recognizing that Costa Rica still retains the right to vote on 
whether or not a different period were adopted). 
433 See id. at 63–67 (recognizing that the treaty acknowledges the existence of a 
regulatory entity responsible for overseeing fees and recognizing that the treaty 
actually operates as a guarantee for telecommunications consumers). 
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exclude similar modalities for citizen participation in 
environmental issues currently existing within Costa Rica’s 
domestic order.434  Thus, it did not present a constitutional 
problem.435  Fourth, none of CAFTA’s labor provisions were 
unconstitutional.436  The treaty would allow the country to 
maintain and improve its labor standards, and it affirmed its 
respect for the ILO conventions and other labor rights and 
guarantees embodied in the Constitution.437  Fifth, there was no 
constitutional violation in the treaty’s use of “negative lists” or 
“lists of non-conforming measures” as part of its text.438 
The court also ruled by unanimity on a highly sensitive issue.  
CAFTA critics had alleged that the inclusion of firearms and other 
light weapons in the treaty’s tariff schedules, coupled with Costa 
Rica’s failure to include in its “list of non-conforming measures” its 
prohibition on the arms trade, meant that CAFTA would make 
Costa Rica a haven for arms smuggling—thereby contributing to 
rampant violence and weakening the country’s prized historic 
ethos of peacefulness.439  The court held that the inclusion of 
firearms in tariff schedules did not prevent Costa Rica from 
enforcing its own laws and regulating or restricting the arms trade 
in any way it saw fit for the sake of public order.440  Finally, the 
court also ruled that the treaty did not violate the constitutionally 
protected rules regarding bidding for public projects, public 
 
434 See id. at 69 (noting that a Reading of article 17 affirms that there are 
sufficient avenues open to citizen participation in the enactment of new laws). 
435 See id. 
436 See id. at 70. 
437 See id. (noting that the treaty directly lists a series of labor rights but is not 
intended to be an exhaustive or exclusive list and merely seeks to create a 
minimum standard). 
438 See id. at 71–72. 
439 Louisa Reynolds, Country Profile: Costa Rica, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, Sept. 
2007, at 36 (discussing the argument that CAFTA would invite U.S. weapons 
manufacturers and “tarnish Costa Rica’s image as an island of peace amidst a sea 
of violence”); Jane Bussey, 5 Questions With Otton Solis: Costa Rican Economist says 
CAFTA is a Bad Deal – A Former Presidential Candidate Explains Why He is Against 
the Central American Free Trade Agreement, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 3, 2008, at G6 
(detailing CAFTA’s potential impact on the country’s involvement in the drug 
trade).  
440 See ROMERO-PÉREZ, supra note 417, at 72–73 (arguing that despite the 
presence of banned goods on Costa Rica’s tarriff relief list, Costa Rica is not 
obligated to allow the free sale of those goods). 
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contracts, and the authority of the Inspector General,441 nor did it 
affect the constitutional framework for municipal autonomy.442 
The court’s carefully reasoned opinion, though welcomed by 
the government and the pro-CAFTA forces, was an obvious 
disappointment to the treaty’s opponents, who resolved to work 
even harder to defeat the treaty at the upcoming referendum.  
Some of the leading labor unions and farmers’ groups went 
further, openly expressing their contempt for, and questioning the 
legitimacy of, both the Constitutional Chamber and the Supreme 
Electoral Tribunal for what they perceived to be their docility 
toward the Arias brothers in the face of the looming surrender of 
the country’s sovereignty to the brave new world of grasping 
foreign investors and U.S. corporations embodied by CAFTA.443  In 
line with much of Costa Rica’s history, however, neither the 
intense disappointment nor the heated vitriol of many of CAFTA’s 
foes led to any kind of violence.444  As the Defender of the People 
of the Nation, herself one of the leading critics of CAFTA who had 
presented the initial petition for review to the Constitutional 
Chamber, explained, the court’s decision “strengthens the 
country’s institutional integrity.”445  For many Costa Ricans like 
 
441 See id. at 73–74. 
442 See id. at 83–84 (recognizing that municipalities shall continue to retain 
their power so long as internal legislation continues to be upheld). 
443 See, e.g., Rosario Incer Arias, TSE y Sala Cuarta no nos Merecen Respeto 
[Supreme Electoral Tribunal and Fourth Courtroom of the Supreme Court do not Deserve 
our Respect], LA NACIÓN, July, 6, 2007, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee 
/2007/julio/06/opinion1158190.html (denouncing the Chamber and SET as 
mechanisms serving the Arias “dictatorship”); see also Carlos A. Villalobos, Grupo 
Anti-TLC Desconoce Legitimidad de Sala IV y TSE [Anti Free Trade Agreement  Group 
Challenges the Legitimacy of the IV Courtroom of the Supreme Court and the Supreme 
Electoral Tribunal], LA NACIÓN, July 6, 2007, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee 
/2007/julio/06/pais1158546.html (listing some of the approximately 30 
organizations affiliated with the Comisión Nacional de Enlace). 
444 Tico Times Staff, Costa Rica Makes History with CAFTA Referendum, TICO 
TIMES, (Oct. 8, 2007), http://www.ticotimes.net/dailyarchive/2007_10 
/100807.htm#story2 (detailing the lack of tangible conflict associated with 
disagreement over CAFTA). 
445 Carlos A. Villalobos, Sala IV Resuelve que El TLC es Constitucional [IV 
Courtroom of the Supreme Court Decides that the TLC is Constitutional], LA 
NACIÓN, July 4, 2007, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2007/julio/04 
/pais1155599.html (reporting on the opinion of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica 
deciding the constitutionality of CAFTA). 
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her, the court’s decision was confirmation that vital legal and 
political issues could be reasoned and debated peacefully, 
deliberately, and in accordance with the agreed upon rules of the 
Constitution. 
8.2. The Referendum Campaign:  Money, Dirty Tactics, and U.S. 
Pressures 
The court’s opinion unleashed a fierce three-month public 
opinion battle by both sides to secure victory at the October 7 
referendum.446  CAFTA opponents, when not outright dismissive 
of the court’s opinion, which after all was silent on the question of 
whether the country should adopt CAFTA and ruled only on 
whether it was constitutional,447 focused on the treaty’s threat to 
national sovereignty and identity.448  Their argument was that 
CAFTA would dilute further Costa Rica’s ability to shape its own 
economic and social character by opening it up to more foreign 
investment and trade, subjecting it to various transnational 
economic, legal, and political constraints, and weakening its 
overall autonomy.449  The Costa Rican social democratic model, 
already weakened over the previous twenty-five years by the 
relentless pressures of globalization450 and its own inability to 
finance its ambitious social vision, would become further 
 
446 See, e.g., Álvaro Murillo, Sentencia de Sala IV Sobre TLC Desata Campañas 
[Decision of the IV Courtroom of the Supreme Court on Free Trade Agreement unleashes 
Political Activism], LA NACIÓN, July 5, 2007, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee 
/2007/julio/05/pais1157043.html (describing the heated political atmosphere 
following the Chamber’s decision). 
447 See ROMERO-PÉREZ, supra note 417 (reporting the Court’s decision, which 
was on constitutional grounds). 
448 See Kate E. Kaiser, Comment, The Fight for Access to AIDS Medications: How 
the Central American Free Trade Agreement Conflicts with Costa Rica’s Constitutional 
Courts, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 535, 559–61 (2007) (noting popular resistance to CAFTA 
and the reasons behind it). 
449 See id. (same); see also id. at 554–58 (discussing CAFTA’s effects on Costa 
Rican sovereignty, in particular examining the decision to set up mechanisms for 
alternative dispute resolution). 
450 See PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO 
OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 2–3 (2002) (noting how globalization has 
weakened states’ ability to protect their citizens from international conglomerates 
with monopolistic property rights). 
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transmogrified into a neo-liberal market society ruled by the 
decline of solidarity and the relentless quest for individual profit.451  
Treaty supporters were equally passionate and their arguments 
covered as wide a range of rationality and realistic expectations 
concerning their preferred outcome.  They argued that accession to 
CAFTA, far from weakening the country, would make it more 
competitive, especially at a time when the small neighboring 
nation of Panama was making an open bid for stealing Costa Rica’s 
own prospects of becoming a future “Central American Tiger,” a 
bicoastal Singapore at the intersection of North and South 
America.452  CAFTA represented both the inevitable—in the world 
of globalization, Costa Rica could not hope to prosper without it—
as well as an unmatched opportunity to modernize the country by 
reforming Costa Rican economic and social institutions.453  The the 
treaty’s more ideological supporters quickly drew links between 
opposition to the treaty and the forces of Hugo Chavez and Fidel 
Castro supposedly bent upon hijacking the country toward a 
Cuban or Venezuelan anti-free market, authoritarian model.454 
As the referendum campaign drew to a close, it became 
extremely tight, with polls showing a narrow margin of difference 
between both sides and a large number of undecided voters.455  On 
September 6, only four weeks before the vote, the country was 
rocked by a leaked memo from Kevin Casas, one of the country’s 
 
451 See, e.g., Esteban Oviedo, 92 Sacerdotes Toman Posicion Politica a Favor del 
NO [Priest take Political Position in favor of the Option No], LA NACIÓN, Sept. 26, 
2007, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2007/septiembre/26/pais1255189.html 
(reporting the Costa Rican Episcopal Conference’s position on the political 
arguments for and against CAFTA’s approval in Costa Rica). 
452 See Strong Economic Growth Potential Puts Albania and Panama Top of Long 
Term Investment List, PROP. WIRE, July 20, 2008, 
http://www.propertywire.com/news/related-stories/albania-panama-long-
term-investment-200807201344.html (noting Panama’s sustained economic 
growth in conjunction with the country’s expansion of the Panama Canal). 
453 See Jerry Haar, Costa Rica’s Free Trade Victory, LATIN BUS. CHRON. (Oct. 15, 
2007), http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=1703 
(detailing how CAFTA would improve Costa Rica’s economic climate and reform 
some of its “nanny-state” features). 
454 See Oviedo, supra note 451 (quoting the anti-CAFTA monks’ response to 
the argument that the “No” side was following Chavez or Castro’s lead). 
455 Trading Arguments, THE ECONOMIST (July 12, 2007), available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/9481436?story_id=E1_JQRTQPG (discussing 
the arguments supporting and opposing DR-CAFTA for Costa Rica). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss2/3
03 COLL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2011  8:23 PM 
2011] COSTA RICA’S BATTLE OVER CAFTA 551 
two vice presidents, to President Oscar Arias and his brother 
Rodrigo, recommending the use of various dirty political tactics to 
defeat the “No” faction.456  The memo, dated July 29, reveals the 
mentality then prevailing among some senior governmental 
officials, who feared that CAFTA would lose at the polls. 
Casas began by lamenting the decline of national confidence in 
the Costa Rican political establishment as a result of the revelations 
of corruption at the presidential level in the 1990s.457  The country’s 
governance had suffered, and the government lacked the 
credibility to impart legitimacy to a project as controversial as 
CAFTA.458  At the moment, he rued, “nobody believes a word said 
by the government or the politicians and for this reason, it would 
be lunacy to delegate in them the defence of the treaty.”459  Further, 
he lamented that the CAFTA campaign had become “a struggle 
between rich and poor, and between the government and the 
people.”460  The anti-CAFTA coalition was “formidable:  
universities, the church, unions, environmental groups, etc.”461  On 
the other side, the pro-CAFTA forces were “only the government, 
and some of the big entrepreneurs.”462 
According to Casas, to prevent CAFTA’s defeat, the ruling 
party’s political machine needed to take several measures.  He 
 
456 Memorandum from Kevin Casas, Vice President & Minister of Planning, 
Costa Rica, and Fernando Sánchez, Representative and President of the Electoral 
Comm’n, Costa Rica, to Óscar Arias, President, Costa Rica, and Rodrigo Arias, 
Minister of the Presidency, Costa Rica passim (July 29, 2007) [hereinafter Casas 
Memo], available at http://www.wola.org/publications/leaked_memo_on 
_cafta_vote_in_costa_rica (follow “Download” hyperlink) (outlining the strategies 
to be used by the Arias administration in promoting the CAFTA movement). 
457 Id. at 1 (identifying the low level of government credibility as a reason 
why government support has failed to grant CAFTA any legitimacy).  See generally 
James C. McKinley, Jr., Letter from the Americas: Putting Presidents On Trial Can 
Hurt Your Reputation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004, http://query.nytimes.com/gst 
/fullpage.html?res=9F03EED71F3DF930A35752C1A9629C8B63&sec=&spon=&pa
gewanted=1 (detailing some of the scandals of the 1990s that generally left Costa 
Rican politicians out of favor with voters). 
458 See Casas Memo, supra note 456, at 1 (discussing severely diminished 
confidence in government, and the importance of coming up with new strategies 
to build support for CAFTA). 
459 Id. 
460 Id. at 2. 
461 Id. 
462 Id. 
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suggested that the fifty-nine pro-CAFTA mayors belonging to the 
ruling party (the PLN) be put in charge of the pro-CAFTA 
campaign in each of their districts, and that “a very simple idea” be 
conveyed to them:  “the Mayor that doesn’t win [CAFTA in] his 
[district] will not get a penny from the government in the next 3 
years.”463  Casas noted that many PLN local leaders were not 
campaigning for CAFTA in order not to “burn themselves before 
the next election.”464  But they needed to be told in no uncertain 
terms that the opposite logic would prevail:  any PLN leader who 
did not commit fully to the pro-CAFTA fight would “burn,” that is, 
would be punished by the ruling party and the government.465 
Casas also urged a well-financed, massive media campaign 
with several specific goals.  The first goal was to debunk the notion 
of a struggle between rich and poor by choosing “almost 
exclusively, workers and small entrepreneurs” as pro-CAFTA faces 
in media ads.466  Second, “[s]timulate fear.”467  Create “[f]ear of loss 
of jobs” if CAFTA were to lose.468  Create “[f]ear of attack to the 
democratic institutions” if the anti-CAFTA forces were to 
prevail.469  Spread the “[f]ear [of] foreign influence.”470  As he 
explained in greater detail, 
[w]e have to insist everywhere on the connection of the 
[anti-CAFTA forces] with Fidel, Chaves and Ortega, in very 
strident terms . . .  [which] might be uncomfortable to some 
people, but . . . it can have a considerable impact amongst 
the simplest people, which is where we have the most 
serious problems.471 
In his memo, Casas also hit upon the one single tactic that was 
ultimately most effective in raising the number of pro-CAFTA 
votes:  get employers of major manufacturing and service firms to 
 
463 Id. 
464 Id. at 3. 
465 See id. (“The reasoning has to be exactly the opposite: the one who doesn’t 
entirely cooperate, ‘burns.’”). 
466 Id. 
467 Id. 
468 Id. at 4. 
469 Id. at 4. 
470 Id. 
471 Id. 
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persuade their employees vote for the treaty.472  Casas knew that 
the government had to be careful.  The Supreme Electoral Tribunal 
had issued strict guidelines prohibiting the use of government 
resources to proselytize referendum voters.473  After noting the 
existence of one million workers, Casas urged that the pro-CAFTA 
campaign persuade business leaders and managers to “invite” 
government officials to visit their shops and factories to talk about 
the government’s vision for the country’s future, as an 
underhanded way to distribute pro-CAFTA propaganda.474  
Following such visits, business managers also could make their 
own efforts to persuade workers to vote for CAFTA.  Finally, Casas 
also urged the organization of a massive pro-CAFTA 
demonstration, though he noted that this would not be easy due to 
the difficulty of getting people sufficiently motivated to attend.475 
The publication of Casas’s Machiavellian memo unleashed a 
storm of public criticism against the government.476  The memo, 
after all, had been addressed to the President and the Minister of 
the Presidency, neither one of whom apparently had expressed any 
objections to its counsels.  As public pressure mounted, the 
government repudiated the memo, clarifying that it reflected solely 
the personal views of Vice President Casas.477  Ultimately, Casas 
resigned from office.478 
 
472 See id. at 5–6 (proposing the organization of “a systemic visit program to 
companies by high government officials,” geared towards gaining the votes of 
over a million workers). 
473 See Scandal Topples Costa Rican Vice President, Clouds Outlook As Cafta 
Referendum Nears, NOTICEN: CENT. AM. & CARIBBEAN AFF., Sept. 27, 2007 
[hereinafter Scandal], available at Factiva, Doc. No. NTCN000020070929e39r00001 
(noting the PAC’s charges to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal that the Casas memo 
violated electoral code provisions). 
474 See Casas Memo, supra note 456, at 5–6 (stating that “[n]o campaigning 
effort is potentially as effective as” appealing to the workers). 
475 See id. at 6 (“It is recommendable to organize a public act or festival that is 
multitudinous (it could be a march, but there we almost always have problems).  
But people have to feel supported and motivated.”). 
476 See Scandal, supra note 473 (mentioning the launch of a criminal 
investigation, calls for governmental resignations, and increased energy of anti-
CAFTA forces in the wake of the leaked memo). 
477 See id. (discussing the subsequent resignation of Casas, and the 
government’s urging to “turn the page and leave [the] memorandum”); see also 
Bindman, supra note 430 (“While such wrong-doings by Casas were in full public 
 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
03 COLL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2011  8:23 PM 
554 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 33:2 
The scandal over the Casas memo seemed to shift the political 
and moral momentum in favor of the anti-CAFTA forces, but not 
for long.  In Washington, senior Bush administration officials, 
alarmed at the prospects that CAFTA might lose, decided to aid 
the Arias government and the pro-CAFTA forces.  For the previous 
two years, one of the chief arguments of the pro-CAFTA party had 
been that, if Costa Rica refused to accede to the treaty, it would 
lose the trade preferences it received from the United States 
through the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).479  Under CBI, Costa 
Rica has enjoyed exceptionally open access to U.S. markets for 
many of its goods, especially agricultural products and light 
manufactures, since the program’s inception in 1984.480  After the 
November 2006 U.S. congressional elections, in which the 
Democrats took control of the House and Senate, a number of 
Costa Rican opponents of CAFTA canvassed several leading 
Democratic members of Congress and received the reassuring 
answer that if CAFTA was not ratified, Congress still would renew 
 
view, the public turned against CAFTA . . . .  Arias denied any personal 
knowledge or involvement in the whole affair . . . .“). 
478 See supra text accompanying note 472. 
479 See Peter Baker, Free-Trade Fight Reflects Broader Battle, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 
2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/11 
/AR2007101102272.html (discussing the Bush administration’s stance that if 
CAFTA was rejected, there would be no guarantee that CBI trade preferences for 
textiles and apparel, which were set to expire in September 2008, would be 
renewed); see also McKinley, Jr., supra note 147.  
A high-ranking Costa Rican official, speaking on the condition of 
anonymity for fear of offending his American counterparts, said the 
implicit threat was that temporary trade preferences enjoyed under old 
agreements would not be renewed.  Central American countries had to 
get on board with the new pact or risk watching their exports dwindle. 
United States trade officials say they argued that a permanent agreement 
was a better deal for smaller countries than the two-decade-old, one-way 
trade preferences that could disappear at the whim of Congress.  But 
they did not dispute that reluctance to extend the preferences past 2008 
might have spurred countries to join the new pact.  “If a country chooses 
not to ratify Cafta and open its markets to U.S. goods and services, it 
should not automatically assume that Congress would continue to 
provide it preferential one-way access into the U.S. market,” said Neena 
Moorjani, a spokeswoman for the United States trade representative, Rob 
Portman. 
Id. 
480 See Libby Colen Roper, Trade Provisions of CBI Starting to Pay Benefits, 7 
BUS. AM. 30, 30–31 (Aug. 20, 1984) (describing early benefits from CBI). 
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Costa Rica’s CBI trade preferences when they came up for renewal 
in 2008.481  After all, so went the reasoning, it would be 
counterproductive for the United States, especially at a time of 
concern over the possible penetration of Central America by Hugo 
Chavez’s influence and oil money, to punish Costa Rica, a paragon 
of democratic stability and friendly ally of the United States, by 
taking away its CBI preferences.482 
But with CAFTA on the verge of losing at the polls, the Bush 
administration decided to play hardball.  On October 1, the day 
after 100,000 anti-CAFTA demonstrators paralyzed the streets of 
San Jose, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative John Veroneau 
pointedly warned that Congress might not renew Costa Rica’s CBI 
preferences if it turned down CAFTA.483  Two days later, 
Veroneau’s boss, U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab, 
repeated the warning in a highly publicized interview to Costa 
Rica’s leading newspaper, La Nación.484  Her barely veiled threat 
angered CAFTA opponents, who in turn sought help from 
 
481 Bindman, supra at note 430. 
[T]he Bush administration threatened that Costa Rica would lose its 
existing trade privileges if the referendum wasn’t signed and ratified. 
U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica, Mark Langdale, often repeated this 
threat during the final hours leading up to the referendum.  Bush’s legal 
authority to end Costa Rica’s preferred status under the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative, however, has been contested by some outraged members of 
the U.S. Congress, who argue that it was a law that grants Costa Rica 
those privileges, not Bush’s noblesse oblige. 
Id. 
482 See generally Editorial, The Stakes in CAFTA, WASH. POST, July 26, 2005, at 
A18 (proposing that failure to pass CAFTA would help anti-American 
demagogues, starting with Chavez). 
483 Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Statement 
from Ambassador John Veroneau, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative (Oct. 1, 
2007), available at http://ustraderep.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases 
/2007/September/Statement_from_Ambassador_John_Veroneau,_Deputy_US_T
rade_Representative_printer.html (stating Veroneau’s inability to predict the 
United States’ reaction if Costa Rica were to reject CAFTA). 
484 Armando González R., EE. UU. Descarta Renegociar Tratado de Libre 
Comercio [The United States Rules Out a Renegotiation of Free Trade Agreement], LA 
NACIÓN, Oct. 5, 2007, http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2007/octubre 
/05/pais1265471.html (explaining the position of the United States’ government 
toward an eventual renegotiation of the terms of CAFTA with Costa Rica). 
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Democrats on Capitol Hill.485  In a strongly worded letter, House 
Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid 
asked U.S. Ambassador Mark Langdale not to interfere with Costa 
Rica’s democratic processes by threatening Costa Rica.486  Vermont 
Senator Bernard Sanders, a self-styled socialist, traveled to the 
country to show his solidarity with the anti-CAFTA movement, 
and urged Costa Ricans to resist U.S. intimidation.487  In response, 
White House spokeswoman Dana Perino issued a statement 
warning Costa Ricans that if they rejected CAFTA, they should not 
expect the United States to renegotiate the treaty as some of its 
opponents hoped.488  Essentially, CAFTA was a take-it-or-leave-it 
proposition.  The White House statement, coming as it did on the 
eve of the referendum, achieved its intended effect, as momentum 
shifted back in favor of those who argued that, in spite of CAFTA’s 
flaws, Costa Rica could not afford the risk of being permanently 
left out of a free trade treaty with its largest commercial partner. 
In spite of the intense political passions surrounding it, the 
October 7 referendum was peaceful and orderly.489  In keeping 
with Costa Rica’s civic traditions, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal 
drafted several thousand school children to serve as guides and 
helpers at the polling stations, and 5,600 inmates from the 
country’s sixteen prisons had the opportunity to cast their vote.490  
 
485 See Baker, supra note 479 (outlining the actions and response of Democrats 
in the final days before the CAFTA vote in Costa Rica). 
486 See id. (discussing the letter sent by Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid, and the 
efforts of the Bush administration in response). 
487 See id. (“My job going down there . . . was to tell the people they will not 
be punished by voting against CAFTA . . . .  They should vote however they 
want.”). 
488 See Manuel Roig-Franzia, Costa Ricans Vote on Trade Pact, WASH. POST, Oct. 
8, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/07 
/AR2007100701460.html (describing the active roles of top U.S. officials in Costa 
Rica’s CAFTA debate, and the threat by Dana Perino to “not renegotiate the trade 
pact if CAFTA is voted down”). 
489 See OAS Affirms Transparency of CAFTA Referendum, ACAN-EFE (Oct. 9, 
2007), available at http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2011 
/05/acan_oascaftareftrasp_10092007.pdf (noting the absence of problems or 
irregularities with Costa Rica’s CAFTA referendum).  
490 See Randall Corella V., Votos Llegaron Tarde en Las Cárceles [Ballots were 
made Available Late in Jails], LA NACIÓN, Oct. 8, 2007, 
http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2007/octubre/08/pais1264828.html (describing 
how the elections developed in Costa Rican jails). 
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Some 45,000 citizens, evenly representing the two opposing 
factions, served as “fiscales,” or overseers at the poll stations to 
guard against irregularities, alongside 10,000 poll workers formally 
hired by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal.491  Voter turnout was 
high, with about 60% of registered voters participating.492  Two 
weeks later, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal concluded a manual 
recount of the votes, confirming 51.6% of votes in favor of CAFTA 
and 48.4% against it.493 
Shortly after the referendum, the leading opposition party, the 
PAC, announced that it was pulling out of the broad national anti-
CAFTA coalition, the “Movimiento del NO al TLC.”494  The PAC 
agreed not to hinder the government as it guided the treaty and 
thirteen laws of implementation (the so-called “implementation 
agenda”) through the Legislative Assembly.495  This support was 
contingent on the government’s following up on its earlier pledges 
to approve eight different “compensatory measures” that would 
aid farmers and small businessmen likely to be hurt by CAFTA 
and increase education spending to 8% of GDP.496  The government 
and its legislative allies were pleased to agree.497 
 
491 See Mayoría de Ticos Diría “No” al TLC con EU [Most Costa Ricans would say 
no to the Free Trade Agreement with the United States], EL NUEVO DIARIO, Oct. 7, 2007, 
http://impreso.elnuevodiario.com.ni/2007/10/07/internacionales/60856 
(describing the results of polls prior to the referendum which showed the rejection 
of the Free Trade Agreement by most Costa Ricans). 
492 Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, Resultados del Escrutinio Referéndum 
2007 a Nivel Nacional, http://www.tse.go.cr/ref/ref_def/pais.htm (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2008). 
493 Id. 
494 Carlos A. Villalobos & Irene Vizcaíno, PAC se Aparta de Movimiento del NO 
[Citizen’s Action Party (PAC) Leaves NO Movement], LA NACIÓN, Oct. 10, 2007, 
http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2007/octubre/10/pais1272035.html (reporting 
the resignation of Citizen’s Action Party to the coalition against CAFTA’s 
approval after the results of the referendum). 
495 Esteban Oviedo & Hassel Fallas, Gobierno y PAC acuerdan inicio de 
negociaciones sobre el TLC [Government and Citizen’s Coalition Party agree initiating 
negotiations regarding the Free Trade Agreement], LA NACIÓN, Oct. 9, 2007, 
http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2007/octubre/09/pais1270041.html (reporting 
the terms of the negotiations between Citizen´s Coalition Party and the 
Government to approve the legal amendments required for the implementation of 
CAFTA). 
496 Id. 
497 Esteban Oviedo, Solís Propone a Arias 18 Proyectos de ‘Mitigación’ [Solís 
Proposes 18 “Mitigation” Projects to Arias], LA NACIÓN, Oct. 11, 2007, 
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9. CAFTA AND THE FUTURE OF COSTA RICA 
Costa Rica’s closely fought battle over CAFTA sharply divided 
a society that takes pride in its consensus approach to political and 
social issues.  In addition to involving every major social and 
economic group, the struggle affected every major institution in 
the country, including all three branches of government.  Since the 
1948 Revolution, no issue has been more divisive or engendered 
more public passion than CAFTA. 
Once Oscar Arias decided to run for president and declared 
himself in favor of CAFTA, the treaty’s foes knew they would have 
an uphill battle on their hands.  After Arias’s victory, following an 
extremely tight race he almost lost, CAFTA’s opponents began 
their effort to slow down the treaty through every conceivable 
political and judicial avenue available to them.  The first to come to 
their aid was the office of the Defender of the People of the Nation.  
Because its formal political function is to monitor and strengthen 
the country’s observance of its human rights obligations, including 
the impact of proposed legislation and treaties, the Defender 
carries a great deal of credibility.  Its detailed report on CAFTA, 
and the thoughtful, critical questions it raised about the treaty’s 
potential effects on human rights proved to be a powerful 
encouragement to treaty opponents.  A few months after the report 
was published, emboldened by Arias’s inability to get the 
Legislative Assembly to approve CAFTA, the treaty’s opponents 
made recourse to another constitutional mechanism that could 
slow the treaty or perhaps even kill it:  the popular referendum.  
By now, the pro-CAFTA forces within the government and civil 
society knew the treaty was in trouble, and they too began to make 
full use of Costa Rica’s sophisticated political and judicial 
instruments to save CAFTA. 
Treaty supporters first pushed through the Legislative 
Assembly a measure to allow it to debate and vote on the treaty in 
an expedited fashion.  They then went to the Supreme Electoral 
Tribunal to argue successfully the measure’s constitutionality 
when its opponents challenged it.  But the Supreme Electoral 
Tribunal also declared constitutional the proposal by CAFTA’s foes 
 
http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2007/octubre/11/pais1273799.html (reporting on 
the terms proposed by the Citizen’s Coalition Party leader to the government to 
mitigate the effects of CAFTA in Costa Rica). 
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to hold a popular referendum.  In response, treaty advocates 
persuaded Arias to call a referendum by presidential decree, which 
he did, thereby insuring that the referendum would be held soon.  
CAFTA’s opponents wanted the referendum to be held through 
the popular initiative instead of by presidential decree, so that they 
would have nine months during which to mobilize their 
supporters; with some luck, they also might push the date close 
enough to March 1 so as to cause Costa Rica to miss the treaty’s 
deadline for accession.  Treaty supporters were cheered when the 
Supreme Electoral Tribunal ruled, after a series of contentious 
arguments before it, that the referendum should be held through 
the most expeditious method possible, that is, through the 
presidential decree. 
At this point, and much to the government’s annoyance, the 
Defender of the People of the Nation stepped into the debate again 
by challenging the constitutionality of the treaty, and asking the 
Constitutional Chamber to rule on the issue before the referendum 
took place.  A number of anti-CAFTA legislators followed the 
Defender’s lead and brought their own petition to the Chamber for 
constitutional review.  Several weeks later, the court ruled that 
none of the numerous challenged provisions of CAFTA violated 
the Constitution.  The court’s sweeping ruling disappointed, but 
did not slow down, CAFTA’s persistent foes. 
The vigorous three-month long referendum campaign that 
followed illustrated all of the strengths and weaknesses of a 
typical, mature democratic society.  The absence of violence on the 
part of CAFTA’s passionate opponents was exemplary, as was the 
generally high level of civic debate and energy shown by both 
sides in raising money, organizing their campaigns, and reaching 
out to the broad public.  Far less exemplary was the effort by 
leading political figures, such as Kevin Casas, to engage in dirty 
tricks, including by calling for the use of appropriated funds to 
pressure mayors into securing a pro-CAFTA outcome in their 
districts.  The practices outlined in Casas’s memo, though 
unfortunately common in most democratic societies, left a bitter 
taste in the heated campaign.  Equally deplorable were the United 
States’s last-minute threats, which succeeded in shifting the tide in 
favor of the pro-CAFTA faction.  Long-time students of U.S. 
relations with Latin America were left wondering whether, in spite 
of Washington’s rhetoric to the contrary, much had changed since 
the old days of American imperialism and hegemonic 
manipulation in the region. 
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The referendum itself was a model of orderliness and 
democratic civility, as was its aftermath, with the major opposition 
party declaring that, in spite of its continuing misgivings about 
CAFTA, it would respect the referendum’s results and would not 
obstruct the treaty’s implementing legislation.  For its part, the 
Arias government wisely struck a conciliatory tone and restated its 
commitment to push through a package of “compensatory 
measures” aimed at smoothing the Costa Rican economy’s 
transition to CAFTA and increasing the country’s competitiveness 
by, among other things, boosting spending on education.  Arias 
also called on all Costa Ricans to put aside the intense polarization 
triggered by the CAFTA debate and work together for the 
country’s future. 
It is difficult to predict how CAFTA will change Costa Rica 
over the next decade and to what extent the worst fears of its 
opponents or the most ambitious expectations of its advocates will 
materialize.  But what seems to be beyond question is that the 
debate itself may have had a profound, and mostly positive, 
impact on the country’s commitment to human rights, 
constitutionalism, and democratic solidarity by validating the 
vigor, resiliency, and popular support for the institutions that 
safeguard such values.  While they ultimately lost the political 
battle, CAFTA’s opponents made skillful and persistent use of 
human rights and constitutional procedure to slow down the treaty 
and force the government to make significant concessions in the 
form of greater commitments to social spending that will keep the 
free trade treaty from mortally wounding the social democratic 
model.  Moreover, the battle over CAFTA created a large popular 
movement, elements of which will likely remain energized and 
active in the Costa Rican political system for a long time, 
contributing to a more vigorous democratic culture.  In light of the 
damage done to Costa Rica by the economic crisis of the 1980s and 
the political corruption scandals of the subsequent decade, the 
country has been in sore need of political renewal.  Some of the 
forces mobilized by the CAFTA debate may play a key role in 
promoting such renewal, even as CAFTA itself, if accompanied by 
a complementary social and educational agenda, may wind up 
invigorating the country’s economy. 
A key fear of CAFTA’s enemies was that the treaty would 
speed up the harmful impact of globalization on Costa Rica.  The 
forces mobilized by the CAFTA debate will ensure that, regardless 
of CAFTA’s actual impact, future Costa Rican governments will 
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face significant political pressures to maintain a serious 
commitment to the social democratic values enshrined in the 1949 
Constitution.  The battle over CAFTA forced the current 
government to make significant concessions along these lines, and 
future governments will have to do likewise.  Thus, the long, 
intense debate over the country’s accession to the treaty served to 
temper whatever future disadvantages the treaty may bring with 
it.  Costa Rica will not avoid all the harms of globalization, but its 
commitment to human rights and constitutional procedure may 
enable it to achieve a reasonable synthesis:  a more competitive 
economy, well integrated into the world trading system, encased 
within a sturdy institutional framework of human rights, the rule 
of law, and the values of its cherished, if challenged, social 
democratic model. 
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